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ADR-0005Architecture decisionAcceptedversion 1.0.02 October 2026

ADR-0005 — Two-axis assurance model and stateless bootstrap ​

Status: Accepted Date: 2026-09-03 Decided by: Tamga Network project management Source: tamga-guven-cercevesi-v0.1.md (sections B, D) — working note; strategy rationale and the full model → PM-ASSUR-0001.


Context ​

PM-ID-0001 §6.2 said that assurance levels would exist and map to the eIDAS (electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services)The EU regulation on electronic identification and trust services; eIDAS 2.0 introduces the European Digital Identity Wallet. LoA (Level of Assurance)How much confidence can be placed in an identity or a credential; Tamga uses separate levels for proofing (T), issuer (I) and wallet (W)., but did not define them. PM-PH-0001 (§Future item 5) said "the infrastructure must also work without a state" but left open how. These two gaps prevented the network from working before states join (phase 0, ARCH-0001).

This decision closes the gaps and makes the measurement of trust implementable.


Decision ​

Decision 1 — Trust is measured on two axes (not one number) ​

  • Axis A — HolderThe person who keeps a credential in their wallet and decides whom to show it to./Wallet Assurance: T0 (anonymous) → T1 (low) → T2 (substantial) → T3 (high).
  • Axis B — Issuer Assurance: I1 (registered) → I2 (contracted) → I3 (accredited).
  • VerifierThe party that checks a presented credential: signature, issuer in the trust list, status and policy. Also called relying party. decision = axis A × axis B (a product, not a sum). A high-assurance holder + a non-accredited issuerThe institution that signs and issues credentials: a university, a professional body, a public institution or a company. = worthless; an accredited issuer + a T0 holder = worthless.
  • IssuerCategory ≠ Issuer Assurance: the SPEC-BC-0001 category states the sector, I1–I3 the degree of accreditation; they are orthogonal.

Decision 2 — Stateless bootstrap is adopted ​

Until states join the network, assurance is derived from existing Turkish institutions (derived assurance). No level requires a state agreement:

  • T3 ← signing a challenge (nonceA random value used once; the verifier sends it and the wallet signs it, so an old presentation cannot be replayed.) with e-signature / qualified electronic signature / mobile signature (verified against the national electronic certificate root).
  • T2 ← remote KYC / NFC passport / institution registration desk (university or chamber = registration authority).
  • T1 ← bank micro-transfer / mobile line ownership.
  • Issuer I1–I3 ← Tamga accredits temporarily in the Root TAO role.

When a state joins (phase 1) this does not disappear; the PID Provider (PID (Person Identification Data)The core identity data a state issues at the highest assurance level. Tamga does not take this role; its identity credential is not a PID.) becomes the default high-LoA source next to T3, adding a broader base and higher enrolment quality.

Decision 3 — Our own levels map 1:1 to the eIDAS LoA ​

T1≈Low, T2≈Substantial, T3≈High. Internally the option to treat enrolment, authenticator and verification dimensions separately (NIST 800-63 style) is kept; externally a single eIDAS LoA is presented → no loss of EUDI/EBSI interoperability ("compatible but independent", PM-PH-0001).

Decision 4 — Assurance decay, and no numbers shown to users ​

  • A level is lowered over time or on events (device change → T1, inactivity, expiry of the source credentialA digital document signed by an issuer and held in the person's wallet; the person shows only the fields that are asked for., anomalies).
  • End users are not shown numbers (they see a state); the numbers belong to the verifier's policy engine.

Rationale ​

  • eIDAS/EBSI precedent: the two axes combine the eIDAS holder LoA with EBSI's issuer accreditation chain — a proven model.
  • Working without states: "I have no state agreement → I cannot verify anyone" is wrong; with derived assurance up to T3 can be produced today. This is the single lever that makes the project viable before states join.
  • Inflation risk: if level criteria are relaxed, the system becomes meaningless → the criteria are written into the formal Trust Framework and made procedurally hard to change (PM-GOV-0001).

Consequences ​

  1. PM-ASSUR-0001 is the full background record of this model (new assurance/ domain).
  2. The verifier policy engine applies the holder and issuer thresholds together → parameters of the ADR-0003requiresCredential primitive.
  3. An issuer assurance level field is added to the SPEC-BC-0001 Issuer struct (holder assurance is not written to the ledger — personal data, PM-TRUST-0001).
  4. SPEC-CRED-0001 holder bindingTying a credential to a key that only the holder's device has, so a copied credential cannot be presented. + WUA (Wallet Unit Attestation)An attestation by the wallet provider about a wallet unit and the security of its keys; in the current EU texts it is split into WIA and key attestation. are the technical precondition for holder assurance.
  5. ARCH-0001 phase 0 is clarified as the stateless bootstrap layer.

Relations ​

  • PM-ASSUR-0001 — full model and rationale.
  • PM-ID-0001 — §6.2 becomes concrete here; PID Provider = phase 1 T3.
  • PM-PH-0001 — the counterpart of the "works without a state" principle.
  • SPEC-CRED-0001 / SPEC-BC-0001 — technical carrier and ledger representation.
  • ADR-0006 — credential format (the carrier of this decision).
  • PM-GOV-0001 (planned) — level criteria text + TAO accreditation governance.

The two-axis model + stateless bootstrap + eIDAS mapping + decay + presentation principle were accepted on 2026-09-03.