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ADR-0026Architecture decisionAcceptedversion 1.0.019 October 2026

Context ​

ADR-0024 added the EU common data set to verifierThe party that checks a presented credential: signature, issuer in the trust list, status and policy. Also called relying party. and issuerThe institution that signs and issues credentials: a university, a professional body, a public institution or a company. records and left the registration certificateA signed statement from the registrar listing which fields a relying party may request and for what purpose (valid up to 12 months). (WRPRC) as the next step. In the EU gap analysis (H1, P2) this item remained open: ARF (Architecture and Reference Framework)The document set that describes roles, architecture, trust model and rules. Tamga ARF follows the structure of the EU ARF. topic 44, RPA_02, RPA_06.

In the EU model:

  • The access certificateThe X.509 certificate a relying party signs its requests with; its client identifier is derived from this certificate's hash. (WRPAC (Wallet-Relying Party Access Certificate)The access certificate a relying party uses to sign its requests to wallets.) states who the verifier is; its subject carries the organisation identifier (ETSI EN 319 412-1 semantic identifier, e.g. VATTR-1234567890).
  • The registration certificate (WRPRC (Wallet-Relying Party Registration Certificate)The registration certificate that states which fields a relying party may request and why., ETSI TS 119 475 v1.2.1) states what the verifier is registered to request, and for which purpose. The national registrar signs it; typ rc-wrp+jwt; JAdES B-B signature; valid for at most 12 months; one certificate per intended use.
  • The verifier carries it in the OpenID4VP (OpenID for Verifiable Presentations)The protocol a verifier uses to request a credential from a wallet and receive the presentation. request as verifier_info: [{"format": "registration_cert", "data": "<jwt>"}] (ETSI TS 119 472-2). In the EU the registration certificate is optional; if the registrar issues one, the wallet verifies it.

The Tamga wallet reads the same information from the signed trust listA signed list of a country's root certificates, issuers and registered relying parties. Today trust in Tamga rests on these lists; a shared ledger comes later.. The registration certificate is needed so that EU wallets can recognise Tamga verifiers and issuers in the form they know. Project management approved the H1 plan (P2) and asked to move on to the next items.

Decision ​

K1 — Registrar and signing key ​

Tamga is the provisional registrar for Türkiye (LOTL (List of Trusted Lists)The signed list that points to the countries' trust lists, their signers and their recognition status. roles.registrar, PROVISIONAL). Registration certificates are signed with a separate registrar key (distinct from the list signing key). The key's fingerprint is published in the LOTL under roles.registrar.signing_keys; the wallet recognises the registrar key from there (the LOTL itself is verified against the fingerprint embedded in the app).

K2 — Production: only from the trust list record ​

On every publication the list publisher produces:

ForHow many certificatesKey fields
Verifierone per intended use (scopes[])purpose, credentials (vct + fields that may be requested), privacy_policy, intended_use_id = scope_id
Issuerone per institutionprovides_attestations (types it is authorised for), entitlements

Common fields: name (trade name), sub_ln (legal name), sub (semantic identifier), country, registry_uri (address of the signed national list), entitlements (ETSI TS 119 475 Annex A URIs), srv_description, info_uri, support_uri, supervisory_authority, public_body, iat, exp.

  • sub is derived from the record's identifiers[]: TR-VKN → VATTR-<number>, TR-MERSIS → NTRTR-<number>. No certificate is produced for a record without an identifier (the publisher warns).
  • exp is at most 12 months, or the end date of the use or the record if that is sooner.
  • For a request through an intermediary (ADR-0017) intermediary {sub, sname} is filled in.
  • Certificates are published under trust.tamga.network/wrprc/ (index: wrprc/index.json). They contain no personal data.

K3 — Organisation identifier in the access certificate ​

Access certificates (pki:issue) carry organizationIdentifier (OID 2.5.4.97) in the subject. The value equals the registration certificate's sub. Development certificates do not carry this field; the certificate is renewed when the identifier is entered into the record.

K4 — Verifier ​

If a registration certificate exists for the request's intended use, the verifier adds verifier_info: [{"format": "registration_cert", "data": "<jwt>"}] to the request object. Otherwise the request is sent without it.

Change of 2026-10-13 (see "Change" below): one registration certificate per request, no credential_ids, registrar_dataset not used.

K5 — Wallet ​

If the request carries a registration_cert, the wallet checks in order:

  1. typ is rc-wrp+jwt; the signature is valid with the x5c certificate; that certificate's fingerprint is one of the registrar keys in the LOTL.
  2. iat ≤ now < exp.
  3. sub (in an intermediated request intermediary.sub) equals the organizationIdentifier in the access certificate that signed the request.
  4. Every requested field is in the certificate's credentials list. Anything beyond it counts as over-asking (warning on the consent screen).

If any of 1–3 fails, the request is rejected and the user sees "registration certificate invalid". If there is no registration certificate, or it is valid, the wallet continues with the trust list check. If the two sources conflict, the more restrictive one applies.

Change of 2026-10-13 (see "Change" below): a request without a registration certificate gets a warning and the default "Don't share"; after 2028-08-11 it is rejected. In proximity the registration certificate comes in euWrprc.

Options considered ​

OptionResultWhy
Not producing registration certificates (optional in the EU)rejectedEU wallets could not tell what Tamga verifiers are registered to request
Signing with the list signing keyrejectedKey separation: list signing and registration statements are different roles
One certificate per verifier rather than per userejectedTS 119 475 and TS5 call for one certificate per intended use
A placeholder sub when there is no identifierrejectedMatching against the access certificate becomes meaningless; creates false trust

Invariants ​

CodeRule
WRC1A registration certificate is produced only from the record in the signed trust list; no field or type outside the list enters the certificate.
WRC2A registration certificate is signed with the registrar key; this key is separate from the list signing key and is published in the LOTL.
WRC3A registration certificate is valid for at most 12 months and never beyond the end date of the record or the use.
WRC4The wallet sends no data to a request carrying a registration certificate whose signature, validity or binding to the access certificate cannot be verified.

Consequences ​

  • apps/trust-publisher: registration certificate production (wrprc.ts), registrar key in the LOTL; ops/gen-pki.ts registrar key; ops/pki-issue.ts --org-id.
  • @tamga-network/verifier: createPresentationRequest({ registrationCert }); apps/verify attaches the certificate for the use.
  • @tamga-network/wallet-core: registration certificate verification; result on the consent screen.
  • Before the pilot: identifiers are entered into the records and access certificates are renewed with organizationIdentifier; when the registrar role passes to the national authority, the key changes in the LOTL.

Change — 2026-10-13 (first EU alignment review) ​

Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1731 made the registration certificate rules of ETSI TS 119 472-2 binding with changes (RO-02…RO-16) and made registration certificate validation in the wallet mandatory from 2028-08-11. K4 and K5 change accordingly; K1–K3 and WRC1–WRC4 still apply unchanged.

K4 (verifier) — new text.

  • In every request the verifier sends one registration certificate, the one for the request's intended use (scope_id), in verifier_info as {"format": "registration_cert", "data": "<jwt>"} (RO-13…RO-16). data is the registration certificate itself; the "base64url" of RO-16 is read as the JWT compact form (a JWS made of base64url parts), with no extra encoding.
  • The entry carries no credential_ids; a request does not carry more than one registration certificate. The certificate covers the whole request; the requested credentials are in that use's registration.
  • The registrar_dataset form (sending the registration data openly in the request) is not used; the regulation removed it (RO-02…RO-12).
  • If the use has no registration certificate (for example a verifier whose identifier is not yet in its registration), the request is sent without one and the wallet behaves as in K5.
  • Implementation: release 0.5.2 of the packages (credential_ids removed).

K5 (wallet) — added rules.

  • Request without a registration certificate: from today the wallet shows a separate warning on the consent screen ("This verifier did not send a registration certificate") and the default choice is "Don't share"; the person can still share. The trust list check does not change.
  • After 2028-08-11 a request without a registration certificate is rejected (the date from which Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1731 makes registration certificate validation in the wallet mandatory). The date is fixed in code and cannot be changed by a setting.
  • Proximity (ISO/IEC 18013-5): in an mdoc request the registration certificate comes in requestInfo.euWrprc. The wallet checks it with steps 1–4 of the remote flow; the binding in step 3 is made with the reader authentication certificate. The warning and the 2028-08-11 rule are the same in proximity. Sending euWrprc on the verifier side and reading it in the wallet come with release 0.6.0 of the packages.
  • The warning and the default "Don't share" come with release 0.6.0 of the packages (wallet-core); the rejection date is in the code in the same release.

Change — 2026-10-19 (ADR-0056) ​

The transition in the 2026-10-13 change to K5 is removed: a request without a registration certificate (remote and proximity) is rejected from today; the wallet stops without asking the person. There is no 2028-08-11 date and no warning + "Don't share" path. Wallet-to-wallet proximity does not change. Precondition: the registrations of the live verifiers carry their identification numbers and the publisher issues a registration certificate for every intended use (K4).

Status ​

Accepted — 2026-09-29. Approved by project management (H1 plan, P2). DECISIONS: D-REG-2.

Change (2026-10-13): K4 and K5 changed as in the "Change" section above (one registration certificate per request, no credential_ids and no registrar_dataset; warning + "Don't share" for a request without one, rejection after 2028-08-11; euWrprc in proximity). Approved by project management (first EU alignment review, decision 14).

Change (2026-10-19): the warning transition of K5 until 2028-08-11 is removed; a request without a registration certificate is rejected from today (ADR-0056 K10, D-API-3). Approved by project management (security review of 2026-10-19).