Plain summary
- When a state or the EU publishes its own trust list, Tamga's list of lists (LOTL) shows that list's address, signer and what it may vouch for. The list stays with its owner; Tamga only collects.
- Wallets and verifiers keep trusting a single thing: the root key of the Tamga LOTL. The LOTL tells them the rest.
- An external list cannot go beyond its scope. For example, a list that vouches only for identity providers cannot add an institution issuing diplomas.
- Today there is no external list in the LOTL. Adding a list is a separate approval.
- The verifier also recognises the EU identity credential (PID) and the driving licence (mDL). Nested fields in the EU identity (address sub-fields, the nationalities array) can be disclosed selectively.
Context
ADR-0035 positioned Tamga Network as a federationA model in which each country runs its own trust list and a list of trusted lists brings them together; Tamga can also show external lists.: it collects country lists and introduces them to each other. ADR-0009 had set the hand-over goal: when the state arrives, the list's owner changes, the identifiers do not. There was no technical gate for this:
- The code read only lists signed by the Tamga root and in the Tamga format (
tamga-tl+jwt). - States and the EU publish their lists in ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards Institute)The European standards body that writes the technical standards for trust lists, signatures and trust services. formats. For the eIDAS 2.0 wallet roles (wallet providerThe organisation that offers a wallet, registers its wallet units and signs wallet and key attestations. Each wallet runs its own provider; the network does not run one, it lists them in the trusted list.s, PID (Person Identification Data)The core identity data a state issues at the highest assurance level. Tamga does not take this role; its identity credential is not a PID. providers, access certificateThe X.509 certificate a relying party signs its requests with; its client identifier is derived from this certificate's hash. providers) the EU uses ETSI TS 119 602 "Lists of Trusted Entities" (LoTE (List of Trusted Entities)The ETSI TS 119 602 list format; Tamga publishes a LoTE view of its lists and can read external LoTE lists.).
- Our issuance service issued credentialA digital document signed by an issuer and held in the person's wallet; the person shows only the fields that are asked for.s only to wallets of wallet providers in the Tamga list. A TÜBİTAK or EU wallet therefore could not obtain credentials from Tamga institutions.
- The verifierThe party that checks a presented credential: signature, issuer in the trust list, status and policy. Also called relying party. did not recognise the EU PID / mDL (mobile Driving Licence)A driving licence held in a wallet in the mdoc format (ISO/IEC 18013-5). types. The SD-JWT package could only disclose top-level fields; there was no nested selective disclosureShowing only the fields a verifier asks for from a credential, and nothing else. (RFC 9901 §4.2).
Project management approved closing these gaps (2026-10-01; the verbatim quote is in the private approval record).
Decision
K1 — External list pointer in the LOTL
lotl.external_lists[]. Each entry contains:
| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
list_id | Permanent identifier |
territory | Country (ISO 3166-1) or EU |
format | etsi-lote-json (read); etsi-tl-xml (read — note of 2026-10-12: ETSI TS 119 612 XML reader with XML signature verification, packages 0.5.0; the same FD rules) |
list_url | Original publication address |
signing_keys | SHA-256 fingerprints of the certificates that sign the list; pinned in the Tamga-signed LOTL |
operator | The list operator |
status | Status |
scope | Scope: see K2 below |
approval | Approval date and record (FD4) |
The publisher keeps a copy of the list at trust.tamga.network/external/<list_id>.jws (npm run trust:external). Readers use this copy first and the original address otherwise. In both cases the signature is checked against the signer pinned in the LOTL (List of Trusted Lists)The signed list that points to the countries' trust lists, their signers and their recognition status.; the copy cannot change the content.
K2 — Scope
scope.entity_kinds ⊂ {wallet_provider, pid_provider, eaa_provider, access_ca}. For PID and EAA (Electronic Attestation of Attributes)The eIDAS term for a credential that attests attributes of a person, such as a degree or a membership. providers scope.vct (the credential types that may be vouched for) is mandatory. The institution's classification shown in the verification policy comes from the scope: category, assurance, class, recognized_by. For wallet providers min_key_storage may be set.
K3 — Reading rules
- Every external list is independent. If one is missing, stale or unverifiable, the freshness of the Tamga lists is not affected. Questions depending on that list return UNKNOWN (INDETERMINATE at the verifier).
- ETSI service type → role mapping follows the path segment of the URI:
WalletSolution,PID,EAA,WRPAC.…/Issuancemeans signing,…/Revocationmeans status listA compressed, signed list in which each credential has one position that tells whether it is valid, suspended or revoked. signing. Withdrawn services are not taken. - The service certificate in the list is a trust anchorThe root key or certificate a verifier trusts first; everything else is checked back to it.: it may be a CA or the signer itself. The verifier takes the fingerprint of the anchor the credential chain leads to and resolves the external institution from it.
- The sequence number cannot go back (rollback rejected). An unknown
LoTEVersionIdentifieris not loaded (CMP2).
K4 — Issuance (external wallets)
An institution accepts the wallet attestation (WIA (Wallet Instance Attestation)A short-lived statement signed by the wallet provider that a wallet installation is genuine; issuers check it before issuing./WUA (Wallet Unit Attestation)An attestation by the wallet provider about a wallet unit and the security of its keys; in the current EU texts it is split into WIA and key attestation.) of a provider recognised by an external list whose scope includes wallet_provider. If the min_key_storage in the scope is stricter than the institution's own policy, it applies. The default does not change: unless an external list is added to the LOTL, only the providers in the Tamga list are recognised.
K5 — Verification (external institutions, EU PID, mDL)
- B2: a type that is not in the Tamga catalogue is accepted only on two conditions: the credential chain leads to the anchor of an external list that vouches for this type, and the type is among the external type definitions (
urn:eudi:pid:1,eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1,org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL). B4 (Tamga catalogue digest) does not apply in this case. For Tamga typesvct#integrityremains mandatory. - C: C1/C2 come from the external list's freshness and scope. C3 is evaluated with
recognized_byin the scope. C4 andissconsistency do not apply. - D: The status list signer is the institution's revocation service certificate in the external list (otherwise the anchor itself).
- E: E1–E3 are unchanged; for nested paths (
address.locality) the scope is evaluated on the field itself or its ancestor.
K6 — Nested selective disclosure
SD-JWT VC (Selective Disclosure JWT Verifiable Credential)The JSON-based credential format with selective disclosure, used for online presentation in the EUDI Wallet and in Tamga. processing follows RFC 9901 §7.1. Objects use _sd, array elements use {"...": digest}; disclosed values are resolved recursively; every disclosureIn SD-JWT, one field value packed with a random salt; the holder hands over only the disclosures the verifier needs. is used exactly once; an unmatched disclosure is rejected. Paths take the form a.b and a[i]. The rule has a single implementation (@tamga-network/core/sd-structure); the verifier and the wallet use the same code. DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language)The query language a verifier uses in OpenID4VP to say which credentials and which fields it needs. paths (["address","locality"], ["nationalities", null]) are converted to this form.
Invariants
| Code | Rule |
|---|---|
| FD1 | An external list is shown only in the Tamga-signed LOTL with its address, pinned signer fingerprint and scope; a list whose signer does not match the LOTL is not loaded. |
| FD2 | An external list cannot vouch for roles and credential types outside its scope; out-of-scope entries are ignored. |
| FD3 | A missing, stale or unverifiable external list does not affect the freshness of the Tamga lists; every question depending on that list returns UNKNOWN. |
| FD4 | An external list enters, changes in or leaves the LOTL only with project management approval, recorded in the approval field; an entry containing placeholders is not published. |
| FD5 | For Tamga types vct#integrity is mandatory; for external types, trust in the type comes from the external list's signed entry. |
Rationale / alternatives
| Option | Result | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Copying external entries into the Tamga list | rejected | The entry would appear under Tamga's signature: wrong ownership, meaningless hand-over and a risk of false statements. |
| Letting verifiers choose external lists themselves | rejected (as the default) | Every verifier would trust differently; the single trust anchor for wallets and institutions would be lost. Institutions can still supply their own TrustSource (BT4). |
| Pointer in the LOTL + pinned signer + scope | accepted | The EU LOTL model; ownership stays with the list; on hand-over only the address and signer change (ADR-0009). |
| An ETSI TS 119 612 XML reader first | deferred | The EU wallet roles are published in 119 602 JSON; XML (QTSP (Qualified Trust Service Provider)A trust service provider granted qualified status by a national supervisory body under eIDAS.s) becomes relevant with an e-signature partnership. |
Known limits:
- The wallet attestation formats (WIA fields) of external wallet providers may differ by vendor. An interoperability test with a real external wallet must be done separately.
- The
access_cascope is defined but only stored. Showing verifiers with external access certificates in the wallet is later work. - Reading external lists in the wallet is off by default (
externalLists). Turning it on is needed for external institutions' credentials to be recognised in the wallet.
Consequences
Implemented (2026-10-01):
@tamga-network/trust: type, LoTE reader, store,TrustSourceand HTTP / directory loaders.- Publisher: entry validation and
external-fetch. @tamga-network/verifier: resolving external institutions via the anchor, external types and nested paths.@tamga-network/sd-jwtand wallet-core: nested selective disclosure.@tamga-network/issuerand the institution service: the external provider's key storage rule.@tamga-network/schemas: external type definitions.- Tamga Verify: external anchors in the root set.
- Tests: federation conformance tests with a synthetic external LoTE; unit tests for nested disclosure.
- Implementation note (2026-11-11; the decision is unchanged) — "missing / unverifiable" in FD3 and the revocation service in FD2.
@tamga-network/trust0.8.3: questions that depend on an external list which is active in the LOTL but could not be loaded (not supplied, signature or territory not verified, rolled back) also return UNKNOWN — an unknown wallet provider key (if the list can vouch for wallet providers) and an unknown anchor that is not a Tamga root (if the list can vouch for that credential type). Before, these questions were answered "not listed"; UNKNOWN was returned only for a loaded list whose validity had passed. Questions that depend on the Tamga lists are not affected. The read set gainedunavailableExternalListFor(vct): it names the external list that can vouch for a credential type but is unavailable right now (so that a credential whose chain reaches no root can end as "unknown" rather than a rejection). FD2: an external institution's revocation service certificate and supply point are attached only to the issuance service of the same role (in scope); the revocation service of an out-of-scope role is ignored.
Addendum — ETSI TS 119 612 XML list publication (deferred decision, 2026-10-13)
- Topic. Today Tamga reads ETSI TS 119 612 XML trusted lists (K1, note of 2026-10-12) but does not publish its own lists as XML; the lists are published as Tamga JSON + JWS and with an ETSI TS 119 602 (LoTE JSON) view. ARF 3.0 asks wallets, relying parties and issuers to support both formats (ISSU_10b, OIA_15b). In the EU adaptation of ETSI TS 119 472-2 (Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/1731, RO-17) the DCQL
trusted_authoritiestypeetsi_tlrefers to a 119 612 XML list. - Decision: deferred. Publishing a 119 612 XML (XAdES-signed) view of Tamga Network's lists and using the
etsi_tltype in verifier requests is not done today. Verifier requests keepaki(HAIP). - Trigger: the first party from the EU (an EU relying party, wallet, member state or EU body) asking for the Tamga list in 119 612 XML or through
etsi_tl. When the trigger happens the topic goes to project management; estimated work ~3 days (generator, XAdES signature, signing key management; SPEC-ID-0002 §8.1). - Rule that applies today: wallets and verifiers treat a
trusted_authoritiestype they do not know as "no match", never as "passed" (no false positive; release 0.5.2 of the packages).
Status
Accepted — 2026-10-01 (approved by project management). Particular external lists (TÜBİTAK, the EU LOTL, other states) are added with separate approvals.
Addendum (2026-10-13): 119 612 XML list publication and
etsi_tlare deferred; the trigger is the first party from the EU asking for them (see "Addendum" above). Approved by project management (first EU alignment review, decision 15).
Lifted (2026-10-29) — ADR-0066: the deferral of 119 612 XML list publication is lifted; the XML view of the Tamga list is generated under ADR-0066 (sandbox first). Using
etsi_tlin verifier requests is a separate topic;akistays today.
Note (2026-10-13, engineering correction, packages 0.5.2): the "no match" rule above was narrowed — the wallet does not exclude a credential because of a
trusted_authoritiesentry it cannot evaluate ("not evaluable"; the credential is offered and it is not a positive trust signal), and it evaluatesetsi_tlagainst the lists it has loaded; details in SPEC-PROTO-0002 §4.6. The ban on counting it as "passed" is unchanged. When the query containsetsi_tl, the wallet passes the external lists whose signature it verified through the LOTL to matching (TrustSource.externalTrustedLists()); for a credential with only an mdoc copy the chain is read from the mdoc IssuerAuthx5chain. This does not need Tamga Network's own 119 612 XML publication (deferred above): what is evaluated are the lists published by the EU and other states.