Partly changed by ADR-0013 (2026-09-26): mdoc (ISO/IEC 18013-5) is not "phase 2" — the identity credential is issued today as mdoc too, alongside SD-JWT VC, with the same fields and bound to the same holder key. SD-JWT VC stays the primary format; the other points (protocols, ES256, mandatory holder binding, WUA, Token Status List) still apply.
ADR-0006 — Credential format and protocols
Status: Accepted Date: 2026-09-03 Decided by: Tamga Network project management Source: tamga-guven-cercevesi-v0.1.md (sections F, G, K) — working note; full specification → SPEC-CRED-0001.
Context
Until now the credentialA digital document signed by an issuer and held in the person's wallet; the person shows only the fields that are asked for. format had been left as "planned" in the repository; SPEC-BC-0001 referred to SD-JWT VC (Selective Disclosure JWT Verifiable Credential)The JSON-based credential format with selective disclosure, used for online presentation in the EUDI Wallet and in Tamga. and the Token Status ListA compressed, signed list in which each credential has one position that tells whether it is valid, suspended or revoked. but there was no formal format decision. In addition, the "hidden flaw in the university idea" (a credential could be loaded into someone else's wallet) was open as a security gap. This ADR closes both. It builds on ADR-0001 (Besu/EVM) and ADR-0004 (X.509 issuerThe institution that signs and issues credentials: a university, a professional body, a public institution or a company. identity).
Decision
Decision 1 — Format: SD-JWT VC (primary), mdoc (secondary, phase 2)
SD-JWT VC is the primary format: built-in selective disclosureShowing only the fields a verifier asks for from a credential, and nothing else., the main format of the EUDI ARF (Architecture and Reference Framework)The document set that describes roles, architecture, trust model and rules. Tamga ARF follows the structure of the EU ARF., plenty of libraries, simpler than JSON-LD. mdocThe ISO/IEC 18013-5 mobile document format, encoded in CBOR; used for in-person presentation and for the mobile driving licence./ISO 18013-5 is secondary (phase 2; offline/in-person presentation, mDL (mobile Driving Licence)A driving licence held in a wallet in the mdoc format (ISO/IEC 18013-5). compatibility).
Decision 2 — Protocols: OpenID4VCI (issuance), OpenID4VP (presentation)
The de facto standards (OpenID4VCI (OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance)The protocol an issuer uses to deliver a credential to a wallet., OpenID4VP (OpenID for Verifiable Presentations)The protocol a verifier uses to request a credential from a wallet and receive the presentation.); they sit on institutions' existing OIDC infrastructure and make verifierThe party that checks a presented credential: signature, issuer in the trust list, status and policy. Also called relying party. integration easy.
Decision 3 — Signature: ES256 (P-256)
Universal support in mobile secure elements (Secure Enclave/StrongBox) and HSMs.
Decision 4 — Holder binding mandatory without exception (cnf + device key)
At issuance every credential is bound with cnf to a key generated on the device of the holderThe person who keeps a credential in their wallet and decides whom to show it to.; at presentation the holder signs the nonceA random value used once; the verifier sends it and the wallet signs it, so an old presentation cannot be replayed. with that key (KB-JWT (Key Binding JWT)A short token the wallet signs with the credential's key at presentation time, proving the holder has the key.). This is the only fix for the holder bindingTying a credential to a key that only the holder's device has, so a copied credential cannot be presented. gap and cannot be switched off. The key is generated in hardware and cannot be exported → the credential cannot be transferred.
Decision 5 — Wallet Unit Attestation (WUA) from the start
The WUA (Wallet Unit Attestation)An attestation by the wallet provider about a wallet unit and the security of its keys; in the current EU texts it is split into WIA and key attestation., which states the wallet's authenticity (hardware key, PIN active, no root/jailbreak, provider identity), is opened as a field and a flow from the start, even if with simple content in the pilot — adding it later would require migrating every wallet.
Decision 6 — Revocation is delegated to the Token Status List
No separate revocation mechanism is defined; the SPEC-BC-0001 §5 Token Status List is used (off-chain list + on-chain pointer, min 100k entries, random index). Anti-correlation batch issuance is deferred to phase 2, with its place kept open in the format.
Rationale
- EUDI alignment: SD-JWT VC + OpenID4VCI/VP + ES256 is the main stack of the EUDI ARF → "compatible but independent" (
PM-PH-0001) and cross-border interoperability. - Holder binding = reason to exist: if this gap stays open, the system silently lies; its value drops to zero.
- Irreversibility: if format, binding and WUA are not set up correctly from the start, the entire wallet base has to be migrated later — the same "free today, impossible later" logic as ADR-0003.
Consequences
- SPEC-CRED-0001 is the full specification (format structure, KB-JWT, WUA, flows).
- The
contracts/andsdk/wallet generates a device secure element key +cnf; software keys are not accepted. - The verifier library works through the
TrustedListProviderinterface (chain-agnostic: phase 0 files / phase 1 ledger) —ARCH-0001. PM-ASSUR-0001holder assurance is tied to the WUA + binding method.
Relations
- SPEC-CRED-0001 — full specification of this decision.
PM-ASSUR-0001/ ADR-0005 — assurance levels (the trust the format carries).SPEC-BC-0001— issuer registry + Token Status List (revocation).- SPEC-ID-0002 — issuer X.509 (
iss), SPEC-ID-0001 — holder pseudonym (cnf). PM-TRUST-0001— credentials are never on the ledger.
Format, protocols, signature, holder binding (mandatory) and WUA were accepted on 2026-09-03. mdoc and batch issuance were referred to later phases.