ADR-0005 — Two-axis assurance model and stateless bootstrap
Status: Accepted Date: 2026-09-03 Decided by: Tamga Network project management Source: tamga-guven-cercevesi-v0.1.md (sections B, D) — working note; strategy rationale and the full model → PM-ASSUR-0001.
Context
PM-ID-0001 §6.2 said that assurance levels would exist and map to the eIDAS (electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services)The EU regulation on electronic identification and trust services; eIDAS 2.0 introduces the European Digital Identity Wallet. LoA (Level of Assurance)How much confidence can be placed in an identity or a credential; Tamga uses separate levels for proofing (T), issuer (I) and wallet (W)., but did not define them. PM-PH-0001 (§Future item 5) said "the infrastructure must also work without a state" but left open how. These two gaps prevented the network from working before states join (phase 0, ARCH-0001).
This decision closes the gaps and makes the measurement of trust implementable.
Decision
Decision 1 — Trust is measured on two axes (not one number)
- Axis A — HolderThe person who keeps a credential in their wallet and decides whom to show it to./Wallet Assurance: T0 (anonymous) → T1 (low) → T2 (substantial) → T3 (high).
- Axis B — Issuer Assurance: I1 (registered) → I2 (contracted) → I3 (accredited).
- VerifierThe party that checks a presented credential: signature, issuer in the trust list, status and policy. Also called relying party. decision = axis A × axis B (a product, not a sum). A high-assurance holder + a non-accredited issuerThe institution that signs and issues credentials: a university, a professional body, a public institution or a company. = worthless; an accredited issuer + a T0 holder = worthless.
- IssuerCategory ≠ Issuer Assurance: the
SPEC-BC-0001category states the sector, I1–I3 the degree of accreditation; they are orthogonal.
Decision 2 — Stateless bootstrap is adopted
Until states join the network, assurance is derived from existing Turkish institutions (derived assurance). No level requires a state agreement:
- T3 ← signing a challenge (nonceA random value used once; the verifier sends it and the wallet signs it, so an old presentation cannot be replayed.) with e-signature / qualified electronic signature / mobile signature (verified against the national electronic certificate root).
- T2 ← remote KYC / NFC passport / institution registration desk (university or chamber = registration authority).
- T1 ← bank micro-transfer / mobile line ownership.
- Issuer I1–I3 ← Tamga accredits temporarily in the Root TAO role.
When a state joins (phase 1) this does not disappear; the PID Provider (PID (Person Identification Data)The core identity data a state issues at the highest assurance level. Tamga does not take this role; its identity credential is not a PID.) becomes the default high-LoA source next to T3, adding a broader base and higher enrolment quality.
Decision 3 — Our own levels map 1:1 to the eIDAS LoA
T1≈Low, T2≈Substantial, T3≈High. Internally the option to treat enrolment, authenticator and verification dimensions separately (NIST 800-63 style) is kept; externally a single eIDAS LoA is presented → no loss of EUDI/EBSI interoperability ("compatible but independent", PM-PH-0001).
Decision 4 — Assurance decay, and no numbers shown to users
- A level is lowered over time or on events (device change → T1, inactivity, expiry of the source credentialA digital document signed by an issuer and held in the person's wallet; the person shows only the fields that are asked for., anomalies).
- End users are not shown numbers (they see a state); the numbers belong to the verifier's policy engine.
Rationale
- eIDAS/EBSI precedent: the two axes combine the eIDAS holder LoA with EBSI's issuer accreditation chain — a proven model.
- Working without states: "I have no state agreement → I cannot verify anyone" is wrong; with derived assurance up to T3 can be produced today. This is the single lever that makes the project viable before states join.
- Inflation risk: if level criteria are relaxed, the system becomes meaningless → the criteria are written into the formal Trust Framework and made procedurally hard to change (PM-GOV-0001).
Consequences
PM-ASSUR-0001is the full background record of this model (newassurance/domain).- The verifier policy engine applies the holder and issuer thresholds together → parameters of the ADR-0003
requiresCredentialprimitive. - An issuer assurance level field is added to the
SPEC-BC-0001Issuerstruct (holder assurance is not written to the ledger — personal data,PM-TRUST-0001). - SPEC-CRED-0001 holder bindingTying a credential to a key that only the holder's device has, so a copied credential cannot be presented. + WUA (Wallet Unit Attestation)An attestation by the wallet provider about a wallet unit and the security of its keys; in the current EU texts it is split into WIA and key attestation. are the technical precondition for holder assurance.
ARCH-0001phase 0 is clarified as the stateless bootstrap layer.
Relations
PM-ASSUR-0001— full model and rationale.PM-ID-0001— §6.2 becomes concrete here; PID Provider = phase 1 T3.PM-PH-0001— the counterpart of the "works without a state" principle.- SPEC-CRED-0001 /
SPEC-BC-0001— technical carrier and ledger representation. - ADR-0006 — credential format (the carrier of this decision).
- PM-GOV-0001 (planned) — level criteria text + TAO accreditation governance.
The two-axis model + stateless bootstrap + eIDAS mapping + decay + presentation principle were accepted on 2026-09-03.