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ADR-0084Architecture decisionAcceptedversion 1.0.015 November 2026

In short ​

In Tamga Network, whether a credential can be trusted is decided today by looking at the signed trust lists; the European Union's trust lists work the same way. This decision says that this arrangement does not change after the chain arrives: the lists remain the single, authoritative source and the chain is their witness. The chain records what was published in the list; anyone may compare the list with it. If the chain stops or falls behind, no credential's verification is affected. The chain code is finished but stays switched off; no servers are set up for now; when moving to the chain, a test network comes first, then the real network.

Context ​

  • ADR-0009 tied the chain to the written acceptance of a second independent operator (K4); until then the trust anchor is the signed lists and the anchor log. ADR-0051 had the chain code written from today and made the chain a projection of the lists (CH1: on conflict the list prevails, the chain's answer is not required for verification). ADR-0074 extended the projection to every trust record in the lists (PJ1: the list remains the source). ADR-0073 set up the one-time transfer of history to the chain and the equivalence test.
  • The documents openly contradicted each other on the source direction (chain layer audit, 2026-11-15):
    • ADR-0051 K6: "lists are still published in the chain stage — as the chain's projection" — i.e. the direction would flip in the chain stage and the chain would become the source;
    • ADR-0074 PJ1: "the list remains the source";
    • ADR-0073 K6: "whether the chain stage makes the chain the source is a separate decision". Until it was decided which one is the source, how a verifier uses the chain, monitoring and the move plan could not be settled.
  • Project management's direction (2026-11-15): the network proceeds today with the EU model and no chain-related process runs in today's model; the chain code still moves forward and the structure is built so that no process from scratch is needed on the day of the move; running validator nodes is an extra cost right now and is not done; when moving to the chain, a test network first, then the real network.

Decision ​

K1 — Source and witness ​

The signed trust lists (LOTL, national lists, their views) and the anchor log are the network's single, authoritative trust source. The chain is a witness: it records every publication of the lists and the trust records they contain (ADR-0074 PJ1, ADR-0085), and it witnesses a list version once as many independent operators as the threshold have written the same digest (ADR-0051 CH3). This direction holds in every chain stage: on the test network, on the real network, and after the second operator arrives. Making the chain the source (reversing the direction) is possible only through a new decision record, and that record requires at least: member states operating the chain themselves, a showing that the EU side can recognise this model, and a way back from chain to list.

K2 — Verification decisions only from the signed list ​

All trust steps of the verification pipeline (A–E) — C1, C2, C3, D5 and the other steps that look at records — read only from the signed list. The TrustSource used in verification is the list source. The trust source that reads the chain (ChainTrustSource) is not consumed in any verification decision; its role is the equivalence test and cross-checking. The limit in ADR-0074 K5, "not used in verification until a continuous projection exists", becomes permanent with this decision: the chain makes no decision even after continuous projection exists.

K3 — Reading the chain is only for cross-checking and transparency ​

A verifier (or any third party) may read the chain and compare it with the list it holds (trust:chain-check, the chain field on the health page, later an optional second source). This reading never changes the verification result in any direction: UNKNOWN does not make the result worse, YES does not make it better, NO does not cause a rejection (ADR-0051 K1.2). Reading the chain is never required for verification and never will be.

K4 — If the chain stops, the list is unaffected ​

The chain stopping, being unreachable, falling behind, or a failed write to the chain does not affect list publication, status lists, verification or wallets. The list publisher does not stop publishing because of a chain write error; chain jobs run after and independently of publication (ADR-0085 SP5). When the chain flag (TAMGA_CHAIN_ENABLED) is switched off the system returns to its current state; the way back is the flag alone.

K5 — A difference raises an alarm ​

Every difference between chain and list raises an alarm and goes into the transparency report: a confirmed different digest on the chain for the same list version (CONFLICT / NO, a double-speak signal), a pending competing candidate (CONTEST), the projection falling behind the list or failing to write, a difference in the equivalence test. The direction of correction is always from the list to the chain: a chain record is not deleted, it is corrected with a new write that matches the list; the list is not corrected to match the chain.

K6 — The code is completed switched off; the move is test network first, then real network ​

  • The chain code (contracts, the publisher's chain jobs, indexer, equivalence tests, operator tools) is completed switched off: the flag is off in production, the live server has no chain settings, and the packages carry no chain client (ADR-0015 K1).
  • For now no server, validator node or test chain server is set up. The code is tested on the local development chain and on the multi-node test network in continuous integration.
  • Order of the move: (1) code switched off; (2) test network — the real lists are projected onto a test chain and equivalence is watched for a period without differences; (3) real network. The real network does not open until all of these hold together: written acceptance of a second independent operator (ADR-0009 K4), threshold ≥ 2 on the list anchor (ADR-0051 CH3), operation without equivalence differences on the test network, a decision record for the production key path (hardware key vault), a decision record for separating governance and consensus keys, and an independent security audit.

Rationale / alternatives ​

OptionResultWhy
List is the source, chain a witness (in every stage)chosenSame as the EU trust list model; same verification with or without the chain; the way back is the flag alone; does not pretend to trust the chain cannot produce while there is a single operator
In the chain stage the chain is the source and the list its view (old provision of ADR-0051 K6)rejected (for now)Verification is affected when an operator drops or the chain stops; departs from the EU model; going back needs a transfer in the opposite direction. May be revisited when states operate the chain (K1, last sentence)
Two sources: list and chain together, accept only if both say "yes"rejectedA failure of either source causes rejection (weakest link); the result is tied to the chain's availability (against K4)
Not using the chain at allrejectedIndependent witnessing against double-speak and record-level transparency are lost; against project management's direction that "the chain code moves forward"
Skipping the test network and going straight to the real networkrejectedThe migration window opens once (ADR-0073 CE1); opening it without a prior rehearsal with the real lists risks an irreversible error

Invariants ​

CodeRule
LS1The signed trust lists and the anchor log are the network's single, authoritative trust source; the chain is a witness. This direction holds in every chain stage; making the chain the source requires a new decision record.
LS2Verification decisions (C1, C2, C3, D5 and the other steps that look at records) are made only from the signed list; the trust source that reads the chain is not consumed in any verification decision.
LS3Reading the chain is only for cross-checking and transparency; it never changes the verification result in any direction and is never required for verification.
LS4The chain stopping, being unreachable, falling behind, or a failed chain write does not affect list publication, status lists, verification or wallets; chain jobs run after and independently of publication.
LS5Every difference between chain and list raises an alarm and goes into the transparency report; correction runs from list to chain, and a chain record is not deleted.
LS6The move to the chain is a test network first, then the real network; the real network does not open without a second independent operator's written acceptance, threshold ≥ 2, equivalence without differences on the test network, decisions on the production key path and key separation, and an independent security audit.

Consequences ​

  • The provision in the last item of ADR-0051 K6, "lists are still published in the chain stage — as the chain's projection", changed: in the chain stage too the list is the source and the chain the projection (witness). This is the separate decision named in the last sentence of ADR-0073 K6. The temporary limit of ADR-0074 K5 became permanent. A reference note was added to all three records.
  • Design of continuous projection: ADR-0085.
  • FW-ARF-0001 §8.1: the trust anchor of the ledger stage is the signed lists; the ledger is a witness. ARCH-0002: the setup steps were updated to this direction and to ADR-0009 K4.
  • No code change was needed: the verifier already reads only from the list; the chain health field does not change the result.
  • Remaining work (in order): governance command tool, production key path, wiring chain monitoring and alarms into live monitoring, real network setup script, key separation decision, the code for ADR-0079.

Status ​

Accepted — 2026-11-15. With project management's approval (2026-11-15). DECISIONS: D-BC-17. LS1–LS6 are binding.