ADR-0004 — Institutional identity: X.509
Status: Accepted Date: 2026-08-06 Decided by: Tamga Network project management Source: docs/tamga-network-cuzdan-odeme-agent.md (X.509 input draft; considered in PM-AUTH-0001 as an argument in favour of X.509). This ADR closes DECISIONS D-ID-1.
Context
SPEC-ID-0001 built identification on two profiles: Entity (did:tamga:<state>:<id>, an institutional identity registered on the ledger) and PseudonymA stable account identifier the wallet derives separately for each website; two sites cannot link the same person. (did:tamga:p:<key>, self-certifying, pairwise). DECISIONS D-ID-1 tracked, as the highest-priority open decision, whether the entity side should move to X.509 certificates. Project management's working papers argued for X.509; the decision was taken.
Decision
Institutional/entity identity = X.509 certificate. The did:tamga entity profile is SUPERSEDED.
The three layers (PM-AUTH-0001 §Three layers) become:
| Layer | Identifier (new) | Changed? |
|---|---|---|
| A. Chain account | EVM address (secp256k1) | No — Besu EVM, always was |
| B. Institutional identity | X.509 certificate + on-ledger issuerId = keccak256(stateCode, certFingerprint) | Yes — instead of did:tamga entity |
| C. Personal identity | Credential (SD-JWT VC) + pairwise pseudonym | No — the pseudonym profile is kept |
Principles:
The chain of trust rests on national root authorities. Each member state's Root CA is anchored on the ledger (trust anchorThe root key or certificate a verifier trusts first; everything else is checked back to it.); an institution's certificate can be verified up to this root.
issuerIdis bound to the institution's certificate fingerprint + state code (SPEC-BC-0001Issuer Registry,onlyOwnerState: only its own state registers an institution).Citizens are not given a global identifier. A fixed global ID would string together a person's health, education, logistics and payment activity. Personal relationships use pairwise pseudonyms — different in each relationship and unlinkable (SPEC-ID-0001 pseudonym profile +
PM-ID-0002accountable disclosure).Chain transactions use EVM addresses — separate from the identity credentialA digital document signed by an issuer and held in the person's wallet; the person shows only the fields that are asked for. (ADR-0003 key-domain separation). The X.509 decision does not affect layer A.
Rationale
The institutional side is already certified. In payment and institutional flows the counterparty is usually an institution (bank, customs broker, port, insurer) — all of them already have X.509 certificates and regulatory registrations. Verifying a licensed institution is solved with existing infrastructure in the X.509 world; the DID world would need a recognition regime from scratch.
Readable by regulators. "Identity verified with a qualified certificate" has a legal counterpart; "verified with a DID" does not. Since audit burden in payments is heavier than in identity, this advantage matters (
PM-AUTH-0001).eIDAS (electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services)The EU regulation on electronic identification and trust services; eIDAS 2.0 introduces the European Digital Identity Wallet./QSCD (Qualified Signature Creation Device)Certified hardware or a remote service that protects the signing key for qualified signatures. alignment. Qualified certificates and QSCDs are already X.509-based; aligned with the "compatible but independent" principle (
PM-PH-0001).No effect on the value layer. Since X.509 does not affect layer A (EVM), it takes nothing away from payment or agent capability (ADR-0003 remains valid).
Consequences
Changed:
- The
did:tamga:<state>:<id>entity profile is not used; institutional identity is X.509 +issuerIdfingerprint. SPEC-BC-0002guardianentityIdand the court-token signature chain are bound to X.509 (court and guardian signatures are verified with the certificate chain). The §7 item "track x509" is closed.- The entity section of SPEC-ID-0001 is superseded; SPEC-ID-0002 (X.509 method specification) is to be written: Root CA anchoring, certificate→issuerId mapping, root rollover, chain validation.
Unchanged:
- The pseudonym profile (SPEC-ID-0001), accountable disclosure (
SPEC-BC-0002escrow), the EVM account model, the value layer hooks (ADR-0003), governance (ADR-0002).
New open topics: anchoring national Root CAs on the ledger + root rollover → SPEC-ID-0002 / RS-X509 (planned). Is a bridge to institutions' existing did:web identities needed (interop)? → SPEC-ID-0002.
Relations
- SPEC-ID-0001 — entity profile superseded; pseudonym kept.
SPEC-BC-0001— Issuer Registry (issuerId = certFingerprint, onlyOwnerState).SPEC-BC-0002— guardian entityId + court token bound to the X.509 signature chain.- ADR-0002 — state namespace / onlyOwnerState (Root CA ownership).
- ADR-0003 — value layer (independent of X.509, kept).
PM-AUTH-0001— three layers + rationale of regulator readability.- SPEC-ID-0002 — the full X.509 method specification.
The X.509 decision was taken on 2026-08-06; D-ID-1 is closed. Entity identity moved to X.509; the pseudonym and value layers are kept. The full method specification (SPEC-ID-0001 revision / SPEC-ID-0002) is follow-up work.