In short
The revocation list (CRL) of relying parties' access certificates moves to its own host: crl.tamga.network. There the list is served over both plain (http) and encrypted (https) connections as the same file, and certificates point to both addresses. The EU standard requires the first address and the EU reference wallet requires the second; a separate host is the only clean way to serve both together.
Context
- ADR-0087 K3 placed the CRL under the trusted-list host without opening a new host (
https://trust.tamga.network/crl/<ca>.crl) and wrote only thishttpsaddress into certificates. It works this way in the sandbox; on the production network the access certificate authority has not been set up yet (it comes with the key ceremony). - ETSI EN 319 412-2 V2.5.1 (2026-08) GEN-4.3.11-3/-4: the distribution point shall point to at least one publicly available CRL, and at least one of these addresses shall be
http(RFC 9110) orldap(RFC 4516). TS 119 411-8 ties the certificate profile to this document through EN 319 411-1; the legal-person profile (EN 319 412-3) does not change this clause. Today's certificate, which offers onlyhttps, does not meet this clause. - RFC 5280 §8:
httpsis not recommended in the distribution point (circular dependency); if used, the server's TLS certificate must be verifiable without that CRL. Because the CRL is signed, plain transport does not weaken its integrity. - EU reference wallet: the Android app disables cleartext traffic, and its go-live guide states that CRL checking always fails for a certificate that offers only
httpaddresses; the platform CRL fetcher tries the addresses in the distribution point in order. On iOS, App Transport Security may also blockhttpdownloads. - The trusted-list host's server block redirects every
httprequest tohttps(together with HSTS); serving the same file over both schemes without redirection on that host would mean relaxing the rule for the whole trusted-list host. - Direction from project management: a new subdomain is not avoided when needed; the more correct approach is chosen.
Decision
K1 — Address
| Network | Host | Files |
|---|---|---|
| Production | crl.tamga.network | /access-ca-1.crl, /root-ca.crl |
| Sandbox | crl.sandbox.tamga.network | /access-ca-1.crl, /root-ca.crl |
The path is /<ca>.crl at the root of the host (lower-case letters, digits, hyphen). Authority names are as in ADR-0087 K2.
K2 — Two schemes, no redirection
- The host serves the same DER file over
httpandhttps; anhttprequest is not redirected tohttps, and the host has no HSTS. - Response type
application/pkix-crl, public, CORS open; nothing other than CRLs is published on the host (root and unknown paths 404). - The TLS certificate of the
httpsside comes from the Web PKI, not from Tamga's access certificate authority or root. - Requests are not logged (CRL fetches could show who checks which relying party).
K3 — Distribution point in the certificate
Every access certificate and the access certificate authority's certificate carry a non-critical CRL Distribution Points extension with a single distribution point; its fullName holds two addresses in this order: http://crl.<network>/<ca>.crl, https://crl.<network>/<ca>.crl. There is no cRLIssuer and no reasons (the rest of ADR-0087 K3 stays in force).
K4 — Transition
- No access certificate has been issued on the production network, so there is no transition there; the first certificate is issued under this rule.
- In the sandbox the only certificate carrying a distribution point is the access certificate authority's; it is reissued with the same key and the new distribution point (the sandbox access certificates were issued before ADR-0087 and carry no distribution point; those issued from now on follow this rule). The old
trust.sandbox.tamga.network/crl/path is removed (development phase: no backward compatibility). roles.access_ca.crl.issuers[].uriin the configuration registry is the CRL'shttpaddress (http://crl.<network>/<ca>.crl); thehttpstwin is derived from the same host and path, so both names always point to the same file. The publisher's configuration check verifies that the scheme ishttp, the host is the CRL host matching the trusted-list host, and the path is/<name>.crlat the root of the host.
Options considered
| Option | Why not chosen |
|---|---|
Under the trusted-list host, https only (ADR-0087 K3) | Does not meet EN 319 412-2 GEN-4.3.11-4; RFC 5280 §8 advises against it. |
Under the trusted-list host, with a redirection exception for http | Relaxes the trusted-list host's HSTS and redirection rule; on an HSTS host, browsers upgrade http anyway. |
http only | The EU reference Android wallet does not download a CRL from a certificate that offers only http. |
| OCSP | Considered in ADR-0087: CRL was chosen; OCSP is a later decision. |
Invariants
| Code | Rule |
|---|---|
| CH1 | The distribution point in the access certificate and the authority certificate carries two addresses: first http://crl.<network>/<ca>.crl, then the https:// address of the same path. |
| CH2 | The CRL host serves the same file over both schemes without redirection and publishes nothing other than CRLs; its https certificate does not come from the Tamga PKI. |
Consequences
- New DNS records:
crl.tamga.network,crl.sandbox.tamga.network(same server). - The list publisher's configuration check, the PKI tools (
--crl-uriwith two addresses), the server configuration in the operator repository and SPEC-TRUST-0001 §2 are updated according to this decision; a reference to this decision is added to ADR-0087 K3. - No change for the Tamga wallet core and verifier: they take trust from the signed list and do not fetch CRLs (ADR-0087 AR5).
Status
Accepted — 2026-11-18.