ADR-0009 — Phase B: chainless beta
Status: Accepted ✅ (2026-09-24). On acceptance it is recorded in DECISIONS as D-BC-6, D-GTM-2 and D-GOV-5.
Context
Problem
Tamga's canonical roadmap tied the pilot to the ledger: the PM-GTM-0001 §2 preconditions Ö1 "contracts compile and tests pass" and Ö2 "testnet up, contracts deployed" had to be met before real graduate data could be processed (GT1). ARCH-0001 §3 defines phase 0 as "4 foundation validators". The contracts had never been compiled (no Foundry; DECISIONS §10.5). This locked the university pilot — and with it the first institution's participation — behind the ledger infrastructure.
Finding: the phase 0 ledger produces no trust (F1)
All four validators in phase 0 belong to the Tamga foundation. Four QBFT nodes run by one operator do not provide the independence that Byzantine fault tolerance assumes: if all four are in the same hands, the assumption "Tamga is not lying" is needed in the same way on the ledger as in a signed list. The difference is only operational (outage resilience) and preparation for future multi-party operation; in terms of trust a single-operator ledger = a hash-chained log signed by a single operator. Therefore requiring the ledger in phase 0 raises the pilot's cost without raising its assurance.
A ledger produces value when the number of signers grows beyond one. DECISIONS D-GOV-2 defines the hand-over thresholds (≥3 states, ≥4 states + 12 months), but a starting threshold had never been defined.
What Europe does
In the EUDI WalletThe European Digital Identity Wallet defined by eIDAS 2.0; Tamga uses the same formats and protocols. ecosystem the trust anchorThe root key or certificate a verifier trusts first; everything else is checked back to it. is not a ledger but the Trusted List signed by each member state (ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute)The European standards body that writes the technical standards for trust lists, signatures and trust services. TS 119 612) + the Commission's LOTL (List of Trusted Lists)The signed list that points to the countries' trust lists, their signers and their recognition status.; the digest is announced in the Official Journal. EBSI keeps the same records on a ledger. Tamga's canonical design uses the EBSI model with EUDI/ETSI data semantics (SPEC-ID-0002 §8.1). Stepping down to EUDI's own model (a signed list) for the beta is not a deviation from the architecture but the single-signer special case of the same semantics. Analysis: the operator's internal record.
Direction from project management (2026-09-23/24)
A pilot is started without waiting for the ledger; the architecture decisions stay the same. The beta is set up as if the states and the Organization of Turkic States had already joined; this set-up is later carried over to the ledger.
Decision
Decision 1 — Phase B is added
The phase order becomes phase B → phase 0 → phase 1 → phase 2. Phase B = chainless beta: university pilot, verifiersThe party that checks a presented credential: signature, issuer in the trust list, status and policy. Also called relying party., Trust Framework, measured results. The application code base is this repository (packages/ + apps/); the tamga-network documents are authoritative.
Decision 2 — The beta trust anchor: signed, versioned, hash-chained lists + an anchor log
Under trust.tamga.network:
| File | Ledger counterpart | Rule |
|---|---|---|
lotl.jws | Governance member list + SchemaRegistry (NETWORK) + wallet provider anchor | monotonic version, previous_version_hash, next_update ≤ 90 days, re-signed even without changes |
tl-<cc>.jws | RootCARegistry + IssuerRegistry (+ SchemaAuth) + RelyingPartyRegistry + CrossRecognition | same; a national namespace is signed only with that state's key (beta: Tamga on its behalf) — the beta reading of N1 |
anchors.jsonl | StatusListRegistry.publishList + schema contentHash anchors | append-only; hourly signature (heartbeat included); lines are never deleted; previous_hash |
keys/ + a permanent web page | Official Journal announcement | fingerprints of the LOTL signing certificates; ≥2 rolling certificates (ETSI 119 612 Annex A.2); rotation ≥30 days ahead, the new key signed with the old one |
Canonical field names and examples: the operator's internal record (formalised on acceptance as SPEC-TRUST-0001 — DB-11).
Decision 3 — Anchor substitution: the beta reading of "recorded on the ledger"
The meaning of the following invariants is kept; their carrier changes:
| Invariant | Canonical wording | Phase B reading |
|---|---|---|
| SPEC-CRED-0003/S1 | No revocation bits on the ledger; only an anchor | No revocation bits in the list/log; only an anchor |
| SPEC-CRED-0003/S4 | Recorded on the ledger after being written to the CDN | … recorded in the anchor log after (same order) |
| SPEC-SCHEMA-0001/D8 | Ledger record after CDN publication | Anchor log record after CDN publication |
SPEC-BC-0001/DP1 | No contract stores personal data… | No list/log/log file stores personal data… |
SPEC-BC-0001/N1 | No writes outside the namespace owner | A national list is signed only by that namespace's signing key |
SPEC-BC-0001/GV2 | NETWORK schemas only via Governance | NETWORK schemas only in lotl.jws, with the operator's signature (suspended: single member) |
| ARCH-0003/CMP1 | The verifier does not query the ledger directly; it reads from the indexer | The verifier does not interpret list files directly; it reads from the TrustSource cache |
| ARCH-0003/CMP2 | Unknown implementation version → stop | Unknown list_format_version → stop |
| ARCH-0003/CMP4 | Stale indexer → INDETERMINATE | List past next_update or unreachable → INDETERMINATE |
These readings are recorded in the specifications concerned; the invariant texts do not change. The ADR-0007 and ADR-0008 principle "content off-chain, anchor on-chain" is read as "content off-chain, anchor in the canonical record (the ledger or the phase B list)".
Known weakening (honest record): an anchor on a ledger makes it impossible, by consensus, for an issuerThe institution that signs and issues credentials: a university, a professional body, a public institution or a company. to double-speak (two different lists to two verifiers). In phase B the anchor rests on the operator's signature; if operator and issuer act together, double-speaking is possible; the public log, the quarterly transparency report (G8) and independent audit deter it but do not make it impossible. This enters the phase 0 limitations statement as item 6 (decision 6).
Decision 4 — Ledger starting threshold
The Besu/QBFT ledger (ADR-0001, unchanged) is set up only when the following condition is met:
At least two independent validator operators (Tamga + ≥1 institution legally and operationally independent of Tamga: a second university, a chamber of commerce/industry or a state institution) have agreed in writing to run a validator.
This line is added to the DECISIONS D-GOV-2 threshold table as the "start" row. Setting up a ledger before the condition is met would mean presenting a single-operator ledger as "multi-party" and is contrary to the spirit of PM-GOV-0001 G6 (a tripwire for every soft power).
Decision 5 — Organization-of-Turkic-States-first principle
No identifier, role name or data structure of phase B assumes "Tamga is the only operator". Concrete rules:
lotl+ a national list slot for every member state of the Organization of Turkic States (TRACTIVE; AZ, KZ, KG, UZRESERVED; observers HU, TM with a separatemembershipfield).- In every national list, the full ARF role set as slots: Registrar, TLSO, PID Provider (empty), Access CA, National Root CA, Wallet Provider; each slot with
status+operated_by. - In every list,
operator: { name: "Tamga Network", status: "provisional", on_behalf_of: "<cc> national authority (to be designated)" }. - Root and registry names belong to the state: "TR National Root CA (provisional operator: Tamga)";
ca_id,issuer_idandvctdo not change on hand-over; only theoperatorfield changes. - The Tamga Trust Framework is written assuming membership of the Organization of Turkic States: membership, appointing a Registrar, root hand-over, disputes, exit; Tamga's current role is defined in the document as "founding proxy"; the 2/3 rule (ADR-0002) is written in the document, not in code.
- Every list has a cross-recognition field (beta: TR → TR).
Decision 6 — Pilot preconditions and the limitations statement are redefined
PM-GTM-0001: Ö1' list commitment tests pass, signed and hash-chained; Ö2' trust.tamga.network + schema.tamga.network live, the root fingerprint page published; Ö5' limitations statement v2 (8 items: item 5 "no blockchain, records are signed and public", item 6 "the anchor rests on a single operator's signature", item 7 "revocation ≤ 90 min"); Ö7' acceptance of this ADR; Ö8' the issuer credential key under the university's control (G1 unchanged). GT1–GT7 unchanged. Criteria B10 (revocation effective ≤ 90 min) and B11 (T0 INDETERMINATE rate ≤ 0.5%) are added.
Decision 7 — Migration = replay + equivalence test
Migrating from phase B to phase 0 means replaying the list version archive as contract calls (the operator's internal record); the since times in the status history are written to the revokedAt/validFrom fields so that isCredentialAcceptable(issuerId, iat) gives the same answer for documents of the beta period (D-BC-3). Acceptance criterion: for every (issuer_id, schema_id, iat, list_id, version) query recorded during the pilot, TrustSource(list) and TrustSource(chain) must give the same C1/C2/C3/D5 answer; any ACCEPTED/REJECTED difference = migration not complete. CredentialsA digital document signed by an issuer and held in the person's wallet; the person shows only the fields that are asked for. already issued are not re-issued; the wallet and the issuer service do not change.
Rationale
- Trust equivalence (F1). A single-operator ledger and a list signed by a single operator rest on the same trust assumption; the latter is cheap, standard (ETSI 119 612) and EUDI's own model.
- The architecture is kept. The read interface (
TrustSource= theSPEC-BC-0001§11.2 read set), the A–E validation pipeline, the SD-JWT VC (Selective Disclosure JWT Verifiable Credential)The JSON-based credential format with selective disclosure, used for online presentation in the EUDI Wallet and in Tamga. profile, the status listA compressed, signed list in which each credential has one position that tells whether it is valid, suspended or revoked., the schema registry, the wallet and the protocols are identical in both phases. The beta is not a "hack" but the single-signer special case of the canonical architecture. - Reversibility. List → ledger migrates by replay; ledger → list (in an ARCH-0004 SEV1) can fall back through the indexer projection. Both directions use the same format.
- Honesty. The phase 0 limitations statement already said "Tamga is both operator and regulator"; phase B writes this even more clearly and defines when a ledger produces value.
- Organization-of-Turkic-States-first reduces hand-over cost to zero and proves the narrative of "infrastructure that works with states" in the data structure (reserved slots, provisional operator).
Alternatives considered
A — Wait for the ledger (the previous plan) — rejected
The pilot stays dependent on Foundry set-up + compilation + testnet + audit (months). No gain in assurance (F1). The institution pilot waits months for the ledger set-up.
B — Pilot on a single-node / four-node "development ledger" — rejected
Gives the appearance of a ledger, not trust; it also brings the cost of operating a ledger (nodes, RPC security O1, indexer) into the beta. Marketing a "blockchain pilot" would be misleading (D-GTM-1/5: "verifiable record infrastructure", not "blockchain").
C — Pilot with a web2 demo (tamga-demo style) — rejected
A demo without trust lists, X.509, SD-JWT VC and a status list is not "the same architecture"; everything would be rewritten when moving to the ledger; the cryptographic claims could not be shown. tamga-demo is a screen/narrative reference only (a BIP39 seed wallet violates WL1).
D — A multi-party ledger from day 1 (with a second institution) — deferred
The right goal, but a second independent operator does not exist today; the way to find one is to show the pilot. Decision 4 defines exactly this threshold.
Consequences
Binding
- DECISIONS: D-BC-6 (phase B + ledger starting threshold), D-GTM-2 (Ö'/statement v2), D-GOV-5 (Organization-of-Turkic-States-first); a starting row in the D-GOV-2 table. In the changed-decisions table: PM-GTM Ö1/Ö2 → Ö1'/Ö2'.
ARCH-0001§3: a phase B row; phase 0 defined as "≥2 independent validator operators".- PM-GTM-0001 (decision 6).
- SPEC-CRED-0003, SPEC-SCHEMA-0001,
SPEC-BC-0001, ARCH-0003: the decision 3 readings. - SPEC-ID-0002 §8.1: projection source "canonical record (the ledger or the phase B list)".
- New document SPEC-TRUST-0001 (list format); PM-TRUST-0002 / Tamga Trust Framework (World Bank 5 layers).
- The code base of this repository depends on this ADR; no business logic interpreting lists may be written outside
TrustSource(BT4).
Decisions not changed
D-BC-0 (Besu/QBFT), D-GOV-0, D-ID-1, D-CRED-1, D-ASSUR-1, D-SCHEMA-1/2/3 (ADR-0010 treats separately), D-REV-1/2/3, D-TRUST-0, D-AUTH-5, D-STR-1..4, D-GTM-1. This ADR defines only when the ledger is set up and whose signature the anchor is until then.
Accepted trade-offs
- Protection against double-speaking weakens (decision 3, statement item 6).
- The Tamga operator component (
trust-publisher) is a single point of failure: verification continues from cache until the list expires, then INDETERMINATE; a runbook + two-person access are mandatory. - GV3/GV4 (voting rules) are suspended in phase B; governance lives in the document, not in code.
Relations
Adds: ARCH-0001 phase B · PM-GTM-0001 · D-GOV-2 starting threshold Interprets: ADR-0007, ADR-0008, SPEC-CRED-0003, SPEC-SCHEMA-0001, SPEC-BC-0001, ARCH-0003Builds on: ADR-0001 (unchanged), ADR-0002 (sovereignty, cross-recognition), PM-ASSUR-0001 (stateless bootstrap) Gives rise to: SPEC-TRUST-0001, Tamga Trust Framework, this repository's code base Sibling: ADR-0010 (vct URN + category — the Organization-of-Turkic-States-first principle applied to type identity) Analysis source: the operator's internal record.
Status
Accepted ✅ — 2026-09-24. Recorded in DECISIONS as D-BC-6, D-GTM-2 and D-GOV-5; the follow-up specification updates are tracked in the DECISIONS §10 list of open commitments.
Note (2026-11-04): the wording about talks in the context and alternative A was replaced by the technical rationale (the pilot stays tied to the ledger set-up for months); the decision content is unchanged (project management).