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ADR-0083Architecture decisionAcceptedversion 1.0.013 November 2026

In short ​

Identity cards and passports contain a chip. The chip holds the person's name, date of birth and photo, together with the state's signature. A phone can read this chip over NFC. With this decision, Tamga takes the attributes of the identity credential from the chip instead of from a photo of the document, and checks the state's signature itself. To show that the person really holds that document, face and liveness checks are still done by an external provider: the live face is compared with the photo on the chip. The correctness of the attributes then rests on the state's signature, not on the provider's software; the provider is needed only for the face part and can be replaced. For documents without a chip, today's photo path remains. The decision is accepted; but because processing the photo on the chip raises a legal question, the chip path is opened only after a favourable legal opinion. So that the software is ready when the opinion arrives, the code is written now, but it is switched off everywhere: it runs only in local tests, with fake document data.

Context ​

  • Today. The identity service (ADR-0011) sends the person to a remote identity verification provider, which reads the document photo, checks liveness and the face, and says "approved". The attributes in the identity credential are the values the provider read. The identity service cannot verify that decision; it can only trust the provider. Class: non-qualified EAA, I2 (ADR-0022).
  • Provider dependency. The provider's free allowance has ended; every verification is paid. This alone is not a large cost (see below), but the whole assurance of identity verification depends on one provider's software and pricing.
  • How PID is issued in the EU. In the EU, person identification data (PID) is issued by a PID provider under a member state's eID scheme; wallet users are enrolled under the enrolment rules of assurance level high (Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2977 Art. 3). For remote enrolment, Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/798 (in force since 2026-04-28) relies on ETSI TS 119 461 V2.1.1 and requires that, in remote enrolment with a physical document, the face image of the document is collected from the chip over NFC and the chip is passively or actively authenticated. In ETSI TS 119 461 the fully automated "document + face" path requires a chip document; the extended level also requires lab-tested presentation attack detection and injection attack detection (CEN/TS 18099). EU national wallets mostly issue PID with the national electronic identity (chip + PIN). A document photo + selfie does not reach this level.
  • Tamga's position. Tamga does not and will not issue PID (TL8). The identity credential is a provisional EAA; it gives way to state PID when that arrives (ADR-0011 K1). But today it is the basis of the identity matching that every institutional credential on the network relies on; the stronger it is, the more trustworthy the rest of the network.
  • Foreseen earlier. ADR-0011 anticipated chip reading "later"; document_chip_verified and verification_method: remote-nfc-liveness-face exist in the schema. The open question was who reads and who verifies the chip.
  • A browser cannot read the chip. An identity card chip cannot be read from a browser; a native app on the phone is needed. So chip reading can be done either by the provider's component embedded in a phone app or by the wallet itself.
  • Link relay attack (ADR-0080). The verification link could be relayed to someone else. If the chip is read on the phone that started the flow, the attacker has to physically tap the victim's card on their own phone; a relayed link alone no longer works.
  • Legal question. In Türkiye, the regulation on the electronic verification of the identity card (Electronic Identity Verification System Regulation, Art. 21(3)) says that biometric data may not be collected, stored or shared. Whether reading the face photo on the chip only for a one-off match falls under that provision is not clear. Biometric data is also special-category personal data under Personal Data Protection Law No. 6698 (Art. 6), and sending it to a provider abroad is a cross-border transfer (Art. 9).

Decision ​

  • K1 — Chip path. The identity service offers two paths: (a) the chip path — the document chip is read over NFC in the wallet that started the flow, and face and liveness are checked by a provider; (b) the document photo path — today's path, as a fallback for documents without a chip and phones without NFC. A person with a chip document and a suitable phone is offered the chip path first.
  • K2 — The wallet is only a reader. The wallet reads the ICAO 9303 data groups from the chip (at least DG1 personal data, DG2 photo and the document security object SOD; DG14 and DG15 if present) and relays them unchanged to the identity service. The wallet does not interpret, decide on, store or log chip data. The chip access key (the MRZ or CAN printed on the document) is used only on the phone and is not sent to the identity service.
  • K3 — The identity service verifies. On the server the identity service performs: (1) passive authentication — it verifies the SOD signature against the document signer certificate, and that certificate against the issuing state's root certificate (CSCA), and compares the data group hashes with the values in the SOD; (2) a clone check — active authentication (AA) or chip authentication (CA) where the chip supports it; for AA the challenge is generated by the identity service, is single-use and bound to the flow. A verification result produced on the phone is not accepted; the server verifies the raw data itself.
  • K4 — Root certificates. The identity service takes each state's CSCA certificates from public, signed master lists; which states' roots are on the list and where they come from is written in the operator's configuration document. A document from a state whose root is not available does not take the chip path and falls back to the photo path.
  • K5 — Narrower meaning of document_chip_verified. true is written only when all three hold: passive authentication succeeded, the clone check (AA or CA) succeeded, and the live face matched the DG2 photo. If passive authentication succeeds but the chip supports no clone check, the credential may still be issued from chip data, but with document_chip_verified: false and verification_method remains remote-document-liveness-face. Attribute names and the schema do not change.
  • K6 — Face and liveness stay with a provider; the provider can be replaced. Liveness detection and face matching are taken from a provider with proven presentation attack (ISO/IEC 30107-3) and injection attack testing; the identity service does not build them itself. Liveness runs in the provider's browser flow (the wallet does not talk to the provider); the live face is compared with the DG2 photo on the chip. The current remote identity verification provider is used first (only its liveness and face matching part). The provider sits behind an adapter in the identity service: provider-specific code and settings do not leave the adapter, and no provider-specific value enters the identity credential, the trust list or the wallet. Replacing the provider does not change the decision; the privacy notice and the data processing agreement are renewed.
  • K7 — Retention. Chip data, the DG2 photo and the face image sent to the provider are kept in memory in the identity service only until issuance and then deleted (IDP4, IDP9 unchanged). Only the keyed hash of the document number, the fact that the chip path was used and the verification results (pass/fail) go into the persistent record; no raw data.
  • K8 — Opening per country. The chip path opens on the live network for a country's documents only when (a) that country's root certificate has been taken from a trusted source and (b) the legal review of a private body reading the identity chip with the person's consent and processing biometric data under that country's law has a favourable outcome. After a favourable legal opinion (K11) it may be tried in the sandbox with test documents; until then the code runs only in local tests.
  • K9 — IDP3 narrowed. New text: "IDV provider integration is only in the Tamga identity service; institutional issuers, the wallet and the verifier do not talk to the provider. A wallet may read the document chip on the device that started the flow and relay the raw data unchanged to the identity service (ADR-0083); it does not verify chip data and makes no identity verification decision."
  • K10 — Open interface. Relaying chip data to the identity service is defined as an open interface in SPEC-ID-0003; any conformant wallet listed by the network may implement it (ADR-0042: the network does not operate a wallet and gives no wallet a privilege). The details of the interface (endpoint, field and error names) are approved during implementation.
  • K11 — Condition for opening: legal opinion first; code behind a switch that is off (as amended on 2026-11-13; see the "Amendment" section below). The code of the chip path (identity service, wallet core, wallet app) may be written and merged; by default it sits behind a switch that is off. The identity service refuses to run on a server (live network and sandbox) while the switch is on. Store builds of the wallet contain no chip reading and no NFC permissions. The code runs only in local tests, with fake document data signed by a root certificate generated in the test (and a blank test card that belongs to no person); no real person's document is read, sent or processed. Until a favourable legal opinion, the chip path is opened neither in the sandbox nor on the live network. For Türkiye the opinion covers: (a) Electronic Identity Verification System Regulation Art. 21(3) — whether reading the face photo on the chip and using it only for a one-off match falls under that provision, and whether a person reading their own card with their own phone needs a separate permission; (b) Law No. 6698 Art. 6 (biometric data, explicit consent) and Art. 9 (transfer to a provider abroad); (c) whether writing the identity number read from the chip only into the identity credential creates a separate obligation. If the opinion is unfavourable or sets conditions, the decision is taken up with a new ADR, and the switched-off code changes or is removed accordingly. Today's document photo path keeps working unchanged in the meantime.
  • K12 — The qualified electronic signature / mobile signature path is the next step. Proving identity with a person's qualified electronic signature or mobile signature certificate (SPEC-ID-0003 T3, IDP7) is taken up after the chip path and decided by a separate ADR. This decision neither opens nor closes that path.

Settled on acceptance ​

The four open points of the draft were closed on acceptance as follows:

  1. First documents. Until the legal opinion arrives, the chip path is not opened for any document (K11); the first documents to open (the Turkish identity card and passport are the subject of the opinion) are set together with the opinion and opened per country under K8.
  2. Face and liveness provider. The liveness and face matching part of the current provider is used first; the provider is set up so that it can be replaced (K6).
  3. Chips without a clone check. As in K5: the credential is issued from chip data, with document_chip_verified: false.
  4. Platform order (iOS / Android). Set during implementation; it does not change the content of the decision.

Amendment (2026-11-13, project management) ​

On the day of acceptance project management amended K11 and CV7: so that the software is ready when the legal opinion arrives, the code of the chip path is written now, but is switched off everywhere. The condition for opening (the legal opinion) and its subject ((a)–(c)) stay the same. The version stays 1.0.0.

  • Before: "The code of the chip path is not written before a favourable legal opinion."
  • Now (K11, CV7): the code may be written and merged; by default it sits behind a switch that is off. The identity service refuses to run on a server (live network and sandbox) while the switch is on; store builds of the wallet contain no chip reading and no NFC permissions; the code runs only in local tests, with fake document data signed by a root certificate generated in the test (and a blank test card that belongs to no person). No real person's document is read, sent or processed. If the opinion is unfavourable or sets conditions, the switched-off code changes or is removed under a new ADR.

The same approval set the following for the first implementation:

  1. Clone check in the first version: AA only. In the first version the clone check is active authentication (AA); chip authentication (CA) is the next step. Until then a chip that supports only CA is handled as in K5, with document_chip_verified: false.
  2. No DG11, no chip path. The full spelling of the given name and family name in the identity credential (with Turkish characters) is taken from DG11 on the chip; the MRZ name without Turkish characters is not written into the credential. If the chip has no DG11, the chip path is closed for that document and the document photo path is used.
  3. Reference image for face matching. Face matching is done in the current provider's biometric verification workflow by giving the DG2 photo from the chip as the reference image (a base64 reference portrait when the session is created, at most 2 MB; confirmed in the provider's documentation). This provider-specific detail stays inside the adapter (K6, CV6).
  4. Interface names (K10): identity service endpoints /chip/read, /chip/submit, /chip/continue; the PAR field by which a wallet says it can read a chip is chip_reader (value icao9303). The flow is written into SPEC-ID-0003 with the implementation.

Rationale ​

  • Assurance rests on the state's signature. Attributes read from a photo are a software estimate; attributes read from the chip are the state's signed data, which the identity service can verify itself. This is the path the higher level of remote identity proofing in the EU asks for.
  • Less provider dependency. The provider is needed only for face and liveness; that part can be obtained from several providers.
  • The relay attack becomes harder. Because the chip is read on the phone that started the flow, a relayed link alone is useless (the residual risk of ADR-0080 shrinks; K1–K4 there still apply).
  • Law first. Processing the photo on the chip is an open legal question in Türkiye; getting it wrong would create a personal data problem that is hard to undo. So the decision is taken now and the chip path is opened after the opinion. The switched-off code processes no real person's data; it makes sure the software is ready when the opinion arrives.
  • Cost comes second. The saving per verification is small; this decision is taken for assurance and independence, not cost.

Options considered ​

OptionOutcomeWhy
Wallet reads the chip, identity service verifies, provider does face/livenessacceptedData verified by the state's signature; independence from the provider; relay attack harder; the wallet does not talk to the provider
Today's path (provider only, document photo)kept as fallbackWorks and is cheap; but assurance depends on the provider's software and does not reach the EU high level
The provider's own chip reading (its phone component embedded in the wallet)rejectedTies the wallet to one provider, against IDP3 and ADR-0042; verification still stays with the provider
Building face and liveness ourselvesrejectedPresentation and injection attacks need expertise and independent testing; a false accept means a fake identity
A separate "identity verification" appnot chosen nowA second app for users, operated by the network. The wallet is enough as a reader
Write the code now, behind a switch that is off; tie opening to the legal opinionaccepted (2026-11-13 amendment)The software is ready when the opinion arrives; switched-off code does not run on a server, is not in store builds and processes no real person's data (K11)
Write the code only after the legal opinion (text on acceptance)changed (2026-11-13)Software would have been months away after the opinion; switched-off code keeps the same safeguard
Accept and open in the sandbox at oncerejectedBefore the legal opinion the chip photo is not processed in the sandbox either (K11)
Bringing the qualified e-signature / mobile signature path forwardnext stepRests on a state-supervised certificate but requires the user to have one; after the chip path, with a separate ADR (K12)
Authoritative source only (state, bank, operator)long-term directionNo accessible path today; when it comes it is added alongside, not instead; when state PID arrives the identity credential gives way to it anyway

Consequences ​

  • Identity service (operator repository). Chip data endpoint, passive authentication, AA challenge (and later CA), loading root certificates, face matching with DG2 at the provider, tests (valid document, altered data group, unknown root, failed clone check, replayed challenge). The code is written now, behind a switch that is off; with the switch on the service does not start on a server; opening follows the legal opinion under K11.
  • Wallet core and wallet app. NFC reading (iOS and Android), MRZ/CAN entry or reading the MRZ with the camera, relaying the raw data; NFC permission text; accessibility and a "my document has no chip" path. The code is written now: the carrier in the wallet core goes into the public repository, its npm release follows the legal opinion; store builds of the wallet app contain no chip reading and no NFC permissions. Trying with a real card follows the legal opinion.
  • Licence of the reader library. On Android an LGPL-licensed open source reader library is used; the obligations of distributing it with the wallet app are put to the legal opinion.
  • Specifications. SPEC-ID-0003: the new IDP3 text and the meaning of document_chip_verified were added on acceptance (version note 2026-11-13); the chip path flow and the open interface (K10) are written with the implementation. SPEC-PROTO-0001 (the extra step in the identity service's flow) and SPEC-WALLET-0001 (the wallet's reader role and the "relay unchanged" rule) are updated with the implementation.
  • Tamga ARF. Tamga Rulebook RB-AP-ID-01 (the counterpart of IDP3) and the Identity Rulebook's definition of document_chip_verified were updated on acceptance.
  • Today's code and CV2. Today's identity service may fill document_chip_verified from the provider's chip result; because the provider workflow uses no chip step (SPEC-ID-0003 §4), the attribute is false today. No chip step is added to the provider workflow until the chip path is coded; CV2 goes into the code when the chip path is implemented.
  • Trust list. The identity service's assurance_basis text mentions the chip path once it is opened; class and assurance level do not change with this decision (ADR-0022; an upgrade only after an independent assessment).
  • Personal data. The privacy notice adds chip reading and sending the chip photo to the provider for face matching; the text is written in line with the legal opinion.

Invariants ​

CodeRule
CV1Chip data is verified server-side in the identity service (passive authentication and, where available, the clone check); a verification result reported by the wallet or the phone is not accepted.
CV2document_chip_verified: true is written only when passive authentication, the clone check (AA or CA) and the match of the live face with DG2 all succeed; otherwise false.
CV3The active authentication (AA) challenge is generated by the identity service, is single-use, bound to the flow and short-lived.
CV4The wallet only reads chip data and relays it unchanged to the identity service; it does not verify, decide on, store or log it and does not talk to the provider. The chip access key (MRZ/CAN) does not leave the phone.
CV5Raw chip data and the DG2 photo are not kept after issuance and are not written to logs or the audit record.
CV6The face and liveness provider sits behind an adapter in the identity service; no provider-specific value enters the identity credential, the trust list or the wallet.
CV7The chip path is opened in no environment before a favourable legal opinion. Its code may be written, but by default it sits behind a switch that is off: the identity service refuses to run on a server while the switch is on; store builds of the wallet contain no chip reading; the code runs only in local tests with fake document data. For a country's documents the chip path is not opened on the live network before that country's root certificate is taken from a trusted source and its legal review has a favourable outcome.

Status ​

Accepted — 2026-11-13. Approved by project management (2026-11-13): accepted; liveness and face matching with the current provider, replaceable; the qualified e-signature / mobile signature path after the chip path. DECISIONS: D-ID-16. CV1–CV7 are binding. SPEC-ID-0003/IDP3 was narrowed by this decision.

Amendment (2026-11-13): K11 and CV7 changed — the code is written now, behind a switch that is off (it does not run on a server, is not in store builds, runs only in local tests with fake document data); the chip path opens after the legal opinion (unchanged). First version: clone check AA only, no DG11 closes the chip path, DG2 as the reference image for face matching. Approved by project management.