Suspended — research direction (2026-10-30, ADR-0072). The five hooks of this ADR are no longer binding; the network issues no token and handles no payment or value transfer. The text is kept as research work; the conditions for reopening are in ADR-0072 K3.
ADR-0003 — Value layer hooks
Status: Accepted (2026-08-06) — suspended 2026-10-30 (ADR-0072) Date: 2026-08-06 Decided by: Tamga Network project management Source: docs/tamga-network-varlik-katmani-strateji.md §4 + docs/tamga-network-cuzdan-odeme-agent.md §2, §4 (strategic input drafts). Strategy rationale → PM-AUTH-0001.
Context
The decision in PM-AUTH-0001: Tamga is an authorisation layer, not a settlement layer, and no payment feature is built in the short term. Being able to open the value/payment/agent door later, however, depends on a few architecture decisions taken today. What they have in common: almost free today, practically impossible later (the whole user base would have to migrate to new accounts). They therefore have to be fixed before any contracts/ Solidity is written.
This ADR builds on ADR-0001 (Besu/EVM) and ADR-0002 (sovereignty-first governance); the value layer is independent of the X.509 vs DID decision (DECISIONS D-ID-1) (layer A = an EVM address exists in either case).
Decision
Decision 1 — Chain accounts are smart contract wallets from the start (not EOAs)
A citizen's or institution's chain account must be a contract account (account abstraction, ERC-4337 style), not a plain key-to-address mapping (EOA) — even if today it only performs identity operations.
This single decision makes the following possible later: recovery, spending limits, agent delegation, gas sponsorship, multi-signature, policy rules. Gas sponsorship is also mandatory for a public service — citizens must not have to acquire a "gas token". Starting with EOAs, none of this can be added later.
Cost today: deploying one contract. ~zero.
Decision 2 — Strictly separate key domains + separate recovery
Three derivation paths, three lifecycles:
Identity key → credential presentation, pseudonym derivation. Not recoverable*. Not delegable.
Asset key → chain transactions, value transfer. Recoverable. Delegable within limits.
Agent key → transactions within a delegation. Time-limited. Revocable instantly.Recovery separation (binding): the recovery mechanism applies only to the asset key/account. The identity key and credentialsA digital document signed by an issuer and held in the person's wallet; the person shows only the fields that are asked for. are never part of it — otherwise the "recoverers" could take over the identity. (*Identities/pseudonymsA stable account identifier the wallet derives separately for each website; two sites cannot link the same person. are re-derived deterministically from the master seed; credentials are requested again from the issuerThe institution that signs and issues credentials: a university, a professional body, a public institution or a company. — this is re-derivation or re-issuance, not "recovery".)
Recoverer composition (decided 2026-08-06): asset wallet recoverers are user-chosen (family/trusted persons + optionally an institution), with an M-of-N threshold and a time lock. A mandatory state institution is NOT a recoverer — that would bring exactly the censorship/leverage paradox avoided in PM-AUTH-0001 back in through money. Asset recovery is a mechanism separate from and independent of identity escrow (SPEC-BC-0002 guardians). Concrete M-of-N, time-lock duration and abuse scenarios → PM-ID-0003.
Cost today: three derivation paths in the wallet. ~one day of work.
Decision 3 — The delegation registry is scope-generic
The agent delegation contract is written today, but scopes stay outside payments (logistics:verify, health:read). The scope field is designed to be extensible rather than a fixed string; adding a pay:* scope later becomes a one-line change. Writing a payment-specific delegation system later would invalidate every existing delegation.
Invariant principles of delegation (detailed in SPEC-AGENT-0001): an agent has no identity of its own, only derived authority; no indefinite delegation (validUntil mandatory); instant revocation (kill switch) without conditions; responsibility lies with the principal; every transaction is logged with its delegation reference; an agent cannot present identity credentials (transactional authority only).
Decision 4 — Credential gating as a generic primitive
The rule "this transaction requires that credential" should be a general contract library, not a payment-specific one:
modifier requiresCredential(bytes32 credentialType, bytes calldata proof) { ... }Today in document verification; tomorrow in a rule such as "only KYC'd accounts may make this transfer" — the same primitive works. It is aligned with the SPEC-BC-0001 StatusList/IssuerRegistry checks.
Narrowed (2026-09-10,
SPEC-AGENT-0001): this decision was narrowed. Since ADR-0008 moved the status list off-chain, the chain cannot see whether a credential is valid; therefore there is no on-chain credential gating in phase 0 andrequiresCredentialis not written as a chain primitive. Verification is done off-chain (SPEC-API-0001). The path to open it in the future (a signed statement by a registered verifierThe party that checks a presented credential: signature, issuer in the trust list, status and policy. Also called relying party. + freshness + nonceA random value used once; the verifier sends it and the wallet signs it, so an old presentation cannot be replayed.) is recorded as a design inSPEC-AGENT-0001§4. Decision 3 (delegation) is unaffected.
Decision 5 — Do not issue an own token, but do not forbid token standards
Governance and technical architecture state explicitly that Tamga has no currency of its own (this sets up the relationship with central banks correctly from the start). But ERC-20 deployment is not forbidden at chain level — a central bank or licensed bank may later want to issue tokenised deposits here; Tamga is then the host, not the issuer.
Constraint: the right to issue tokens is tied to an allow-list — only institutions in the FINANCE category of the Issuer Registry, authorised by the state concerned (ADR-0002 onlyOwnerState + SPEC-BC-0001 IssuerCategory). This prevents unauthorised token spam and gives regulators confidence.
Rationale
- Asymmetry of irreversibility: the five decisions cost ~zero today; taking them later requires user migration. The asymmetry clearly says "take them now".
- Consistency with the strategy: the hooks are not features; none of them opens a payment capability today. They do not increase the risk of losing focus (
PM-AUTH-0001). - Consistency with sovereignty: decision 2 (user-chosen recovery) and decision 5 (FINANCE allow-list) keep the censorship paradox away from money.
Consequences (binding for contracts/)
- The
contracts/wallet is designed as a contract account (decision 1); an EOA assumption is not accepted. - The wallet/SDK produces three derivation paths (decision 2); recovery only on the asset path.
- The delegation contract makes
scopeextensible (decision 3). requiresCredentiallives as a shared library inshared/orcontracts/lib(decision 4).- No native token; ERC-20 deployment is gated by the FINANCE-issuer allow-list (decision 5).
Relations
PM-AUTH-0001— the strategy rationale for this ADR.- ADR-0001 — Besu/EVM (layer A account model).
- ADR-0002 — sovereignty-first governance (FINANCE permission,
onlyOwnerState). SPEC-BC-0001— Issuer Registry / IssuerCategory / StatusList (data source for credential gating).SPEC-BC-0002— accountable disclosure (identity escrow, separate from asset recovery).- PM-ID-0003 (planned) — details of asset wallet recovery composition.
SPEC-AGENT-0001— agent delegation surface (decision 3) + narrowing of credential gating (decision 4).
The five hook decisions were fixed on 2026-08-06. The contracts/ implementation follows these constraints. Recovery composition and agent delegation details were referred to separate documents. 2026-09-10: decision 4 was narrowed by SPEC-AGENT-0001 (no on-chain credential gating in phase 0; see the note under decision 4).