Release notes
Changes to the @tamga-network/* packages, the services and the documentation — newest first.
[Unreleased]
Changed
- CRL on a separate host (ADR-0090). Access certificate revocation lists move from
trust.<network>/crl/tocrl.<network>/<authority>.crl, served over bothhttpandhttpswithout redirection. The CRL Distribution Points extension now holds a single distribution point with two names,httpfirst, thenhttps(ETSI EN 319 412-2 GEN-4.3.11-4; clients that block cleartext use the second). The registry settingroles.access_ca.crl.issuers[].uriis thehttpaddress; the publisher derives thehttpstwin (crlUrisOf) and checks the host against the trusted-list host (crlHostOf). Newops/crl-dp.ts;gen-pki.tsandpki-issue.ts --crl-uri http://crl.…/<authority>.crlwrite both names. The sandbox access CA certificate was reissued with the same key.
0.8.7 — 2026-11-17
All ten packages move to 0.8.7 together (patch release). The code changes are in wallet-core (identity number in the driving licence attestation, TS10 password 12, externalListsDirect) and trust (externalListsDirect); the other eight packages carry the version number. Published on npm on 2026-11-17.
Changed
- wallet-core — driving licence attestation: the identity presentation also discloses the identity number (ADR-0039 open question 1, D-ID-8 note).
identityPresentationForIssuerdisclosespersonal_administrative_numberin addition togiven_name,family_nameandbirthdatewhen the identity credential has it; the identity service compares it only as a keyed digest with the number on the card (TR) and never writes it to the credential. Without it, a card that carries an identity number is refused ("identity number not disclosed"). - wallet-core — TS10 migration file password at least 12 characters (
TS10_MIN_PASSWORD8 → 12; ADR-0027 note). Only export checks it; import keeps opening older files protected with 8+ characters. - trust-publisher — ADR-0081 RR3 is enforced: once the previous signed list or the new source contains an issuer or relying party that is not the provisional operator's own record (the first participant institution), no removal is published, even with an approved removal record (
participantRecords; production only). - trust-publisher — gate groups before suspension (Y9):
statusandrp-statusprint the active gate groups bound to the institution and theend-usecommands to withdraw them first (ADR-0069 TG1; the build still refuses such a list). - Registry — Tamga Verify's uses carry the network privacy page (
privacy_policy_uri: https://tamga.network/privacy, ADR-0024 RPR3); it reaches the signed list and the registration certificates with the next publication.
Added
- trust / wallet-core —
externalListsDirect(defaulttrue, behaviour unchanged):falseuses only the publisher's copy of an external list and never contacts the external list server directly (that server would see the client's IP address and the fetch time).
Documentation
- SPEC-ID-0003 §9.3 (driving licence prerequisite and match), GUIDE-0017 §7 (withdraw gate groups before suspending), ADR-0081 implementation note (RR3), ADR-0027 note (password 12), wallet guides (password 12) — tr/en/az. RS-EIDAS-0001 §9.1 intermediate steps for non-EU countries (TC AdES LOTL pilot, regional recognition).
0.8.6 — 2026-11-16
All ten packages move to 0.8.6 together (patch release). The code changes are in wallet-core (standard mdoc path for the identity credential, identity renewal, future-dated credentials, credentialValidity), trust (isIssuerSuspended, walletProviderOfKey), verifier (suspended issuer at C1, verifier/zk fixes), issuer, sd-jwt, mdoc and schemas (nbf, mdoc configuration scope, expiry_date, date_of_expiry) and zk (Android libraries rebuilt with ruzstd 0.9.1); core and onboard carry the version number (and, for onboard, a test time limit). The single-credential rule for presentations is in the reference verifier (apps/verify), not in the packages. Published on npm on 2026-11-16.
Migration notes (for app developers)
- Schema hashes changed. Every credential type's type metadata hash (
vct#integrity) is new (nbf,date_of_expiry, name length). Issuers and verifiers must use the current catalog and trust list (already published on the live network, list v266); a hash pinned in your own code must be updated. - A suspended issuer's credentials are now
REJECTEDat C1 (failed_reason: "issuer suspended"), also those issued before the suspension. Before, only credentials issued during the suspension were dropped. Show "temporarily not accepted" rather than "invalid"; once the suspension is lifted, the earlier credentials are accepted again. A customTrustSourceshould implementisIssuerSuspendedso the reason can be told apart. - Wallet developers: the identity credential's mdoc copy now comes from the issuer's separate
mso_mdocconfiguration; an issuer that only put the mdoc into the non-standardmso_mdocresponse field gives a credential without an mdoc copy. Show validity withcredentialValidity(not_yet_validandissuer_suspendedare new states) and schedule identity renewal withscheduleIdentityRenewals/identityRenewalDue→renewIdentityCredential; a future-dated credential is kept but not offered for presentation until itsnbf. - zk: rebuild the app after updating (the native libraries changed); no code change.
Changed
- Identity credential: standard mdoc configuration, renewal of short-lived copies, wallet provider suspension (ADR-0089).
wallet-core:obtainCredentialrequests the mdoc copy through the issuer's separatemso_mdocconfiguration (same scope,doctype= vct; newmdocCompanionConfigId) with a second standard credential request using the same keys in the same order; the non-standardmso_mdocfield of the credential response is no longer read. Newidentity-renewalmodule:renewIdentityCredential(refresh token + DPoP + WIA + a presentation of a copy with all claims disclosed → new batch replaces the old credential; ZK copies and passes are kept;invalid_grantremoves the binding,temporarily_unavailable= provider suspended, binding kept),identityRenewalDue,scheduleIdentityRenewals(2 unused copies / 7 days, random delay ≤ 6 h),fullIdentityPresentation;StoredCredential.renewDueAt; institution silent refresh no longer covers the identity credential.schemas: optionaldate_of_expiry(administrative validity) onIdentityAttestation(type metadata hash changes).mdoc:expiry_dateis afull-dateelement.issuer:mdocConfigurations[]take an optionalscopeandreusePolicy.trust: optionalTrustSource.walletProviderOfKey(provider id of a WIA/KA signing key, regardless of status). - Credentials of a suspended issuer are not accepted (ADR-0088). While an issuer is
SUSPENDEDin the trust list, C1 rejects all of its credentials regardless of issuance time (REJECTED,failed_step: "C1",failed_reason: "issuer suspended"); once the suspension is lifted, credentials issued before it are accepted again, those issued during it never. Revocation, retirement and expiry keep the issuance-time rule.trust: new optionalTrustSource.isIssuerSuspended;ListTrustSource, the chain trust source (apps/chain-indexer) andIssuerRegistry.isCredentialAcceptablegive the same answer. Earlier the suspension only dropped credentials issued during it (ADR-0073 K5, changed). wallet-core: a future-dated credential (nbfahead) is no longer rejected on receipt;verifyIssuedSdJwtreturnsnbfandnotYetValid, the stored credential keepsnbf, its mdoc copy is checked at the start time, and remote and proximity presentation selection skip it until it is valid (ARF 3.0 "Issued"). A malformednbfornbf ≥ expis rejected.issuer:buildCredentialswritesnbf(default: the issuance timeiat; optionalnbffor a future start).sd-jwt:issueSdJwtVctakes an optionalnbf(integer,≥ iat,< exp).schemas: every credential type schema allowsnbf; inIdentityAttestationfamily_name/given_nameare limited to 150 characters (EU PID mdoc text rule). The type metadata hashes change (development stage, ADR-0029).
Added
wallet-core:credentialValidity(cred, { now, trust })→valid·not_yet_valid·expired·revoked·suspended·issuer_suspended(withvalidFrom,validUntil,presentable) andisNotYetValid; receipt from a suspended issuer gives a distinct message.
Fixed
trust: malformed XML that the parser rejects by throwing directly (for example]]>outside a CDATA section) now surfaces asXmlSignatureErrorlike every other malformed list, instead of a plainError(found by the property test in CI).verifier/zk: the native backend no longer lets a write to a dead prover process crash the host (stdinerror listener).verifier/zk: the bundled WASM verifier is rebuilt withruzstd0.9.1 (RUSTSEC-2026-0344).zk: the three Android libraries are rebuilt withruzstd0.9.1 (RUSTSEC-2026-0344; 0.8.5 shipped 0.8.3), still 16 KB aligned. No API change.onboard: the security test has a longer time limit (cold CLI starts under load).
Applications and repository (not part of the npm packages)
apps/verify: a presentation is verified for one credential only (plus an optional pseudonym); a policy with a second credential is refused instead of silently checking the first (ARF discussion #775, credential pooling; SPEC-API-0001 §1.5).
Documents
- ADR-0088; Tamga ARF Risk Register (FW-RISK-0001, self-assessment against the CIR 2024/2981 risk register); Annex D terms (Wallet Instance, LoTE, Access CA, RP Instance, registration certificate provider, scheme owner, logical / technical credential; "verifier" = EU Relying Party); Annex E: eight EU sources; Identity Rulebook PID mapping rows (
place_of_birth,issuing_authoritywithout counterpart,issuing_countrymeaning).
0.8.5 — 2026-11-15
All ten packages move to 0.8.5 together (patch release). The code changes in the packages are in wallet-core (POST fetch of the request object, single-use approvals, the closed chip carrier), verifier (one optional option) and zk (rebuilt Android libraries); the other packages carry the version number and README wording. The chain tools (ADR-0084/0085/0086) and the access certificate revocation list (ADR-0087) are in the list publisher and the repository tools, not in the npm packages. Published on npm on 2026-11-15.
Migration notes (for app developers)
- wallet-core approvals are single-use. Call
checkRpagain before retrying a failedrespond, and do not change the request'sstateor response encryption key betweencheckRpandrespond(both now givetrust_error). request_uri_method=postis optional. A wallet that keeps callingfetchRequestObject(GET) works as before. To support POST:parseVpUri→fetchRequestObjectFor(uri, http, { randomBytes })→verifyRequestObject(…, { walletNonce })with the returnedwalletNonce. A verifier that setsrequestUriMethod: "post"must keep serving GET on the request URI.- zk: rebuild the app after updating (the native libraries changed); no code change.
- Chip carrier: nothing to do; it stays closed (see below).
Added
request_uri_method=postin the wallet core (OpenID4VP 1.0 §5.10):parseVpUrireturnsrequestUriMethod; newfetchRequestObjectFormakes an HTTPS POST (application/x-www-form-urlencoded,Accept: application/oauth-authz-req+jwt) with a freshwallet_nonce(newWalletNonce) and optionalwallet_metadata;verifyRequestObjecttakeswalletNonceand rejects a request object without the samewallet_nonce. The GET path is unchanged; an unknownrequest_uri_methodis rejected.@tamga-network/verifier:requestUriMethod: "post"writes the parameter into the QR / link (a wallet without POST fetches with GET, so the request URI must serve both). The reference verifier (apps/verify) now sets it (its request URI already served GET and POST).- wallet-core — identity document chip carrier, switched off (ADR-0083).
chipReadRequestOf(url, authorizationServer)checks the identity service's/chip/read?r=…&c=…address (same origin as the authorization server, exact path) and returns the/chip/submitaddress, the opaque handle and the 8-byte active authentication challenge;submitChipRead(…)relays the raw chip data (SOD, DG1, DG2; DG11, DG14, DG15, the active authentication signature and CardAccess if present) unchanged, base64url in a JSON body with the wallet attestation headers, and returns thenextaddress (same origin only). The wallet does not interpret chip data (CV4); no field goes into logs or error messages.CHIP_READER_PARAM/CHIP_READER_ICAO9303: the PAR fieldchip_reader=icao9303. Closed: the code ships in this release, but nothing calls it until the chip path is turned on in the identity service; opening depends on the identity service's key and a favourable legal opinion (ADR-0083 K11, CV7).
Changed
- Presentation approvals are single-use and bound to
stateand the response encryption key (wallet core; self-audit against the EU reference library's 0.32.0 fixes, #440):respondconsumes thecheckRpapproval on its first call, and an approval no longer matches a request whosestateor encryption key was changed aftercheckRp. The approval is consumed before the response is built, so a failedrespondcannot be retried with the same approval. - zk — Android libraries aligned for 16 KB pages (Android 15+ devices; Google Play requires it for apps targeting Android 15+). The three native libraries are linked with
-z max-page-size=16384and-z common-page-size=16384(NDK r27c); the build script and packing check every library withpackages/zk/scripts/elf-align.mjs(eachLOADsegment aligned to at least 16 KB,GNU_RELROsafe) and fail on a 4 KB-aligned one. Earlier releases shipped 4 KB-aligned libraries. No API change.
Applications and repository (not part of the npm packages)
- Revocation list (CRL) for access certificates (ADR-0087, AR1–AR5; ETSI TS 119 411-8 REV-6.3.9-04). The list publisher issues an RFC 5280 v2 CRL per issuing authority (
crl/<authority>.crl, DER, AKI + CRL Number, a reasonCode per entry,nextUpdate24 hours; re-signed on every publication and on the hourly heartbeat). When a verifier is suspended or revoked its access certificate is revoked in the same publication (privilegeWithdrawn), on retirement withcessationOfOperation, when it leaves the registry withsuperseded; nocertificateHold. An active registration that points to a revoked access certificate stops publication before the list is signed (AR3). New commandscrl-statusandcrl-revoke <access_cert> --reason <code>; state inaccess-crl-state.json(rebuilt from the published CRL if lost). An offline authority's CRL (the root) is signed on its own computer and only checked and published. Settingnational_lists[].roles.access_ca.crl(publisher-internal, not written to the LOTL); enabled in the sandbox registry. Registration certificates keep their own status list (ADR-0068). - Access certificate authority in the PKI tools (ADR-0087 K2):
ops/gen-pki.tscreatesaccess-ca-1(root-signed, path length 0, keyCertSign + cRLSign) in the development and sandbox PKI, writes the CRL Distribution Points extension into access certificates, and--root-crl [--revoke=<serial>:<reason>,…]signs the root's CRL (365 days).ops/pki-issue.tsgains--ca <authority>and--crl-uri <url>(mandatory for a production access certificate); the authority certificate of an access certificate issued byaccess-ca-1is written to<name>.chain.pem. - Governance key separated from the node (consensus) key (ADR-0086, KG1–KG5). Every member record in
Governancenow holds two addresses: the QBFT node address (validatorAddress) and the governance (vote) address (governanceAddress, withgovernanceSince). All on-chain authority — proposals, votes, vote and proposal retraction, the delegate list, withdrawal, the SchemaRegistry binding — moved to the current governance address (onlyValidator→onlyGovernor,NotValidator→NotGovernor); the node key has no authority on the chain and leaves the Besu account allowlist (the governance key is listed instead). A member changes its node address with its own governance key, without a vote (setValidatorAddress); the governance key changes only throughproposeGovernanceKeyChange(kindGOVERNANCE_KEY_CHANGE): 2/3 of active members (at least 2) and a supporting vote cast with the changing member's current key (KeyChangeNeedsOwnVote), so a majority cannot take over a state's delegate list. An address is used in one state and one role only (ValidatorInUse,KeyInUse); released addresses stay bound to their state.initialize(founders, validators, governors)andproposeStateAdmission(code, validator, governance)take the governance address. Storage: members appended to the mapping-value structs,_governanceToStatetaken from__gap(37 → 36); the layout check passes, the baseline was renewed (no chain is running). Governance code size 23,872 bytes (headroom 704). Key maptamga-chain-keys/1gains agovernancekey per state; local development rule: governance key = Hardhat node account + 10 (deploy-dev.ts,testnet.mjs,make-network.sh,scripts/besu-dev.ps1— an existing local Besu development chain must be reset). SPEC-BC-0001 §1, ARCH-0002 (open issue 6 closed) and the node handbook updated. - Governance command tool, switched off (
trust:chain-gov, proposed name):status,show,queue,propose <kind>(admit, remove, key-change, upgrade, anchorer, anchor-threshold, founder-recognition, migration-open/extend/close, schema-deprecate/revoke/hash, network-schema, network-record, rp-reassign, rp-reregister),vote,retract,cancel,execute(an upgrade is queued first and applied after the delay),revote(re-casts last votes that are no longer counted after an upgrade or a key change),set-node,set-delegates,withdraw. Signing is abstract (GovernanceSigner): local development keys and the test/staging key map today; the hardware key store path stops with an explicit message. Writes only to the local and test chain; on the real network it reads and prints the call data. With the flag off it does not connect (--dry-runstill encodes the call). A reason text is written only as its SHA-256 digest. - Chain health and alarms (
trust:chain-health, proposed name; formattamga-chain-health/1): block stall, peers, incomplete continuous-projection run, projection lag over two hours, list anchoringNO/CONFLICT/CONTESTand versions left unanchored for more than two hours;--monitorprints one[!] chain: <CODE> <message>line per problem for an operator's monitoring script. With the flag off:"status": "disabled", exit 0. Exit codes 0 / 4 (warning) / 5 (alarm). - Shadow chain setup (
network/testnet/shadow-chain.sh): one command on a Linux server sets up an N-validator QBFT test chain with generated keys, mirrors the real network's signed lists and archive read-only (apps/chain-indexer/scripts/mirror-lists.ts, verified), and runs the bootstrap with them (contracts, Governance, permissions, anchoring, migration window + replay of the real archive + equivalence);sync(hourly) mirrors new versions, runs the continuous projection, anchors with each anchorer and checks chain health;report;--dry-runprints every command and runs in CI (testnetworkflow, lint job). GUIDE-0018: "Shadow chain" with minimum server requirements, "Chain health" and "Governance command tool". - Continuous chain projection, switched off (ADR-0085; list is the source, chain is a witness — ADR-0084). After the migration window has closed,
trust:chain-sync(proposed name) turns the difference between the last projected signed list archive and the current one into chain operations with the migration's plan engine — plan(now) − plan(before) — and writes them with block-time dates (hard revocation and status list publication moment keep the list's date). Intermediate states of the same record within one run are merged (only the final state is written); a future-dated record (e.g. an authorisation end) is written in the first run after its time has come; network-level records and network schemas go through Governance proposals; execution checks the final state on the chain, so a repeated run writes nothing; at most 500 writes per run. Only a complete run advances the projection point (<dist>/chain-sync.json, written bytrust:chain-replaywhen the migration finishes without differences); an incomplete run exits 5 and is retried. Writes only to the local development chain and the test/staging chain; there is no write path to the real network. A post-publication hook runschain-syncandchain-submitafterbuild,heartbeatandanchoronly whileTAMGA_CHAIN_ENABLED=1; with the flag off it does nothing, and its errors never stop or change list publication. Pure plannerplanChainSync(apps/trust-publisher), executorexecuteChainSync(apps/chain-indexer); the replay plan engine takes an optional plan time; the equivalence test takes lag intervals[list date, chain date). Tests: planner and hook without a network; continuous equivalence on the local chain (migration → issuer added, suspension, revocation, merged suspend + reinstate, wallet provider key and access certificate change, status list version, future-dated authorisation end — list = chain at every step). No contract change.
Documents
- ADR-0087 (tr / en / az): revocation list (CRL) for access certificates — suspension, revocation and retirement revoke the access certificate in the same publication, permanent revocation instead of
certificateHold, online access certificate authority, 24-hour CRL under the trust-list domain (/crl/<authority>.crl), registration certificates stay on their status list, the Tamga wallet core does not fetch the CRL (rules AR1–AR5). SPEC-TRUST-0001 §2 (file layout) and version note; SPEC-PROTO-0002 §3request_uri_methodrow and version note; SPEC-PROTO-0001issuer_inforow (the identity service publishes it too). - ADR-0084 (tr / en / az): the signed trust lists are the single, authoritative source in every chain stage and the chain is a witness — verification decisions only from the list, reading the chain only for cross-checking, a stopped chain does not affect lists or verification, every difference raises an alarm; the move is a test network first, then the real network. ADR-0051's provision that in the chain stage "lists are published as the chain's projection" changed; the question ADR-0073 left open is closed; ADR-0074's temporary limit on the chain trust source became permanent (notes in all three, three languages). ADR-0085 (tr / en / az): continuous projection (rules SP1–SP7). Tamga ARF §8.1: the trust anchor stays the signed lists in every phase, the ledger is a witness (release 1.0 archive refreshed). ARCH-0002 (Besu network setup): source direction, the first network with two independent operators (2 × 2 validators), current contract names, applications do not read the chain, test network → real network conditions, monitoring; QBFT open point closed.
- ADR-0083 amendment (2026-11-13; tr / en / az): K11 and CV7 changed — the code of the chip path may be written now, behind a switch that is off by default (the identity service refuses to run on a server while it is on; store builds of the wallet contain no chip reading; the code runs only in local tests with fake document data). The chip path still opens only after a favourable legal opinion. First version: clone check by active authentication only (chip authentication later); no DG11 on the chip closes the chip path for that document; face matching gives the DG2 photo to the provider as the reference image. Interface names
/chip/read,/chip/submit,/chip/continue, PAR fieldchip_reader. Identity proofing specification (version note), ADR-0011 note, Identity Rulebook wording (release 1.0 archive refreshed).
0.8.4 — 2026-11-12
All ten packages move to 0.8.4 together (patch release). The code change in the packages is in wallet-core (additions only; without the new options the behaviour is that of 0.8.3); the other packages carry the version number and README wording. Published on npm on 2026-11-13.
Added
- wallet-core — copy state and reuse decision for proximity and wallet-to-wallet presentation (wallet rules §4.1, target behaviour decided 2026-11-12). Every proximity session uses a new copy; running out must not leave the person standing at the door. The core gives the decision and the state, the app makes the refresh call and shows the warning:
proximityCopies(credential, lowAt?)returns{ total, remaining, low, exhausted, refreshable }for the copies that can be shown in proximity (those with an mdoc);planProximityCopy(credential, { online, lowAt? })adds the action for the table in the specification —present,refresh_first(no copy left, device online),reuse_with_warning(no copy left, device offline),unavailable— andrefreshInBackground(few copies left and the credential has a refresh token).presentProximityandpresentToPersoncarry the state to the caller:copiesin the consent view (before the session) and in the result (after), andreusedin the result.- New option
reuseLastCopy: when no unused copy is left, the last copy is reused — only when the caller passes the option, that is after the person accepted the warning that this presentation can be linked to the previous one. Reuse always falls on the same copy (copies shown only in proximity are preferred over one a remote verifier has seen), and the presentation log entry is markedreused: true(PresentationLogEntry.reused). Without the option the behaviour is unchanged: the session ends with an error and no copy is reused; the reason is exported asPROXIMITY_NO_COPY_REASON. selectProximityCopy(credential, { reuseLastCopy? })andPROXIMITY_COPY_PREFIXare exported for callers that build their own flow. Copy selection in proximity now takes the first unused copy that has an mdoc (before: the first unused copy, which failed the session if that copy had no mdoc while another one did).
- wallet-core —
beforeSendhook inpresentProximityandpresentToPerson(found by an independent review). The copy was marked as used only in the returned state: if the app stopped while the response was being sent, the mark was lost and the same copy could be given to another reader as unused. The optional hook is called once, after the response is built and signed and immediately before it is sent, with the state in which the copy is marked; the caller saves it. If the hook throws, nothing is sent and the returned state is unchanged. Same contract asrespond({ beforeSend }). - wallet-core — final identity confirmation in the authorization-code flow (
confirmIdentity; ADR-0080). When the identity service returns a masked summary of the verified identity with the token (identity_confirmation: initials and birth year, never full values),completeAuthorizedcalls the new optionalconfirmIdentity(prompt)before the credential is requested; the app shows the summary and returns the person's decision. The decision is sent to the identity service (DPoP and the wallet attestation, same as the token request). Onfalseno credential is requested and the error code is the newidentity_rejected; the confirmation endpoint must be on the authorization server's origin, otherwise the access token is not sent. Without the option nothing changes — an identity service that requires the confirmation then refuses the credential request. TypesIdentityConfirmationPrompt,IdentityConfirmationSummary. - wallet-core —
sharedBefore(state, rpKey, requested, { vct? })for the notice about earlier sharing (WL6, wallet rules §4.2): from the presentation log on the device it returns how often and when something was sent to this verifier, the field names shared before with the date each was last sent, which requested fields were shared before (again) and which are requested for the first time (firstTime). Only sent presentations count; values are never returned. The key is the verifier's persistent identity (the registereddns_name); proximity readers and wallet-to-wallet peers have none, so nothing is returned for them.
Changed
- onboard — README: the sentence about provenance now says that the package is published by hand for now (0.8.2 and 0.8.3) and will carry provenance once it moves to the automated release workflow; the command table was reformatted. This wording was written after 0.8.3 was published, so it first ships with 0.8.4. No code change.
Applications and repository (not part of the npm packages)
- Trust list publisher — closing a validity period cannot rewrite the past, and the comparison uses the previous signed list (record removal check, SPEC-TRUST-0001 TL2; found by an independent review). (1) An open period of a scope or a terminal group could be closed with any earlier date, even one before
valid_fromor in 1970, without an approved removal entry — a retroactive rewrite of what the previous signed list stated. The new end must now be at or aftervalid_fromand at or after the publication time (issued_at) of the previous signed list. (2) Whether a period is still open was decided by the time of the new publication: a row ending on 1 December, closed withend-useon 30 November and published on 2 December, counted as already closed and stopped the build. The comparison now uses the publication time of the previous signed list. - Chain stage (contracts; no production chain):
- ADR-0082: the state of a revoked issuer can correct, change or remove its successor afterwards (
IssuerRegistry.setIssuerSuccessor, eventIssuerSuccessorSet, errorIssuerNotRevoked). Before, the successor was written in one step with the revocation and could not be changed: a wrong successor was permanent, and the status lists froze when an issuer was revoked without a successor or when the successor itself was closed. - ADR-0082: the delegate key mapping in
Governanceis kept per state. A state could block another state's delegate assignment by writing the same key into its own list first (DelegateKeyInUse); the error is removed, and one state's list neither touches nor blocks another's. Only a state's own delegate writes to its records, as before. Storage: slot 2 ofGovernanceis retyped (_delegateToState→_isDelegate); there is no deployed chain, so the storage baseline was rewritten. Governance runtime code 22,880 bytes (1,696 bytes of headroom). - Migration window (ADR-0073 implementation note): while the window is open the start of validity (
validFrom) must be given explicitly when a root CA, an issuer or a schema is registered; an undated start is rejected except from Governance (DateRequiredDuringMigration). Before, the start silently became the block time, could not be corrected, and every credential issued before that moment was rejected for that record. - Votes after a Governance upgrade: verified from the code and by test that an upgrade to a version that records vote times cannot lock itself (the threshold is counted before the upgrade call); other open proposals and queued upgrades wait until the members cast their votes again in the same direction, which is accepted. Written as an explicit step into the contract specification (§9) and the network set-up document (step 11). No code change.
- Development tools:
hardhat3.20.0 → 3.21.2 and@nomicfoundation/hardhat-ethers4.2.1 → 4.2.2 (no major change); the remainingnpm auditnotices (zod through hardhat, glob and minimatch through mocha) have no fix without a major change and affect development tools only.
- ADR-0082: the state of a revoked issuer can correct, change or remove its successor afterwards (
Documents
- Wallet rules (SPEC-WALLET-0001 §4.1, §4.2; tr / en / az): the wallet-core part of the target behaviour when copies run out in proximity and of the notice about earlier sharing is ready in 0.8.4; the app screens are pending.
- ADR-0082 (accepted 2026-11-12; tr / en / az): correctable issuer successor and per-state delegate keys (IS1–IS2, DK1–DK2). ADR-0073 implementation note (tr / en / az): the explicit-date rule of the migration window also covers the start of a record. Contract specification: N1, §1, §3, §7.3, §9, §16.1.
- ADR-0083 (accepted 2026-11-13; tr / en / az): the identity document chip is read over NFC by the wallet that started the flow and verified by the identity service (passive authentication and a clone check); face and liveness stay with a replaceable provider (CV1–CV7). IDP3 is narrowed: a wallet may read the chip and relay the raw data unchanged. No code for the chip path until a legal opinion is favourable. Identity proofing specification (IDP3, §9
document_chip_verified), ADR-0011 note, Tamga ARF (Tamga Rulebook RB-AP-ID-01, Identity Rulebookdocument_chip_verified; release 1.0 archive refreshed).
0.8.3 — 2026-11-11
All ten packages move to 0.8.3 together (patch release) after an independent review of the 0.8.2 code base (2026-11-10). Published on npm on 2026-11-12.
Fixed after a second review (2026-11-11)
A code review of the changes above found the following; the fixes are part of 0.8.3.
- onboard —
check --report/node check --reportcan be run twice. An earlier change in this release made the report file exclusive-create and wrote it before printing the result, so the second run of the same command failed withEEXISTafter all checks had run and the result table was never printed. The result is now printed first, and a report file is refreshed when the existing file is an earlier report of this tool (written beside it and renamed, so a symbolic link is never followed). Any other existing file — another JSON document, a symbolic link — is still never overwritten and gives a clear error; the.jsonand key-like-name rules are unchanged. - trust —
fetchListTrustSourcerefuses anadditionalStatesentry it cannot load. A state that is not in the LOTL, whose list is not ACTIVE (suspended), or whose code is not two letters was skipped silently and the load stayed healthy, so the caller believed the cross-country name rule (ADR-0075) was in effect with fewer lists than it asked for. Each case is now aTrustListError, as the option's documentation already said. - chain indexer — an index without
errorsresumes; pending errors are retried without a new block. An index saved before theerrorsfield existed failed withretry is not iterable; a missing field is now an empty list. Records whose read failed are retried on the nextsynceven when the chain has no new block (at the block the index is pinned to). - chain replay — event counts scan the chain once. Every numbered plan operation re-read the chain from block 0 in 2,000-block slices to count one event; logs are now collected once per contract and event and only new blocks are read after that. The answers are the same.
- contracts — a network schema proposal no longer becomes unexecutable when its
validFrompasses during the vote. Since the 2026-11-10 change the schema registry refuses a pastvalidFromoutside the migration window, while a Governance proposal storesvalidFromwhen it is opened and sends it unchanged at execution: a proposal opened with the current time (or a date that passes while the vote is open) could never be executed. When the caller is Governance, a start that is already past is now written as the execution time; a later date is kept, and the rule is unchanged for delegates and the migration executor. Source and tests only: an already deployed registry needs a protocol upgrade vote. Until then givevalidFromas0or a date after the voting period. - contracts — an upgrade proposal pins the code it was opened with.
proposeProtocolUpgradestored only the address of the new implementation. The chain runs with Shanghai rules, whereSELFDESTRUCTremoves code, so an implementation deployed withCREATE2could be destroyed during the 7-day delay and redeployed at the same address with different code. The proposal now stores the implementation's code hash andexecuterefuses a different code (UpgradeImplementationChanged), both when queueing and when applying. Storage: one member appended to the upgrade queue struct (a mapping value;__gapunchanged). - contracts — Governance has room again and the build checks it. The deployed code was 24,530 of 24,576 bytes (EIP-170), which left no room for a fix. The validator check and repeated proposal checks moved into shared internal functions: 22,881 bytes with everything in this list included; external interface and storage layout unchanged.
npm run contracts:checknow fails when any contract has less than 512 bytes of headroom. - contracts — proposal payloads can be read from the chain. New views on Governance:
getSchemaPayload(network schema proposal),upgradePayloadOf(initialiser selector and pinned code hash) andremovalReasonOf(reason digest of a removal proposal), so that a voter can read what the vote will execute. - contracts —
Governance.initializerefuses the zero state code. A founder with code0x0000was accepted as an active member. - contracts — the migration executor can deprecate only the network schemas it wrote. During a migration window the executor could deprecate any network schema with a back-dated time (
deprecateSchemaAt(…, 1)), which rejects every credential issued with that schema and cannot be undone. A network schema registered by Governance can now be deprecated only by Governance; replayed schemas are unchanged (ADR-0073 K1). Same reasoning as the 2026-11-04 change for revocation. Storage: one mapping inSchemaRegistry(__gap44 → 43). - contracts — the schema step of C2 honours
validFrom; an authorisation needs a registered schema.isSchemaAcceptableAtignoredvalidFrom, so a schema registered with a future start accepted credentials from the day of registration; it now requiresiat ≥ validFrom(the chain indexer applies the same rule).setSchemaAuthorization(…, true)is refused withUnknownSchemawhen the schema is not registered. The replay plan skips an authorisation whose schema is not in the archive and moves a window that opens before the schema's first status to that time, with a warning. - contracts — removing an anchor writer cannot take the writer count below the threshold.
setAnchorer(…, false)is refused withInvalidThresholdwhen it would leave fewer writers thanrequiredConfirmations(no anchor could be confirmed after that). Rotate a key by adding the new writer first, or lower the threshold first. - contracts — a schema with a future
validFromcan be registered while a migration window is open. It failed withDateInFuture, so a future-dated network schema proposal could not be executed during the window. The start is written as given and the first status time is the block time. - contracts —
withdrawis refused in a network with two active members (ADR-0076, accepted 2026-11-12; narrows ADR-0002 #5). With two members, one member'swithdrawleft a single member, and a single member cannot execute anything (minimum of 2 votes), cannot admit a member and cannot withdraw: governance was locked for good.Governance.withdrawnow reverts withTooFewMembers(active, required)while the network has 2 or fewer active members; leaving a network of three or more members is unchanged (unilateral, no vote). A member that wants to leave a two-member network first has a third member admitted, then withdraws. One error added to the ABI (the copy inapps/chain-indexeris regenerated); function signatures and storage layout unchanged; Governance is 22,918 bytes. - contracts — the network is founded by at least two founders (ADR-0076 GC4, 2026-11-12).
Governance.initializeaccepted a single founder; with one member no proposal can ever be executed and no member can be admitted, so governance was locked from the first block. It now reverts with the existingFounderMismatcherror for fewer than two founders. The rule is in the contract, not only in the scripts, and there is no flag for a single-founder set-up: the local development chain, the test network and the tests already used two or three founders. The set-up code refuses the same case before anything is deployed, with a clear message (deployTrustLayer,setupStagingNetwork,MIN_FOUNDERS); a test network key map with fewer than two founders is refused (loadChainKeys,testnet.mjs), andmake-network.sh --keys generatewrites no key map for a one-validator network (node-level checks only). The number of QBFT validators is a separate matter: the local one-validator chain still sets the contracts up with two founders. ABI and storage layout unchanged. - contracts, network — the chain is set up with the Cancun rule set (ADR-0077, 2026-11-12). The genesis generators (
scripts/besu-dev.ps1,network/testnet/make-network.sh) writecancunTime: 0next toshanghaiTime: 0; the contracts are compiled withevmVersion: cancunand the in-process test network runs withhardfork: "cancun". Under CancunSELFDESTRUCTno longer removes code (EIP-6780), which closes the path behind the "upgrade proposal pins the code" fix above; that check stays as a second line of defence and is now tested by replacing the code with the test node's hook, and a second test shows that a self-destructing implementation keeps its code and cannot be redeployed at the same address. Blob transactions are not used and no KZG option is needed (tried on a one-validator Besu 26.11.0 QBFT network). A local chain created earlier has a Shanghai genesis: deletenetwork/dev/genesis.jsonandkeys/, runnpm run chain:besu:init, thenchain:besu:reset. The exported ABI copies now say"evmVersion": "cancun"; ABI and storage layout unchanged; Governance is 22,920 bytes. - verifier —
verifyPresentationreturns only the values the policy asks for (required_claims). Technical fields of an SD-JWT VC (iss,iat,exp,vct,category,cnf,statuswith the revocation index) and claims disclosed beyond the request are no longer inclaims(AP3/AP4). An always-visible claim that the policy asks for now counts as disclosed: it appears indisclosed_claimsand is checked at E3. - verifier — D5 bounds the "token newer than its anchor" case. New policy field
freshness.max_anchor_lag_sec(default 3600 s): a status token newer than the latest anchor by more than this, or a list with no anchor on a credential older than this, gives INDETERMINATE / STATUS_STALE. External-list issuers are unchanged. - verifier —
issis mandatory for SD-JWT VC of Tamga types (A3b);allowLocalIssuerUrlstreats onlyhttp://localhostand loopback / private IPv4 ranges as local. - verifier — a status key outside its
valid_from…valid_towindow is not accepted as the status list signer (D3). A cached status body that is not a token gives INDETERMINATE / STATUS_UNREACHABLE instead of REJECTED. - verifier — an unavailable external list gives INDETERMINATE, not REJECTED (ADR-0036 FD3): when the chain reaches none of the given roots (A3), or the type is not in the catalogue and the anchor does not resolve to an external institution (B2), and an external list that could vouch for the requested type is unavailable (
TrustSource.unavailableExternalListFor). - verifier — a throwing or rejecting
auditsink no longer fails the verification; E4 is reported inchecks_skipped. Async sinks are awaited. WithrootCertsDer: "none"(SD-JWT VC) A3 is reported inchecks_skipped. - verifier — pass tokens with a non-string or over-long (more than 128 characters)
jtiare rejected (AP13 replay list). - sd-jwt — an intermediate CA without the KeyUsage extension is rejected (A3;
keyCertSignrequired). Failure reasons are fixed messages: no header or payload value and no library exception text.VerifyFail.internalmarks unexpected internal errors (reported as INDETERMINATE by the verifier). The same holds for the mdoc and ZK paths; an unreadable trust anchor gives INDETERMINATE / CHAIN_UNREACHABLE. - Tamga Verify — attempts that end INDETERMINATE before proof of possession no longer turn the presentation into REJECTED at the attempt limit;
last_attemptcarriesoutcomeandindeterminate_reason. The audit record always matches the stored result (pseudonym rejection, wallet decline, attempt limit). Theerrorof a wallet error response is recorded only when it is a defined OpenID4VP / OAuth error code, otherwise aswallet error. - Tamga Verify sample site — a session opens only in the browser that started the presentation (flow cookie);
/sample-site/startis rate limited. The sign-in guide states the rule with example code. OptionalTAMGA_VERIFY_CLIENT_KEY_HEADERseparates rate-limit buckets per client behind the proxy. - Tamga Verify — the anchor log must be fresh when the service runs on HTTPS. The service loaded the lists with the directory loader's default (anchor log accepted for 365 days), so a stopped anchor log did not make the trust source stale. With an HTTPS public address (production and sandbox) the limit is now 3 hours (the heartbeat is hourly), set with
TAMGA_VERIFY_ANCHOR_MAX_AGE_SEC(seconds). When the last anchor is older, the existing stale path applies:/healthzreportstrust.healthy: falseand verifications return INDETERMINATE, not REJECTED. With an http address (local development and tests) the behaviour is unchanged unless the setting is given. No package change. - trust — a
dns_namethat appears in two records of one national list is ambiguous (answersnullby name and by client id) instead of the second record silently replacing the first; the list schema rejects a trailing dot, leading dot or empty label indns_name(ADR-0075 RO5). - trust — questions that depend on an external list that is active in the LOTL but was not loaded answer UNKNOWN instead of NO / null (
isWalletProviderKey,externalIssuerByAnchor); newunavailableExternalListFor(vct)(ADR-0036 FD3). An external entity's revocation-service certificates and supply points are bound only to the issuance service of the same role (FD2). - trust — a list version that jumps by more than one but names the last seen version as its predecessor is rejected (TL2).
- trust-publisher — source records are checked against an allow-list of known fields per record type; unknown or computed fields (
client_id,rp_id,issuer_id,ca_id, fingerprints) stop the build instead of being published (TL11, ADR-0034 CI3).buildrejects a duplicatedns_name(case and trailing dot ignored) and a list operator that is notprovisionalwith a non-emptyon_behalf_of(RO5, TL1). - trust-publisher — without
provisional-operator.jsona production registry is not published; the sandbox exception requires the list operator name to be exactly "Tamga Network Sandbox (TEST)" (ADR-0070 OP2); another name that merely carries "(TEST)" is refused. - trust-publisher — the removal guard also counts root CAs, schemas, and — in records that stay — scopes, schema authorizations and status-history rows (TL2). The next version, the previous hash and schema
registered_atare read from the signed.jwsof the previous publication (signature verified), not from the unsigned.jsoncopy (TL9). - trust-publisher — registration commands run under
registry.lock, roll the source back when list validation fails, and write the change-log line only after a successful build; the lock is refreshed while held.--reasonofstatus,rp-statusandwallet-provider suspend|revokepasses the public-text filter;contactfields are format-checked (TL11). - wallet-core —
checkRegistrationCerts/relevantRegistrationCertstake the trust of the certificate that signed the request (signerTrust: the relying party's registered access-certificate fingerprint and/orroot_cas). When given, a registration certificate is valid only if that certificate is anchored (untrusted_access_certificateotherwise) — a self-signed certificate copying a registered organisation's identifier no longer binds to that organisation's public registration certificate (remote flow and ISO/IEC 18013-7 Annex C; proximity already did this). When omitted, the result carriessignerTrusted: falseand theregistration_binding_unverifiedflag. A registration certificate withoutexpis rejected (JWT and CWT). - wallet-core —
parsePassGrantrejects a consent period over 6 months (single-use tickets excepted), an expired grant and anaudthat is neither a domain name nor anx509_hash:identifier (the latter is kept with theaud_not_dns_namewarning); optional checks verify the grant signature against the request's certificate,cnf_kidagainst the wallet's pass key and the relying party's registration.mintPassTokenaccepts the same trust source. - wallet-core —
respondgainsbeforeSend, called after signing and before the presentation leaves the wallet, so copies are marked used before delivery (WL5).presentProximitymarks the copy before sending and keeps it marked when the transport fails.respondreturns the verifier'sredirect_urionly when it is https. - wallet-core — http is refused by default:
parseOfferrejects http offer addresses and httpcredential_issuer; Digital Credentials API requests fromhttp://localhost/http://127.0.0.1are accepted only withallowLocalDevHost(the Annex C branch no longer drops the option). - wallet-core —
matchDcqlandpresentProximityno longer offer an expired credential.rpRecordOfandregistrarKeysOfread from an already verified trust source;fetchRpRecord/fetchRegistrarKeysaccept{ throwOnListError: true }to tell "list unavailable" from "not registered". - wallet-core — TS10 export uses 600,000 PBKDF2 iterations by default and refuses fewer than 200,000; import refuses files with fewer than 100,000.
- wallet-core —
HardwareKeyProvider.attestation()reports the device secure area (Secure Enclave, StrongBox, TEE) as W2 and software as W1; W3 is never reported. A failing backendinfo()is no longer cached and no longer falls back to software keys silently (hardware_unavailable); a failed hardware key deletion is reported to the caller. - docs — SPEC-API-0001, SPEC-TRUST-0001, SPEC-WALLET-0001, ADR-0036 / ADR-0070 / ADR-0075 implementation notes and the sign-in guide updated in tr / en / az. SPEC-WALLET-0001 WL13 now states the exception the code already had: a single-use ticket is exempt from the 6-month consent ceiling (its grant ends when the event ends, ADR-0012 K4).
- docs — decisions of 2026-11-12 (tr / en / az; no package change). ADR-0078: the wallet takes no backup — credentials are bound to the device's hardware key and are issued again on a new device; the only thing that leaves the device is the migration file started by the person (EU TS10; no credential values, no keys). SPEC-WALLET-0001 (WL2 and §1.4, §7) and Tamga Rulebook RB-WP-07 now describe this; the seed-encrypted backup and the hosted store in the earlier text were never built. ADR-0079 (accepted, implementation before a second state joins): a state may authorise its institution for another state's national schema only with a consent record written by the state that owns the schema; today the contract does not check this. ADR-0080 (accepted, implementation before identity verification is opened to everyone): a final confirmation in the wallet with a masked summary of the verified identity, and a warning to the person doing the verification, against a relayed verification link. ADR-0070 OP2 now states the sandbox exception in the rule text (list operator name carries "(TEST)", published as "Tamga Network Sandbox (TEST)"). SPEC-WALLET-0001 implementation notes: the "previously shared" notice of WL6 is not implemented yet (first wallet update); target behaviour when copies run out in a proximity session (background refresh, immediate refresh when online, reuse of the last copy with a warning when offline) is recorded as pending.
- docs — SPEC-WALLET-0001 §2.3: the PIN attempt rule now describes the wallet as built (approved by project management, 2026-11-12). After the 5th wrong attempt in a row the wait starts at 30 s and doubles with every further wrong attempt, up to 1 hour; the counter survives an app restart and a clock change. The wallet is not erased or locked for good after 10 wrong attempts, as the text said before: a forgotten PIN is handled by the person resetting the wallet, confirmed with the phone's own lock (§7.6). tr / en / az.
- trust-publisher — an approved removal entry is bound to one version transition (TL2, ADR-0081 implementation note).
registry/removals.jsonentries now carryprevious_version(required: the number of the signed list version before the removal) and optionallyprevious_version_hash(the digest of that version's.jws); the publisher accepts an entry only when the previously published version is that one. Before, an entry matched on the list name and the counts only, so the entry of 2026-11-11 would also have let through a later removal of the same number of other records and written the old reason to the list's change log. That entry is now bound to the transition from version 240 to 241. An entry withoutprevious_version(the earlier format) matches nothing. - trust-publisher — history rows are kept with their content, and more removals are counted (TL2). In a record that stays in the list, every
status_historyrow of the previous version must be present unchanged in the new one (compared canonically): changing a row — for example moving theinvalidates_fromof an existing REVOKED row forward — counts as removing it. A schema authorization row must stay as it was; the only free change is closing an open period (valid_untilabsent → a date), so a closed authorization can no longer be reopened or its end date changed. Before, rows were recognised by two fields only and such edits were not seen. Also counted now: an issuer'sdelegate_keysrows (by fingerprint and purpose) and thenational_lists,wallet_providers(with their status history) andexternal_listsrecords of the LOTL; removal entries carry them as optional counts of the same names. What the registry commands write (status,rp-status,authorize,authorize --revoke,scope,end-use,wallet-provider) passes unchanged. Operating note: when a status list key is renewed, keep the old key in the issuer'sdelegate_keyswith avalid_todate instead of dropping it. - trust-publisher — the public-text filter accepts an ISO date.
--reason "key compromise 2026-11-12"was refused as a "phone or identity number"; a valid calendar date (YYYY-MM-DD) with no digit or hyphen next to it is no longer counted as a digit run. The other rules are unchanged: two capitalised words in a row (Contract Ended) are still read as a person's name — write the reason in lower case. - trust-publisher — the "previous list could not be verified" message no longer suggests removing the publication folder. On the real network that would restart the list at version 1 and break the hash chain and the removal check. The message now says: never remove the folder on the real network; when the list signer changes, keep the old signer in the source (
signing_certs/anchor_signing_certs) for one publication. Removing the folder is for local development only. - verifier — a status list signed with a registered but lapsed status key gives INDETERMINATE, not REJECTED (D3). When an institution renews its status key, a verifier's cache can still hold a list — inside its own validity — signed with the old key. If that key is still in the trust list but outside its
valid_from…valid_towindow (orRETIRED), the result is now INDETERMINATE / STATUS_STALE and the next prefetch settles it; before it was REJECTED D3 once a new key was registered (and INDETERMINATE only when there was none). A signer that is not registered, or aREVOKED/SUSPENDEDkey, is still REJECTED. The same rule applies to identifier lists. - verifier — operating note for D5 (
freshness.max_anchor_lag_sec, default 3600 s). The anchor log must be reloaded more often thanmax_anchor_lag_sec: a verifier that keeps refreshing status lists but holds the anchors it loaded at start-up answers INDETERMINATE / STATUS_STALE at D5 for every credential after about an hour. A verifier that loads its trust source without anchors (fetchListTrustSourcewithoutanchors: true, the default) has no anchor for any list and gets the same answer for every Tamga credential with a status entry that is older thanmax_anchor_lag_sec: verifiers that check revocation must load withanchors: true. Example 02 (examples/02-verify-own-server) loaded the lists once; it now exposesrefresh()(trust lists and anchors, then the status lists) for a timer, andtrustreturns the set in use. The server guide and the troubleshooting page say the same (tr / en / az). - verifier — a nested path requested from an always-visible object is reported under the requested path (E3). When the policy asks for
address.countryand the issuer left the wholeaddressobject undisclosable,disclosed_claimscarried the root nameaddress, and a relying party whose registered scope isaddress.countrywas REJECTED at E3 for a legitimate presentation. The requested path itself is now reported and checked. - verifier —
PassRegistry.issuerefuses a pass longer than 6 months (WL13).valid_daysmust be a positive number of at mostPASS_MAX_VALID_DAYS(184, the same limit as wallet-core'sPASS_GRANT_MAX_VALIDITY_SEC) unless the pass issingle_use; before, a longer pass was issued and the 0.8.3 wallet discarded it. - Tamga Verify — one audit record per response at the attempt limit. The last failed response of a presentation that closes on the attempt limit wrote two records with the same
verification_id(the attempt and the closing result); now only the closing record is written (also on the ISO/IEC 18013-7 Annex C route). The sample site's flow cookie is re-sent on every start, so itsMax-Ageis extended together with the server-side flow. SPEC-API-0001 §2.3 now states why an internal error after the presentation has been used up is reported asINDEXER_STALEwith an emptyfailed_step(the closed set has no "internal error" value; no new value was added). - wallet-core — migration note for applications (0.8.2 → 0.8.3): the application must be updated, not only the package. (1) http and local development:
parseOfferrefuses anhttpoffer address orcredential_issuer(invalid_offer), andresponddrops anhttpredirect_uri. An application that issues or presents against a local development server (localhost,.test/.local, a private IPv4 address) must pass{ allowLocalDevHost: true }toparseOfferandallowLocalDevHost: truein therespondinput — in a development build or on the sandbox only. (2) Registration certificates:checkRegistrationCerts/relevantRegistrationCertscalled the 0.8.2 way, withoutsignerTrust, still returnvalid: true— the check stays open, and the only signal issignerTrusted: falsewith theregistration_binding_unverifiedflag. To get the protection the application passessignerTrust(the relying party'saccess_cert_fingerprint_sha256from its trust-list record asregisteredFingerprints,{}when there is no record, and/orroot_cas) and does not treat a result withsignerTrusted: falseas valid. (3) Authorization-code issuance with an identity presentation: the institution returns the result (code or error) inredirect_urion the wallet's own callback address, which is usually an app scheme and not https.respondreturns such an address only when the application passes it as the newcallbackUriinput (exact address, optionally followed by a query or fragment); without itredirectUriis undefined and the issuance cannot be completed. - contracts — the migration executor adds a version hash only to a network schema it replayed itself.
SchemaRegistry.addSchemaContentHashon a network schema registered by Governance now reverts withNetworkTierRequiresGovernancefor the executor (the same limit as deprecation): it could otherwise add a content hash nobody voted on (hashes cannot be removed) or fill the hash quota. The in-process test network is now really Cancun (Hardhat 3 names itdefault; thehardhatentry was never used and the tests ran with a newer rule set). ABI and storage layout unchanged. SPEC-BC-0001 §16.1 and ADR-0077 (implementation note) updated. - docs — SPEC-CRED-0003 §7 step Ş6 follows the D5 definition of SPEC-API-0001. The step still said "REJECT when the token digest differs from the anchor" and referred to a version field the token does not carry; it now lists the D5 cases (older token: rollback or prefetch delay; newer token: allowed up to
max_anchor_lag_sec; no anchor). Ş4 and S11 state the lapsed-key case (tr / en / az). - trust-publisher — the validity period of a scope and of a terminal group is protected (TL2). In a relying party that stays in the list,
scopesandterminal_groupsrows were compared by identifier only, so an ended use could be reopened or extended by editing its dates. A row that stays keeps itsvalid_from;valid_untilmay only move towards closing a period that is still open (no end, or an end that has not passed, set to an earlier time — whatend-use,rp-status REVOKED|RETIRED, re-registration and reassignment write). A period that has ended is not changed, and no end is moved later or removed: a new period is a new row with a new identifier. A row changed in any other way counts as removed (scopes/terminal_groups) and stops the build unless an approved removal entry covers it. Descriptive fields (purpose text, translations, requested claims, label, policies) can still be edited. The check is not applied in the sandbox, as before. SPEC-TRUST-0001 (TL2 implementation note) updated (tr / en / az). - trust-publisher — the 2026-11-11 removal entry carries the digest of the version it applied to.
registry/removals.jsonnow hasprevious_version_hash(sha256:+ 64 hex digits, the form the publisher computes for the previous signed version) besidesprevious_version; the comment in the source named the formsha-256:. - contracts — a re-admitted member's earlier votes are no longer counted. When a member that withdrew or was removed was admitted again with the same validator address, its "for" votes on proposals that were still open counted again without the member voting. A vote is now counted at execution only if it was cast after the member's latest admission; the member casts its vote again (a vote from the earlier membership period can be repeated in the same direction without
AlreadyVoted; the rawforVotes/againstVotescounters do not change). ABI unchanged. Storage: one mapping inGovernance(vote time;__gap38 → 37, layout baseline updated). Governance is 23,121 bytes (1,455 bytes of headroom). Source and tests only: an already deployed Governance needs a protocol upgrade vote, and votes cast before that upgrade have no recorded time, so they are cast again on proposals that are still open. SPEC-BC-0001 §1 updated. - docs — the pass grant limit is written as a number. The code allows 184 days (
PASS_MAX_VALID_DAYS,PASS_GRANT_MAX_VALIDITY_SEC); the wallet specification said "≤ 6 months". SPEC-WALLET-0001 (§ on the pass grant and WL13), the education rulebook and the limitations page now say "at most 6 months (184 days)" (tr / en / az). No code change. - docs — the result example of SPEC-API-0001 §2.2 matches the reference implementation. The example listed
A3c(certificate revocation query) andB5(extendschain) underchecks_performed; the reference verifier does not perform these two steps and reports them inchecks_skippedfor every presentation. The example now shows that, withE4underchecks_performed(audit record written), and a note explains it (tr / en / az). No code change. - docs — key backup while the network has two members (ADR-0076 implementation note). In a two-member network the loss of one member's governance key means that no proposal can pass and the member can neither be removed nor withdraw. Operating rule: until a third member joins, every member keeps a backup of its governance key, stored in a separate place and tested by restoring it. Written into ADR-0076 (tr / en / az), the Besu network set-up document (step 11) and the test network guide.
Correction to the 0.8.2 notes
The 0.8.2 entry said that wallet-core's fetchRpRecord "applies the cross-country name rule on the x509_hash: path too" and presented this as a fail-closed behaviour change. That statement was misleading: fetchRpRecord loads the LOTL and one national list (stateCode), and the rule only compares records across the national lists that are loaded. With a single list loaded, an ambiguity with another country's list cannot be seen, so the 0.8.2 change had no effect for the wallet in practice; its test built a multi-list store by hand that the real loader never produces. What is true as of 0.8.3: the rule lives inside ListTrustSource (both lookups), it is tested through the real loader with two signed lists, and it takes effect for callers that load several national lists (the reference verifier, the onboarding tool, fetchListTrustSource with additionalStates). The wallet's single-list scope is now documented in the code.
Behaviour changes in 0.8.3 (fail-closed)
- trust —
ListTrustSource.relyingParty(clientId)returnsnullfor an ambiguous name (ADR-0075). The cross-country rule (the samedns_namenot revoked in more than one loaded national list, or no structured reassignment record) was applied only byrelyingPartyByDnsName; a lookup by client identifier returned the record. Both now answernull. Affects callers that load more than one national list. - issuer —
WalletStatusCheckercounts status list entries from the list's ownbits. The minimum-size rule (10,000 entries, CIR 2026/1731 Annex Ib) computed entries as bytes × 4, which is right only for 2-bit lists: a compliant 1-bit list of 10,000 entries was reportedNONCOMPLIANT, and a 4-bit or 8-bit list half or a quarter of the required size was accepted. The count is now bytes × 8 / bits. - onboard —
--reportnever overwrites and refuses key-like targets.check --report/node check --reportwrote the report over any existing file. The file is now created with exclusive create (an existing file is an error), must end in.json, and a name that looks like a key or certificate file is refused.
Added
- trust —
fetchListTrustSourceoptionadditionalStates. Loads further national lists besidesstateCodeso that the cross-list rules can take effect; every listed state must have an ACTIVE list that verifies (a missing one refuses the load). - verifier —
verifyPseudonymoptionclientStatus("optional"default,"required"): with"required"a wallet instance attestation without a revocation entry (client_status) is refused, so a wallet unit that cannot be revoked cannot log in with a site pseudonym. Tamga Verify uses"required"on the real network.
Fixed
- onboard —
icaclsis called by its full path (%SystemRoot%\System32\icacls.exe) when a private key file's permissions are narrowed or checked on Windows; calling it by name let a plantedicacls.exeearlier in the search path run. - verifier — comment on
RequestBranch.branchId: uniqueness within a presentation is not guaranteed bycreateRequestBranch(48 random bits);BranchSetis the unit that keeps branches apart.
Applications and repository (not part of the npm packages)
- Tamga Verify — branchless Digital Credentials API response path. The response key identifier for this path (
enc-dc-<presentation>) derives from the public presentation identifier. A presentation without a DC API request now answers such a response with a cheap 400; with one, the response is decrypted first and only a response that decrypts is charged to the presentation's rate bucket and single-use lock (also on the ISO/IEC 18013-7 Annex C endpoint). Before, junk responses from anyone who saw the QR could exhaust the bucket and hold the lock against the page's real response. - Tamga Verify —
/healthzchain field returns a fixed reason when the chain cannot be reached or is misconfigured; the error detail (which may carry an RPC address) goes to the service log only. English sandbox guide links point to the site root. - Trust list publisher — record removal is checked (SPEC-TRUST-0001 TL2). A build stops when an issuer, relying party or terminal group of the previously published national list is missing from the new one, unless the registry carries an approved removal entry with exactly matching counts (
registry/removals.json); the public changelog of the list then gets a line without names. Used once: test records left from the pre-pilot test period were removed from the real network's list (2026-11-11). - Chain stage (contracts, indexer, node tooling; no production chain):
RelyingPartyRegistry.stagePeriodChangerequires a registered identifier;TrustListAnchorRegistry.anchorLogHeadcaps the sequence step (as list versions already were);SchemaRegistry.registerSchemano longer accepts a past validity start outside the migration mode; deployment verifies the Governance → SchemaRegistry link.Governance: a member can change its vote (voteto the other side) or take it back (retractVote) until the proposal is executed, including a queued upgrade during its delay; the threshold is recounted at execution.- Indexer: reacts to state-changing events only (staging events that anyone can emit no longer make it read a record that does not exist and stop), a record whose read reverts is recorded as an error instead of stopping the cursor, events are read in chunks of at most 2,000 blocks with the cursor advancing per chunk (also in the replay's "already written" checks), and an index resumed against another chain id, other contract addresses or a shorter chain is refused.
ChainTrustSource: healthy only when the caller binds it to content (level projected on chain ≥ level of the signed lists) and the index has no unreadable record — otherwise every answer isUNKNOWN; a status list lookup whose last path segment is shared by two issuers no longer returns the other issuer's anchor; a terminal group whose institution is not in the index is inactive. It must not be used in verification until an ongoing projection exists (ADR-0074 K5 note).- Equivalence test: a reverse pass (every indexed issuer, authorization, relying party, terminal group, status list and wallet provider key must be in the signed lists or never have been active), comparison of the index against the replay plan's record set, and cheap record fields (certificate fingerprints, registration periods, gate certificates, offline flag).
- Besu allowlist reader accepts IPv6 enode addresses; the JSON-RPC filter forwards the request it parsed and checked instead of the client's bytes (repeated-key bodies) and refuses
net_enode/net_services;make-network.sh --keys dev(public test keys) is refused with non-loopback hosts.
- Release workflow: GitHub Actions are pinned by commit SHA and the npm CLI by exact version.
Documents
- ADR-0073 (the migration window closes by itself regardless of the equivalence result; failure means redeploying; keep it short and close early), ADR-0074 (read path wording; content-bound health; not consumed in verification yet), ADR-0055 (vote change and retraction), ADR-0067 (real cost of the eviction attack; proxy burst lowered), ADR-0075, the chain test network guide and the node operator handbook (governance and consensus key are the same key today — HSM required on the real network, separation is an open decision), trust list specification (record removal check;
contactis a role address). - ADR-0081 (accepted 2026-11-12): the test-record exception to "no record is deleted from the trust list" (SPEC-TRUST-0001 TL2) is tied to a decision. Only a record entered for testing, which never issued to a real person and never received a real presentation, may be removed, before the first participant institution enters the real network's list and with the reason in the public changelog; the exception closes with the first institution; signed list versions stay in the archive. The trust list specification (§4, TL2) refers to it. No code change.
- Four deviations left from the document–code scan are closed on the document side (2026-11-12; no behaviour change): verification pipeline specification — in a ZK presentation
C1/C2are asked at proof time, written into AP11 as an explicit exception (ADR-0032 implementation note);C4is not applied to mdoc and ZK presentations and the issuer class is read fromissuer.class(ADR-0010 implementation note); the reporting ofA3dandA8under neighbouring codes is the binding behaviour of the reference implementation (ADR-0056 implementation note); trust list specification — thedesignatedoperator status is reserved for the handover: the loader recognises it, the publisher does not publish it in the list stage (ADR-0070 implementation note).
0.8.2 — 2026-11-05
All ten packages move to 0.8.2 together (patch release). New: the first publication of @tamga-network/onboard, the joining tool for institutions and for state / operator nodes (it was built and checked with 0.8.1 but not published). One change in wallet-core refuses more (below); no API change in the other packages. Published on npm on 2026-11-05.
Behaviour changes in 0.8.2 (fail-closed)
- wallet-core —
fetchRpRecordapplies the cross-country name rule on thex509_hash:path too (ADR-0075). In 0.8.1 the lookup bydns_namereturnednullfor a relying party whose name is ambiguous between national lists (no structured reassignment record), but the lookup by client identifier read the record directly. Now both returnnull: the request is treated as unregistered ("not found in the trust list" warning; a request that needs a registration is refused). A properly reassigned name (old recordREVOKEDwithreassigned_to) still resolves. Nothing to migrate.
Added
- onboard — new package
@tamga-network/onboard(commandtamga-onboard; first published in 0.8.2). An onboarding tool for an institution's IT team:initbuilds the registration application(s) from the institution's answers and checks them with the same rules as the operator's registration tool (ADR-0024; no unknown fields, so no names of people);validatechecks an application;keysgenerates the institution's P-256 keys on its own computer and writes CSRs whose subject carries theorganizationIdentifier(ADR-0050) and, for an access certificate, the DNS name and support address (ADR-0058 AC1) —keys --inspectchecks a CSR made in an HSM;checkchecks the institution's own setup (keys ↔ CSRs ↔ certificates, domain and DNS TXT confirmation, https addresses, own-service metadata, lookup endpoint probed with invalid requests only) and, with--listing, its record in the signed trust list against embedded root pins (status, registration data, credential types, status list anchor, registration certificates, metadata chain to the listed root);sandboxprints the "Try your institution" steps.tamga-onboard mcpoffers the same operations as a local MCP server (stdio; files only under its root, private keys never returned, network text marked untrusted). Nothing is written to the network or the list. First publication in 0.8.2, by hand without npm provenance (trusted publishing from GitHub Actions can only be set up for a package that already exists on npm); later releases come from the release workflow. - onboard — node steps for a state or operator (
tamga-onboard node init | declare | check; ADR-0052).node initgenerates the Besu node key (secp256k1, Besu key file format) on the node's own machine with the same key file protections askeys(owner-only permissions, refused in a cloud-synced folder, never overwritten), prints the enode public key and the validator address, and writes abesu.tomltemplate: permissioned mode, JSON-RPC on 127.0.0.1 only (outside clients get ETH, NET, WEB3 throughnetwork/rpc-proxy), P2P on one internal interface (p2p-interface;0.0.0.0/::are refused), discovery, WebSocket and GraphQL off; genesis is not generated — it comes from the operators and its hash is compared out of band.node declarewrites thetamga-node-declaration/1file, validated with the same rules as the schema (contact is a role address; a non-role mailbox gets a warning).node checkchecks the running node read-only — only read-only JSON-RPC methods are called: sync and genesis against a reference endpoint, peers, running key, node and account allowlists against the rendered file and the reference endpoint, validator set, the external endpoint refusesadmin_/perm_/qbft_/debug_/txpool_,besu.tomlinterfaces and permissioning flags, clock. Only addresses typed by the user are contacted; loopback is allowed by default, other private networks need--allow-private, plain http only to local addresses, no redirects. MCP toolsgenerate_node_key,create_node_declaration,check_node(key never returned; loopback / private endpoints only when listed inTAMGA_ONBOARD_PRIVATE_NODES; network text marked untrusted). Nothing is written to the chain, the allowlist or the network. New dependency:@noble/hashes(Keccak-256 for the node address).
Security (second review, 2026-11-04)
- onboard — paths stay inside the onboarding folder.
onboarding.jsonis validated before use (a broken profile stops the command); application file names must be<slug>.issuer.json/<slug>.rp.jsonand key namesissuer-…/rp-…; every path is checked after symbolic links and Windows junctions are resolved (nearest existing parent), in the CLI and in the MCP server's root check. MCPvalidate_applicationreads only*.jsonand does not echo parse errors. - onboard — no requests to local networks.
checkfollows redirects itself (scheme checked on every hop, at most 5) and refuses loopback, private, link-local, CGNAT and IPv6 unique-local addresses after name resolution, at connect time (--allow-privatein the CLI for local tests; not available over MCP). Over MCP, request addresses outside the institution's domain are reported as a warning row. - onboard — private key files. On Windows the key file is created empty, narrowed with
icaclsand only then written; ificaclsfails the file is removed and the command stops. Keys are not written under OneDrive / Dropbox / Google Drive / iCloud folders without--allow-synced; on Windows an unencrypted key needs--no-passphrase; a passphrase has at least 12 characters, and over MCP the passphrase variable name must start withTAMGA_. - onboard — trust list checks. Root pins can no longer be overridden over MCP; a
--pingiven in the CLI is reported as a warning row. Registration certificates listed in the unsignedwrprc/index.jsonare now downloaded and their signature is verified against the registrar keys of the signed list (row H5, also for verifiers).
Applications and repository (not in the npm packages)
- release — packages may ship a command (
bin). The pack script mapsbintolib/and requires a#!/usr/bin/env nodeline; the smoke test runs each command with--versionfrom the installed tarball.release:versionnow sets ten packages. - ops —
pki-issue --org-idaccepts a CSR that already carries the sameorganizationIdentifier(astamga-onboard keyswrites it); a different value is refused (exit 2). Before, anyorganizationIdentifierin the CSR subject was refused when--org-idwas given. - Security (second review, 2026-11-04) — ops —
pki-issuereads the CSR subject as an ASN.1 name, not as text. Only CN, OU, O,organizationIdentifierand C are taken, each at most once (twoorganizationIdentifiervalues, unknown attributes and multi-valued RDNs are refused); the certificate subject is rebuilt from these fields. With--prod,--org-idis required for every certificate and must equal the value in the CSR. Signing with the production root needsTAMGA_CONFIRM_PROD=<institution slug>matching the certificate name. - Security (second review, 2026-11-04) — trust-publisher — registration checks the certificate's institution number.
registercompares the certificate'sorganizationIdentifier(ASN.1, not text) with the application'sidentifiers(issuer certificate, status list certificate and a verifier's own access certificate); on the production registry a certificate without it is refused. Writing to the production registry (register,status,authorize,scope,rp-status,end-usewithout--check) needsTAMGA_CONFIRM_PRODset to the slug or DNS name of the record. - Security (second review, 2026-11-04) — repository —
*.key.pemis ignored in every folder. - chain — test network path C: Governance with generated keys (GUIDE-0018;
network/testnet/, CI jobstaging; production chain still off).make-network.sh --keys generatenow uses chain id 31339 (31337/31338 stay the local ids of the public test keys and are refused in this mode;--keys devrefuses 31339) and also generates the role keys of a key mapkeys/keys.json(tamga-chain-keys/1: deployer, migration executor, two list anchorers with threshold 2, one delegate per state; validator = node key; every file 0600; genesis balances and the start-up allowlist hold only generated accounts — no Hardhat account). Test and staging networks only: production keys are generated by each state on its own hardware and kept in HSMs. Newcontracts/scripts/deploy-network.ts(npm --prefix contracts run deploy:network, Hardhat networkbesuStaging, URLTAMGA_CHAIN_RPC_URL, chain id from the key map;scripts/lib/network-setup.ts): founders and their delegates, founder recognition by Governance vote (proposeFounderRecognition), list anchor registry administered by the Governance contract →deployments/besuStaging.json; refuses 31337/31338 and every non-test id. Newnetwork/testnet/bootstrap-governance.sh(idempotent, each step logged): deploy → admission of the other states by 2/3 vote (each sets its delegate) → permissions rendered from the chain on every node (the deployer drops out; an unlisted key is refused) → anchoring by both anchorers → migration windows opened by vote, permissions rendered again with the window's executor listed → sample archive replayed with the key map → equivalence;--only permissionsfor one-node-per-server layouts.trust:chain-replaywrites to the test/staging chain withTAMGA_CHAIN_KEYS+TAMGA_CHAIN_DEPLOYMENT(the real network keeps theTAMGA_CONFIRM_PRODgate and still stops) and gains--open-only;besu-smoke.ts --archive-dirkeeps and reuses its archive;testnet.mjsgainscheck-keymapandadmit/accounts --keys. Reference loaderapps/chain-indexer/src/chain-keys.ts(refuses a map that is notpurpose: "test", not on 31339, or whose key file is missing, readable by others or belongs to another address); contracts teststaging-setup.test.ts(557 equivalence questions, no decision difference). CI jobstaging: 4 validators under systemd with generated keys (heap-Xmx640mthrough a unit drop-in), the bootstrap end to end, then a second run that must write nothing. ADR-0052: dated note — the executor of an open migration window is on the account list (the decision is unchanged). - chain — Linux multi-node Besu test network (
network/testnet/, CItestnet.yml; production chain still off). Bash scripts (shellcheck-clean):install-besu.sh(Temurin JDK 25 + Besu 26.11.0 from the official release pages, sha256-pinned;--systeminstalls root-owned binaries in/opt/tamga-besu, abesuservice user and/var/lib/tamga-besu),make-network.sh(4 QBFT validators + 1 extra node by default: genesisextraData, static peers, start-up permissions file, node declarations, onebesu.tomlper node with JSON-RPC on 127.0.0.1 andp2p-interfaceset;--keys generateusesbesu operator generate-blockchain-config,--hostsone node per test server),node.sh(process or systemd mode),besu@.service(hardened unit) anddeploy-and-wire.sh, the end-to-end test: contracts → list replay and equivalence →trust:chain-submit/chain-check→ Governance admission of the other validators' test states → permissions rendered from each node's own chain view, reloaded and checked (equalshared_sha256) → validator added and removed by QBFT vote → one stopped validator does not stop the chain, two do, restart resumes → RPC protection (rpc-proxy-check.sh: method filter and nginx mutual TLS). The GitHub Actions workflow runs it on ubuntu-latest (manually, weekly and on chain code changes) plus a systemd job, and writes the results to the job summary. Chain id 31338 and Hardhat's public test keys — test only. - chain — Besu local permissioning and operations (ADR-0052; production chain still off).
npm run trust:chain-permissions -- renderreadsGovernance,IssuerRegistry,TrustListAnchorRegistryand the open migration windows at one pinned block and writes a deterministicpermissions_config.toml(sorted, unique, lower case, LF; no block number or time — the same chain state gives the same bytes): accounts = active members' validator addresses and delegate keys, delegates of operational issuers, list anchorers, the executor of an open migration window; nodes = the declared validator nodes whose key matches an active validator address inGovernance(plus, with--operator <CC>, that operator's own RPC nodes). It printssha256andshared_sha256(without the operator's own RPC nodes — must be equal on all validators).checkcompares the node'sperm_getAccountsAllowlist/perm_getNodesAllowlistwith the expected list (loopback admin endpoint only); exit 3 on a difference or a rejected declaration. There is no option to add an account by hand. Read-only on the local development chains whileTAMGA_CHAIN_ENABLED=0.network/permissions/: node declaration formattamga-node-declaration/1(JSON schema, examples; state code, rolevalidator|rpc, node public key, IP literal, P2P port, institutional contact — no personal data) and the matching rule.scripts/besu-dev.ps1 -Permissioned(-Init,-Start [-Node 2],-Apply,-Stop,-Reset,-Status): a local two-node network with both permissioning flags on andPERM/ADMINon 127.0.0.1 only;-Applyrenders each node's list from the chain, reloads it and checks it. Tried locally: an unlisted account is refused ("Sender account not authorized"), a state delegate writes; a node removed from the list is disconnected; node 2 is added to and removed from the QBFT validator set byqbft_proposeValidatorVote(apps/trust-publisher/scripts/besu-permissions-smoke.ts). Besu rewrites the permissions file in its own format on reload, so the rendered file is kept next to it and compared withcheck. Fix: the local P2P port now binds to 127.0.0.1 (p2p-interface;p2p-hostis only the advertised address).network/rpc-proxy/: nginx example with TLS 1.3 and a mandatory client certificate, andfilter.mjs, a dependency-free JSON-RPC method filter (onlyeth_*,net_*,web3_*without the signing, mining and subscription methods; one refused call refuses the whole batch; body and batch limits; only refusal counts are logged), a systemd unit example and a local test certificate script.- Verifier
/healthzhas achainfield (C32 (7)): whether the loadedlotl.jws/tl-<cc>.jwsare anchored on chain (YES/NO/UNKNOWN). WithTAMGA_CHAIN_ENABLED=0and in the sandbox it isUNKNOWNwithout connecting; it never changesokor a verification result (CH1).
- chain — reading and transfer side (ADR-0073 K1/K6, ADR-0074 K4/K5, ADR-0075; production chain still off).
npm run trust:chain-replayreplays the signed list archive into the contracts: it verifies the archive (signatures, version chain, anchor chain, environment), builds a deterministic plan starting at the first archived version and prints it with itsreplayPlanHash(default and--dry-run); when writing it checks that every migration-capable registry has its window open with this digest, writes in time order with the dates from the lists, skips what is already on chain (resumable), uses the state delegate for national records, the single migration executor for network schemas and wallet providers, and a Governance vote for network schema revocation and relying party reassignment / re-registration. It ends with the equivalence test. Writing to a non-local chain needsTAMGA_CONFIRM_PROD=<plan digest>; a sandbox set is refused outside the local development chain.- New application
apps/chain-indexer/: event-based indexer (events find the changed records, the records are read at the same pinned block into a plain-JSON index) andChainTrustSource, theTrustSourceinterface answered from the index with the contract rules (C1/C2/C3/D5).ethersstays in the application; thepackages/*libraries take no chain dependency. - Equivalence test
contracts/test/chain-equivalence.test.ts(Hardhat, runs in CI; the contracts job now installs the root packages): a multi-version fixture archive (suspension and reinstatement, soft and hard revocation, retired root with successor, schema versions, deprecated and revoked schemas, authorisation windows, recognition on and off, wallet keys, scopes, terminal groups, re-registration after revocation, reassignment between two states) is replayed and the same 493 questions go to the list source, the chain source and direct contract reads: no difference in C1/C2/C3/D5; one documented known difference (the samedns_nameleft in two state lists after a reassignment — the list source treats it as ambiguous). Local Besu smoke scriptapps/chain-indexer/scripts/besu-smoke.ts. trust:chain-submitalso anchors the new anchor log lines (tamga:trust-list-view:<env>:<file>,tamga:registration-status:<env>:<name>) and refuses a sandbox set outside the local development chain (ADR-0074 K7);trust:chain-checkalso checks a view file or the registration certificate status list. The trust list publisher writes the new lines only while the chain projection is on (TAMGA_CHAIN_ENABLED=1).contracts/scripts/export-abi.mjsalso exports the registry ABIs toapps/chain-indexer/src/abi/(contracts:check).- Phase D remainder (2026-11-05). Relying party suspensions, reinstatements and revocations are replayed with the list date (new contract functions below); the issuer successor (
successor_id) is written with the revocation when it is an active issuer of the same state at that moment (otherwise a warning); all otherNetworkRegistryrecord kinds are replayed from the LOTL and the national lists (ZK circuits, external lists, EAA categories, list signers, list operators, state and role slots, catalogue —apps/chain-indexer/src/network-records.ts; a record that leaves the list is writtenRETIRED). The status list's bit count and size come from the anchor line, else from the token at the list address (https,submust match), else the default — refused on a real network. The indexer keeps every field and the status history of network records and the issuer successor;ChainTrustSourcegainsisRelyingPartyAcceptableAt,zkCircuit,networkRecord,registrationPeriods. The equivalence test also asks about a relying party's status at past moments, the issuer successor and every network record kind: 557 questions, 0 differences, no known difference left (the gap between the list date and the execution date of a reassignment / re-registration is not asked: ADR-0075 dates it at execution). - trust-publisher:
anchor --token <file>writes the status list'sbitsandsizefrom the token (its digest must equal--content-hashand itssubthe--list-uri);rp-status <dns_name> REVOKED --reassigned-to <CC> --approval <ref>is the old-country side of a reassignment (ADR-0075 RO5): the record becomesREVOKEDwith the reassignment record as the reason and the structuredreassigned_to: "<CC>"in the history entry (what the loader reads, 0.8.1), its uses and terminal groups end. - Fix: every chain provider of the replay, the equivalence test and
trust:chain-submitturns off the ethers request cache (cacheTimeout: -1). ethers v6 shares identical requests for 250 ms; on a fast machine the gas estimate of a registration data write was taken from an earlier write with the same call data (period 0, before a re-registration), and the transaction ran out of gas inside the proxy (CI failure, no revert data). A failed replay write now names the decoded custom error, or says that the gas limit was too low.
- contracts — dated relying party status writes (2026-11-05; ADR-0073 K1/K5).
RelyingPartyRegistry.suspendRelyingPartyAt,reinstateRelyingPartyAt,revokeRelyingPartyAt(rpId, at):at= 0 is the block time; a past date only while the migration window is open, never ahead of the block time, in order per record (StatusOutOfOrder). The undated forms now follow the same rule as the other registries: while the window is open they are frozen for the state delegates (DateRequiredDuringMigration). A reassignment or re-registration is still dated at execution (ADR-0075). No storage change. - contracts — ADR-0075 accepted (D-BC-14): relying party identity ownership and re-registration after revocation. The owning state of a relying party identity (
rpId = keccak256(dns_name)) changes only by a typed Governance proposal (2/3):Governance.proposeRelyingPartyReassignment(registry, stageId)(identity captured by another state) andproposeRelyingPartyReRegistration(registry, stageId)(identity revoked; newAdminActionvaluesREASSIGN_RELYING_PARTY,REREGISTER_RELYING_PARTY, appended). The content is staged first inRelyingPartyRegistry.stagePeriodChange(PeriodChange)(identity, old and new state, name digest, access certificate fingerprint, reason digest; no free text) and the proposal carries only itsstageId; execution callscommitPeriodChange(stageId, action)(Governance only). A stage is bound to the record's period count (StalePeriodChange), the proposal type must match (UnknownPeriodChange), and the record, owner, status and new state are checked at execution (InvalidPeriodChange,CertificateInUse). Both paths open a new registration period: the record is not deleted, status history and periods are append-only (registrationPeriodsOf,relyingPartyStatusHistoryOf), scopes, registration data and the terminal group list are kept per period (the new period inherits none; the old period's open terminal groups close), andrelyingPartyAt(rpId, t)/isRelyingPartyAcceptableAt(rpId, t)answer for the period in force att. EventsPeriodChangeStaged,RelyingPartyReassigned,RelyingPartyReRegistered. Storage layout only appended (__gap39 → 35);Governancestays under the 24 KB code size limit. Contract tests 247; Slither 0 results. - trust-publisher — same rule in the registry tool (ADR-0075 RO5). A
dns_nameis never registered twice, whatever its status; the error now says that an ownership change needs project management approval. A revoked relying party can be re-registered only withregister rp <application> --approval <approval record>: the same record gets a new period (status_history→ACTIVE, reasonre-registration (approval …)), old uses and terminal groups stay closed, new uses need newscope_ids. Writing to the production registry still needsTAMGA_CONFIRM_PROD. - contracts — ADR-0073 and ADR-0074 accepted (D-BC-12, D-BC-13);
contracts/,network/anddocs/ledgerare public. The contracts are not an npm package; no production chain exists (ADR-0009 K4). - contracts — one-time migration window (ADR-0073 K1, CE1). Every registry (
RootCARegistry,IssuerRegistry,SchemaRegistry,RelyingPartyRegistry,CrossRecognition,StatusListRegistry) carries a migration state that only moves forward (not started → open → closed). Governance opens it once per registry by a typed proposal (proposeMigrationOpen(registry, replayPlanHash, window, executor), window ≤ 30 days, counted from execution); it may be extended only while open and within 30 days of opening (proposeMigrationExtend), and closes by proposal (proposeMigrationClose) or by itself when the time runs out — finally. While open, dated writes (*Atfunctions, theregisteredAtfield) may carry a past date (never later than block time, in order per record) and the daily quotas are not applied; outside the window an explicit date is refused (PastDateOutsideMigration). Network schemas may be written by the single migration executor while the window is open. Governance compares each upgrade target'smigrationState()before and after the upgrade and reverts on any change (MigrationStateChanged), so no upgrade can reopen or extend a window. The state lives in ERC-7201 namespaced storage (tamga.storage.MigrationWindow). - contracts — C1/C2 evaluated at the credential's
iat(ADR-0073 K5, CE5). Issuers, root CAs and schemas keep an append-only status history (*StatusAt,*StatusHistoryOf); intervals are half-open. A suspended issuer's credentials issued before the suspension are accepted (list rule; before, a suspension rejected all of them). Two boundary fixes: a credential issued at the revocation second or at the schema-authorisation withdrawal second is now rejected (iat < revokedAt,iat < until), and a retired root CA no longer accepts credentials issued after its retirement (isChainAcceptableAt). A deprecated schema accepts only credentials issued before the deprecation; a schema or root CA ever revoked accepts none. List mapping helpers:retireIssuer(soft revocation +IssuerRetired),announceRootCARollover(ROLLING_OVER). - contracts — read views (C33 (1)):
Governance.memberList,IssuerRegistry.issuerDelegatesOf. - contracts — hard revocation
invalidatesFrom(ADR-0073 K2, CE2).IssuerRegistry.setIssuerInvalidatesFrom(issuerId, from)marks a compromised issuer: credentials withiat ≥ fromfail C1. Only on a revoked issuer,validFrom ≤ from ≤ revokedAt, and the date can only be moved earlier (never removed); it is the one past date that may be written outside the migration window. Read withinvalidatesFromOf. - contracts — schema version digests are append-only (ADR-0073 K3, CE3).
SchemaRegistry.addSchemaContentHash(schemaId, contentHash)adds a new version digest (national schema: the owning state; network schema: GovernanceproposeNetworkSchemaContentHash, or the migration executor);matchesContentHashaccepts the first digest or any added one, none on a revoked schema;contentHashesOflists them. At most 32 added digests per schema; empty and duplicate digests are refused. SPEC-BC-0001 SC1 now reads "every written digest never changes; new version digests are only appended". - contracts — relying party identity and request scopes (ADR-0073 K4, CE4).
RelyingPartyRegistrytakes the identityrpId = keccak256(utf8(dns_name))from the registrar (no domain text in the ABI); renewing the access certificate keeps it (updateAccessCertificate, old and new fingerprint inAccessCertificateUpdated; a fingerprint belongs to one relying party at a time,rpIdOfCertificate). Suspension can be lifted (reinstateRelyingParty); revocation is final. The coarseallowedScopes/updateScope/hasScopeare removed: each use is aRequestScope(scope, service, type, formatdc+sd-jwt/mso_mdoc/mso_mdoc_zk, mdoc namespace, sorted element-path digests, validity, details digest), set withsetRequestScopeand closed (never deleted) withcloseRequestScope; wallets askmayRequest(rpId, service, type, format, namespace, element). Caps: 32 scopes, 64 elements. Storage layout baseline updated (no deployed state). - contracts — new
NetworkRegistry(ADR-0074 K3, PJ1–PJ3). The network's own records (wallet providers and their WUA signing keys, ZK circuits, external lists, EAA categories, list signers, list operators, state and role slots, catalogue) as typed records: identifier digests, fingerprints, closed-set values, numbers, dates and a details digest only — no free text. Written only through Governance: content is pinned withstageRecord, a typed proposalproposeNetworkRecord(registry, stageId)carries its digest, and 2/3 executescommitStaged; during the migration window the single migration executor writes dated records (writeRecord). Status history is append-only;isListedProviderKey(fingerprint)answers "is this a WUA key of a listed wallet provider now". UUPS, deployed byscripts/lib/deploy.ts; covered by the privacy ABI, UUPS and storage layout checks. - contracts — registration data and gate groups on chain (ADR-0074 K2).
IssuerRegistry.setIssuerProfile(classPUB/QUALIFIED/EAA, public-sector flag, entitlement bit mask, registration and operations detail digests) andRelyingPartyRegistry.setRelyingPartyProfile(registration digest, flags, alias policy, intermediary and served relying parties asrpIdarrays). Gate groups (ADR-0069) asTerminalGrouprecords: the group id is unique across the network, bound to an institution and at least one gate policy; withdrawn groups are closed, not deleted;isActiveTerminalCertificate(groupId, fingerprint). - contracts — read views (C33 (1), continued) and the 2026-10-19 security round remainder (F-18).
TrustListAnchorRegistry.anchorers();DelegateKeysSetnow carries the keys;SchemaRegistrySetevent;proposeStateRemoval(stateCode, bytes32 reasonHash)takes a reason digest instead of an unused string andStateRemovedemits it; status list and anchor versions may grow by at mostMAX_VERSION_STEP(1 000 000) per step, soversion = 2^64-1can no longer freeze a list; unusedCANCELLED,ProposalCancelledandSchemaNotAuthorizedremoved. The anchor registry ABI copy inapps/trust-publisher/src/chain/abi/is regenerated. - contracts — security review (2026-11-04). No deployed state; storage layout baselines updated.
- High: the single migration executor could permanently revoke a network schema during the window. It now writes only registrations, version digests and deprecations; revoking a network schema is Governance-only (
NetworkTierRequiresGovernance). - Medium: voted
NetworkRegistryproposals could be executed by anyone in any order (e.g. an oldACTIVEafterREVOKED), and executed content could be re-staged and written again by an old proposal. A stage is now bound to the record's write counter (stageId = keccak256(abi.encode(rec, baseRevision)),revisionOf,stageIdFor,stagedRevisionOf); a commit on a changed record reverts (StaleStage), so any newer write supersedes pending proposals.REVOKEDis not final for network records (ADR-0074 does not say so); re-activation needs a proposal staged after the revocation. Every write emitsRecordWritten(kind, recordId, stageId, contentHash, revision); status changes emitRecordStatusChanged. A proposer can withdraw an unexecuted proposal:Governance.cancelProposal(ProposalStatus.CANCELLEDre-added at the end,ProposalCancelled,NotProposer). - Medium: "cannot be reopened by an upgrade" relied only on the before/after comparison. Registries now refuse upgrades while their window is open (
UpgradeDuringMigration), andcontracts:checkpins the source digest ofMigrationWindow.sol(storage-layout/MigrationWindow.pin.json,--update-pin), its ERC-7201 slot, and that no other source references the slot or uses inline assembly. ADR-0073 carries a dated implementation note (decision unchanged). - Medium, decision needed: relying party identity ownership and re-registration after revocation — ADR-0075, accepted the same day and implemented (see Applications and repository).
- Low: while the window is open, undated ordinary writes (
at = 0,registeredAt = 0,publishList(publishedAt = 0)) are refused except from Governance (DateRequiredDuringMigration; ADR-0073 K1 "dates explicit"); a closed request scope or gate group cannot be silently reopened under the same id (ScopeClosed,TerminalGroupNotOpen); a gate group's institution must be the relying party itself or a registered relying party / issuer of the same state (UnknownInstitution;RelyingPartyRegistry.initializetakes the issuer registry); outside the window issuer and root CAvalidFromcannot be in the past andvalidUntilis checked against the effective start; revocation reasons arebytes32 reasonHashdigests (revokeSchema,revokeRootCA,retireList,proposeNetworkSchemaRevocation; the privacy ABI test no longer allows areasonstring);Initializable/UUPSUpgradeableimported from@openzeppelin/contracts(same code in 5.6, namespaced storage). Not changed: the quota exemption stays for the whole window (CE1), andisChainAcceptableAtdoes not check the CA validity interval (the list rule does not either; CE6). - Slither is green (0 results):
SchemaRegistrySet(address indexed), four false positives excluded inline with reasons;scripts/slither.mjsfinds apip --userinstall. New tests:security-round-2026-11-04.test.tsandmigration-invariants-fuzz.test.ts(history order, ordinary write vs replay, executor powers; seeded).
- High: the single migration executor could permanently revoke a network schema during the window. It now writes only registrations, version digests and deprecations; revoking a network schema is Governance-only (
Documents
- docs (2026-11-05; currency check after the 0.8.2 release): version sentences 0.8.2 (README —
@tamga-network/onboardadded to the package table —, docs home and guides in three languages, package index, code examples page, SPEC-API-0001 examplesdk_version, audit package "Version under review"); GUIDE-0014 and GUIDE-0015 (three languages) install the onboarding tool from npm (npm install -g @tamga-network/onboard), running from source stays as an optional note; the guides' package table lists@tamga-network/onboard.
0.8.1 — 2026-11-05
All nine packages move to 0.8.1 together (patch release). The API additions are optional (new methods and fields; VerifyInput.aud became optional — a widened type; the Anchor union gained two line types, see below). Some behaviours changed in the fail-closed direction; they are listed under "Behaviour changes in 0.8.1" below. The version stays 0.8.1 (0.x test release; every change refuses more — the one name it resolves again, a relying party reassigned between countries, needs a signed, structured reassignment record). The changes come from the 2026-11-04 review round (per-branch lock, Digital Credentials API audience, registration status warning, mdoc namespace scope, ambiguous gate groups) and the 2026-11-05 trust additions (anchor line types for the chain projection, bits / size, reassignment rule).
Behaviour changes in 0.8.1 (fail-closed, with migration)
- verifier — Digital Credentials API audience. A mismatching
audon this path is rejected at A1 with an explicit message (was: a generic "aud mismatch" at A6);origintogether withaud=client_idis now REJECTED (the audience on this path isorigin:<origin>, also for signed requests). Migrate: passoriginand leaveaudout. - trust — gate groups are
null/ inactive when ambiguous.terminalGroup(id)returnsnullwhen the samegroup_idappears in more than one verifier record;terminalGroupByCertFingerprint(fp)returnsnullwhen the fingerprint is in more than one active group; a verifier whosedns_nameappears in more than one national list is ambiguous (relyingPartyByDnsName→null, its groups inactive) unless the lists show a reassignment (item 5); a group'sinstitution_idslug is looked up in the verifier's own national list only. - wallet-core — mdoc registration scope is narrower.
allowedClaimslists only elements whose[namespace, element]path matches the request's namespace; a single-element path without a namespace grants nothing for an mdoc registration. Elements outside it are shown as over-asking. - verifier — per-branch lock;
consume()throws once the presentation is completed.begin(branch)locks only that branch, so two branches' valid responses can be verified at the same time.BranchSet.consume()now throwsPresentationAlreadyConsumedErrorwhen the presentation is already completed: the 0.8.0 patternisOpen→await verifyPresentation→consume()fails instead of accepting a second response. Migrate: accept withif (!branches.tryConsume()) { /* do not accept */ }. A failed-attempt limit no longer rejects the presentation while another response is being processed (only that branch closes). - trust — reassignment between countries only with a structured record (ADR-0075 RO1/RO5). When the same
dns_nameis in more than one national list, the loader takes the single record that is notREVOKED/RETIRED(aSUSPENDEDrecord counts as not revoked) only if every other record's lastREVOKEDhistory entry carriesreassigned_tonaming that record's country. Otherwise the name stays ambiguous (null, fail closed): no reassignment record, one naming another country, two records not revoked, or a re-registration after revocation in another country (RO2 — until a network-level record exists). The free-textreasonis never read for this. If all records are revoked, the record whose status changed last is returned. The result does not depend on the order in which lists are loaded. Migrate: write the old country's side withrp-status <dns_name> REVOKED --reassigned-to <CC> --approval <ref>(trust-publisher), which addsreassigned_to.
Added
trust — two new anchor log line types (ADR-0074 K4). The loader recognises
registration_status(every publication of the registration certificate status list, ADR-0068:list_uri,content_hash, a per-listlist_version,published_at) andlist_view(every ETSI XML / LoTE view, ADR-0066:file,format,source_file,source_version,content_hash); the store keeps the latest line per list and per file. A step back stops the load: per list forregistration_status, per (file,source_file) pair forlist_view(a file moved to another source list continues from that source's own version). A checkpointstatemay carry both; itslist_views[].file/source_filefollow the same rules as the line (no.., sourcelotlortl-<cc>). An unknown line type still stops the loader, so loaders before 0.8.1 stop on these lines: the publisher writes them only once 0.8.1 is the minimum loader version of every consumer. The lines do not enter the verification decision.trust — a
status_listanchor line may carry the list's bit count and size (bits,size). Both are optional but come together (bitsfrom the Token Status List set 1, 2, 4, 8;sizea positive integer = inflatedlstbytes × 8 /bits, sosize × bitsis a multiple of 8, at mostSTATUS_LIST_MAX_SIZE= 2^32 − 1, the chain field'suint32); a line breaking this stops the load. Kept in the store'sStatusAnchorRowand in a checkpoint'sstate.status_lists[](same rule). They are read from the token by the publisher and are needed by the list record on chain (StatusListRegistry.registerList); they do not enter the verification decision. Older loaders ignore the extra fields (the line type is unchanged). SPEC-TRUST-0001 §5.trust —
StatusHistoryEntry.reassigned_to(optional, two capital letters): on aREVOKEDentry, the country list the identity moved to (ADR-0075 RO1/RO5; behaviour change 5). Older lists without it stay valid.trust —
TrustStore.relying_party_records,relyingPartyAmbiguous(dns),relyingPartyStateOf(dns).relying_party_recordsis dns name → country → record;relyingPartyAmbiguousapplies the reassignment rule (for a store built by hand withoutrelying_party_records, a name seen in more than one list is ambiguous);relyingPartyStateOfis the selected record's country (undefined when ambiguous).relying_party_stateskeeps every list a name appears in.verifier —
PresentationAlreadyConsumedError(thrown byBranchSet.consume()on a completed presentation; see above).verifier —
BranchSet.tryConsume()andBranchSet.declineBlocked(branch).tryConsumecompletes the presentation atomically and returnsfalsewhen another response already did (use it instead ofconsumewhen accepting);declineBlockedtells whether a decline must wait (its own branch's response is being processed, or the decline would close a single-fetch presentation while another response is being processed).verifier —
audmay be omitted on the Digital Credentials API path. Fordc+sd-jwt, whenoriginis given andaudis not,verifyPresentationderivesorigin:<origin>(OpenID4VP 1.0 Annex A.4).VerifyInput.audis now optional; withoutoriginit is still required (A1).wallet-core —
AuthStart.registrationStatusUnknown.startAuthorizedreportstruewhen the issuer's registration certificate status could not be checked (no list, no unexpired cached copy); the app warns the person (ADR-0068 WRS4). A revoked certificate still throws.
Changed
- verifier — the single-use lock is per request branch (ADR-0067, note 2026-11-04).
BranchSet.begin(branch)locks only that branch; another branch's response can be processed at the same time and acceptance is decided bytryConsume. Before, one slowly processed response on an attacker's branch made the real wallet's response get "a response is being processed" (400). The branch-less Digital Credentials API path keeps one lock per presentation.busystill means "any response in progress". - verifier — a mismatching
audon the Digital Credentials API path is rejected at A1 with an explicit message (was: a generic "aud mismatch" at A6). - wallet-core — registration-certificate scope for mdoc compares namespace + element.
allowedClaimslists only elements whose[namespace, element]path in the certificate matches the request's namespace (OpenID4VP and proximity); an element of the same name in another namespace counts as over-asking. - trust — ambiguous gate groups are closed.
terminalGroup(id)returnsnullwhen the samegroup_idappears in more than one verifier record (e.g. two national lists);terminalGroupByCertFingerprintreturnsnullwhen the fingerprint is in more than one active group (a withdrawn old group does not count); a verifierdns_namelisted by more than one national list is ambiguous (relyingPartyByDnsName→null, its groups inactive); a group'sinstitution_idslug is matched only against the issuers of the verifier's own national list (institution + country), and is not active if that still matches more than one. - wallet-core — an mdoc registration path without a namespace (
[element]) grants nothing (was: allowed the element in any namespace). - trust — the
Anchorunion is wider and refined.Anchor(the zod schema and its TypeScript type) now also has theregistration_statusandlist_viewmembers; code that switches exhaustively onkindmust handle them (anevercheck fails to compile until it does).Anchoris now a refined schema (thebits/sizerule), soAnchor.optionsand other discriminated-union helpers are no longer available on it;parse/safeParseare unchanged. - trust — relying party reassigned between countries (ADR-0075).
relyingPartyByDnsNameand the terminal group answers follow the reassignment rule of behaviour change 5 instead of treating every name in two lists as ambiguous. - verifier —
failedAttemptdoes not reject the presentation while another response is being processed; it closes only that branch (on the branch-less path the limit applies once the other response is done).
Fixed
- wallet-core —
wiaStatusInListlist bound is8 / bits. 4- and 8-bit lists no longer treat entries past the list as inside it (which threw "idx outside the list").
Applications and repository (not in the npm packages)
- Tamga Verify — ISO/IEC 18013-7 Annex C decline carries no status token (ADR-0067 RQ3). The
redirect_urireturned for a declinedorg-iso-mdocresponse is the bare result page; a decline while another response is being processed gets 400. - Tamga Verify — a response whose processing fails after another branch completed the presentation no longer overwrites the result.
- Tamga Verify / sandbox list — sandbox gate group ids are fictional. Sandbox test institutions and their gate groups are
example-university-campus,example-events-gate,example-cinema-gate(also the defaults ofTAMGA_VERIFY_CAMPUS_GROUP/TAMGA_VERIFY_TICKET_GROUP); sandbox terminals paired with the previous group ids must be paired again. - trust-publisher —
history-reset(sandbox only). Cleans the sandbox publication's history: each list keeps only its current version in the archive, the public changelog restarts, retired registration-certificate paths are anonymised. Current lists, version numbers, the version chain and status bits are unchanged; refused on the real network. - conformance — OpenID4VP vectors (
conformance/vectors/openid4vp/basic.json; vector set version 8). KB-JWTaudon both paths (client identifier on the cross-device path,origin:<origin>on the Digital Credentials API path; expected: A steps pass, or A6 / A1), per-fetch request branches (encrypted response to a branch key, encrypted and plaintext decline, soft decline, attempts, responses no branch key opens) and branchkidnaming. Keys, time,state/nonceand the wallet's JWE ephemeral bytes are fixed (test keys from public seeds); the runner checks them against the current packages. - Tamga Verify — the store-review over-18 policy (
review-age-over-18, ADR-0033) requestsmso_mdoc(tamga.id.1, asage-over-18-mdoc). The verifier's registered over-18 usage (age-over-18-1) ismso_mdoconly, so the SD-JWT request was sent without a registration certificate and the wallet refused it; the review credential carries an mdoc per copy. - contracts —
VersionNotMonotonicis declared once inITamgaErrors(shared byIStatusListRegistryandITrustListAnchorRegistry; same selector; the anchor registry ABI's first parameter is now namedcurrent).
Documents
- SPEC-PROTO-0002 PV7 and §7.1 (Digital Credentials API
origin:audience, also for signed requests), §7.4 (Annex C decline); SPEC-PROTO-0001 §2.1display[].localecanonicalisation (full ICU note); SPEC-CRED-0002 Ş5(g) forbidden claim names (__proto__,constructor,prototype); SPEC-CRED-0003 §3.30x03is APPLICATION_SPECIFIC and read fail-closed; ADR-0067 K1 note onrequest_uri_methodand residual-risk note on the per-branch lock; hosted verifier OpenAPI (Annex C decline). SPEC-PROTO-0002 §10.1 change note 2026-11-04 (per-branch lock, atomic acceptance, 400 for a decline while a response is processed,consume()throws once completed) and §6.1 (mdoc scope by namespace + element); SPEC-API-0001 §1.A A1 also carries caller configuration errors, examplesdk_version0.8.1; ADR-0067 note on the Annex C decline 400; verifier README and "Verify on your own server" guide accept withtryConsume(). - docs (2026-11-05; currency check after the 0.8.1 release): version sentences 0.8.1 (README, docs home and guides in three languages, code examples page, package index, audit package "Version under review").
@tamga-network/onboardis not part of this release (first published in 0.8.2).
0.8.0 — 2026-11-03
All nine packages move to 0.8.0 together (minor bump: one interface default changed). The code changes below come from the second-model review of the 0.7.4 work (per-fetch branches, status lists, gate groups, WIA status); the second half of the list is behaviour that now fails closed.
Breaking / behaviour changes in 0.8.0 (with migration)
- verifier —
createPresentationRequestdefaults to per-fetch branches (ADR-0056 safe default).initialRequestObjectnow defaults tofalse: no shared cross-device request object is produced and the result is aPresentationSession(norequestJwt,encPrivateKey,encPublicJwk,encJwkThumbprint); a response whosekidnames no branch is rejected.initialRequestObject: truekeeps the oldPresentationRequestfor one release and is deprecated. Not backward-compatible for integrators that servedreq.requestJwt: with 0.8.0 that field isundefined. Migration:packages/verifier/README.md"Migrating from one shared request object" — open presentations without the flag, create oneBranchSetper presentation, serverequest_uriwithBranchSet.fetch, find the branch from the responsekid;examples/02-verify-own-servershows the full flow. To keep the old shape for one more release passinitialRequestObject: trueexplicitly. - wallet-core — WIA status bit reads fail closed.
wiaRevokedInList/wiaRevokedByListnow treat the undefined value 3 as revoked (was: only 1); newwiaStatusInList/wiaStatusByListreturnvalid | suspended | revoked(WiaListStatus) andwiaValidInListis true only for 0 — every non-zero value means "do not use this WIA", only revoked (1 / 3) justifies deleting it locally. Migration: gate WIA use onwiaValidInList(orwiaStatusByList(...) === "valid"), treatsuspendedas temporary (do not delete); code that only calledwiaRevokedByListkeeps working and now also deletes on 3. - trust — an active gate group needs an ACTIVE institution (ADR-0069 TG2/TG3).
TrustSource.terminalGroupsAll/terminalGroupreportactive: falsewhen the group'sinstitution_idnames an issuer or verifier that is REVOKED, SUSPENDED or not in the list, so a withdrawn institution's gates close with the list (403 in Tamga Verify). Groups withoutinstitution_id(legacy) are still judged by the verifier record and the validity window only. Migration: none for conforming lists; the publisher refuses to build an active group whose institution is not ACTIVE (valid_untilwithdraws it). - Tamga Verify — real network refuses terminal keys from the environment (ADR-0065 TK3). On the real network (https, not sandbox) the service does not start when
TAMGA_VERIFY_TERMINAL_KEYSis set; sandbox and local development are unchanged. Migration: operators keep the variable insandbox.envonly; real-network gate keys come from the trust list.
Fixed
- verifier —
BranchSet.fetchevicts only after a successful signature. The victim branch is dropped after the new branch is minted (a failed or late signature loses no branch; a victim that started receiving a response meanwhile is re-selected), the presentation expiry is re-checked after minting, andBranchRegistrycounts branches being minted in its budget so concurrent fetches cannot exceed it (_makeRoommay now evict more than one branch to make room). - Tamga Verify —
/vp/responserate limit per request branch. The bucket key is the branch (kid), not the presentation, on both the encrypted and the plain-decline path (unknown or branch-lesskid→ 400 before the bucket); only the branch-less Digital Credentials API path stays per presentation. A flood on an attacker's branch no longer returns 429 to the real wallet's branch. - wallet-core — registration-certificate status cache never rolls back.
fetchRegistrationStatuseskeeps the cached list when a freshly fetched valid list is older than it (iatsmaller: a stale proxy or a rolled-back publication) and does not overwrite the cache;StatusListexposesiat. A revocation once seen cannot disappear while the cached list has not expired. - trust-publisher — old registration status lists keep following their entries (WRS3). After a registrar's
status_list_urichanges, VALID entries of the previous lists are revoked with the publication:registration_endedwhen the old path is no longer published,supersededwhen its content changed; unchanged content stays valid. - trust-publisher — XML signer slot check counts the validity window.
xmlSignerSlotProblemschecks thexml_signing_keysentry'svalid_from/valid_until, not only its presence (ADR-0066 §5.7.1);statusOfwith no current history entry starts the status at the list's publication time (not at the previous status' start) — SPEC-ID-0002 §8.1 notes the SKI approximation. - trust-publisher — own-record detection (ADR-0070).
isOwnalso recognises a record whoseoperator.nameor tax number equals the provisional-operator value, not only the note. - Tests. Fuzz property test for hostile XML allows 6 s under full load; the spawn-heavy publisher test files get a 180 s budget (
docs/audit/build-and-test.mdsays how to run them alone).
Added
- trust-publisher — single provisional-operator value (ADR-0070).
registry/provisional-operator.jsonholds the legal provisional operator of the network's own services; every publication checks that own records carry exactly this value and that the list operator name is "Tamga Network" (OP1–OP3). The pending app-store review signer record carries the same value. - ops/brand — DOM builders for the service pages.
tamga-ui.jsgainsel/set/small/pillNode/row/cell/linkso fetched data enters the page as text nodes (no inline scripts, noinnerHTML; strict CSP on the operator's pages).
Documents
- ADR-0070 (provisional operator chain; the provisional operator's postal address was later removed from the public text), ADR-0071 (no fees in the provisional phase; Trust Framework §5.5 rewritten) and ADR-0072 (value layer suspended; ADR-0003 marked superseded) accepted; ADR-0028 (health credentials) parked. ADR-0067 K2 / RQ2, SPEC-PROTO-0002 §10.1 + PV15 and D-PROTO-5 say a presentation is REJECTED "if it has a single fetch" (branches being minted count; an evicted branch is not subtracted).
docs/audit/limitations.md§5 Q4 (WIA status reading). ADR-0006/0007/0011/0035/0040 carry a "partly superseded" note. - docs (2026-11-03; currency check after the 0.8.0 release): version sentences 0.8.0 (README, docs home and guides in three languages, code examples page,
sdk_versionexamples, package index, audit package "Version under review").
0.7.4 — 2026-10-29
Breaking / behaviour changes in 0.7.4 (with migration)
- wallet-core — Digital Credentials API KB-JWT
aud. SD-JWT VC presented over the DC API binds the Key Binding JWT toaud = "origin:<origin>"(OpenID4VP 1.0 Appendix A.4), no longer to the client identifier; Tamga Verify expects the same and rejects a proof bound to the other path. Not backward-compatible: there is no transition code — a 0.7.3 wallet's SD-JWT presentation over the DC API is rejected by a 0.7.4 verifier, and the other way round (by decision: development phase, no compatibility shims before the beta, ADR-0029). Migration: wallets and verifiers update to 0.7.4 together for SD-JWT over the DC API; a verifier that checks DC API presentations itself must expectorigin:<origin>. Cross-device (QR) keeps the client identifier and is unaffected. - verifier —
registrationScopesFormatches the presentation format. A registered use only matches a request of the same format (dc+sd-jwtdefault,mso_mdoc,mso_mdoc_zk). Migration: registry scopes for mdoc / ZK requests setformat(andmdoc_namespacefor mdoc); otherwise the request finds no registration certificate. - wallet-core —
checkDcqlShapeis stricter. Malformed DCQL (non-object credential query,claimsnot an array, invalid claim path, emptyvalues) throws aWalletErrorinstead of aTypeErroror passing. Migration: catchWalletError; fix queries that relied on the lenient shape. - wallet-core — registration status. New flag
registration_status_unknownwhen a registration certificate's status could not be checked (also when no statuses are passed); a revoked certificate makes the request invalid.startAuthorized(auth code issuance) now fetches the registrar's status list whenregistrarKeysis given; a registration-certificate status list withoutexpis not accepted (reads as unknown). Migration: passfetchRegistrationStatuses(...)results to the registration checks (or accept the flag as a warning); allow the wallet to reach the registrar's/status/...address. - core —
resolveSdPayloadrejects__proto__. A payload with a plain__proto__key is rejected. Migration: none for conforming issuers; never use__proto__as a claim name. - wallet-core —
statusBitAtreads 4- and 8-bit lists. Values above 3 read as 3 (invalid). Migration: none; treat 3 as invalid as before. - trust — XML list signers in their own LOTL field (
xml_signing_keys). The ETSI TS 119 612 XML list signer is published in the country slot's newnational_lists[].xml_signing_keysinstead ofsigning_keys; JSON lists are validated only againstsigning_keys. As defence in depth, a LOTL ortl-<cc>JSON list whose signer certificate has EKUid-tsl-kp-tslSigning(0.4.0.2231.3.0) is still not loaded. The publisher refuses a tslSigning-EKU certificate insigning_certsand checks the XML signer againstxml_signing_keysbefore writing the XML (stops on the real network). Migration: registries move the XML signer fromsigning_certstoxml_signing_certs; XML readers look the signer up inxml_signing_keys; sign JSON lists with the JSON list signer only. - verify — gates fail closed. A terminal key with an owner, or a key of a group once seen in the list, gets 403 when the list is stale or the group is gone; a pass from a policy not in the group's
allowed_policiesgets 403 without being consumed. Migration: keep the trust list fresh; passes issued before 0.7.4 (no policy id) still pass when every policy of the group is allowed. - trust-publisher —
wrprc-revokereason codes.--reasontakescompromised | superseded | ceased | policy_violation | other, optional--note(short, no personal data). A lostwrprc-status.jsonstops the build. Migration: use a code; after state loss runwrprc-status --reset --reason "<why>". purposeremoval increatePresentationRequesthappened in 0.7.3 (now flagged there).- verify / operator issuer — no 429 for a request-object fetch past 10 branches (ADR-0067 amendment 2026-10-29). The fixed "10 branches, then 429" rule let a bystander lock the real wallet out with 10 fetches. Now a new fetch past the soft limit (10) replaces a closed branch or the oldest never-answered branch at least 120 s old; at the hard ceiling (32) the age condition is dropped; a branch whose response is being processed is never evicted. A response to an evicted branch gets 400
unknown request object(not counted; the person scans again). A shared budget caps branches across presentations (20,000; when every branch is in flight a fetch gets 503). The per-presentation fetch bucket is gone; fetches are limited per client address (nginx zonetamga_vpreq, 2 r/s, burst 20; application-wide ceilingvpRequest). Migration: none for wallets; operators reload nginx. - verifier —
createPresentationRequest({ initialRequestObject: false }). Without the shared cross-device request object the result is aPresentationSession(norequestJwt,encPrivateKey,encPublicJwk,encJwkThumbprint) and a response whosekidnames no branch is rejected. The default (true, old shape) stays for 0.7.x and is deprecated: one object served to every fetch exposesstateto anyone who sees the QR.openPresentationResponse/decryptPresentationResponsenow typereqasResponseKeysand branches asBranchKeys(generic) —PresentationRequestandRequestBranchstill fit. Migration:packages/verifier/README.md"Migrating from one shared request object";examples/02-verify-own-servershows the full flow (itsrequestObject(id, walletNonce)is now async; newhandleDecline(state)).
Changes
docs + ARF (2026-10-29; currency check after the 0.7.4 release): version sentences 0.7.4 (README, docs home and guides,
sdk_versionexamples, package index); ADR-0066/0067/0069 notes no longer say "not on npm"; the trust-list spec and the audit package say registration-certificate status is configured on the real network too (ADR-0068 implementation note); Trust Framework: the real network's ETSI XML view waits for the foundation that will operate the list (postal address, signer); Event Ticket rulebook rule 5 names the gate group's institution and accepted pass policies (ADR-0069 TG1–TG3; the Azerbaijani text also gains the ADR-0065 TK1 sentence it lacked).verifier + verify + operator issuer (2026-10-29; ADR-0067 amendment, K16): one branch state machine. New
BranchSet/BranchRegistryin@tamga-network/verifier(branches.ts): fetch (fresh branch; signed object returned, not stored; the branch keeps the SHA-256 ofstate,nonce, private key,kid, timestamps), lookup bykidand bystate(hash map, no linear scan;timingSafeEqual), soft decline (decline, REJECTED only after a single fetch — fetches still being signed count), attempts per branch (failedAttempt), single-use lock (beginbefore decrypting,isOpenafter,end),consume,dispose, eviction (BRANCH_LIMITS: soft 10, hard 32, 120 s, 5 attempts). Tamga Verify and the operator's inline identity presentation both use it; their duplicated logic is deleted. This fixes drift in the operator service: it took the single-use lock only after decrypting, so a decline arriving during decryption could close the branch and the response was still accepted; it comparedstatewith===and scanned every pending branch for a decline; its/{slug}/vp/req/{id}had no rate limit (now per address at the proxy plus an application ceiling). Tamga Verify and the operator no longer create the unused first request object (one signature and one key generation less per presentation).examples/02-verify-own-serverrewritten to the branch API (lock before decrypting, used up only after A6, the pending entry is never deleted before decryption); the SDK page copy on tamga.network regenerated. Code comments use the RQ codes of ADR-0067 (were FB1–FB6); ADR-0067 tr RQ3 wording fixed.trust + trust-publisher (2026-10-29; ADR-0066 implementation note):
xml_signing_keys. The country slot in the LOTL carries the ETSI TS 119 612 XML list signers in their own field (national_lists[].xml_signing_keys; registryxml_signing_certs), separate from the JSON list signers. The sandbox LOTL movedtl-xml-signer-1there. Publisher checks: no tslSigning-EKU certificate insigning_certs; the XML signer must be active inxml_signing_keys(stops on the real network, warning in the sandbox). OpenAPILotlschema, SPEC-TRUST-0001 and SPEC-ID-0002 updated.trust-publisher (2026-10-29; ADR-0068 on the real network): registration certificates of the real network carry
policy_id2.25.338612186327611064481769354006034529929(UUID-based OID),certificate_policyhttps://arf.tamga.network/policies/registration-certificateandstatus→https://trust.tamga.network/status/wrprc/1(1-bit Token Status List, re-signed hourly). FW-POL-0003 records the OID.docs (2026-10-29): the legal operator of the network's own services is stated with one sentence everywhere it appears — "Operated by a provisional operator on behalf of Tamga Network (foundation to be established)" (ARF definitions, roles, trust framework, rulebooks). The lists keep naming the operator "Tamga Network".
verify + verifier + trust (2026-10-29; ADR-0069 TG3 follow-up): gates fail closed. "List stale" and "group not in the list" are told apart (
freshness().healthy); a key with an owner or a group once seen in the list (listed_groupsinterminal-keys.json) that cannot be confirmed gets 403 at/terminal/verifyand no new key (409). Unowned keys issued while a group was unlisted are bound to the group's institution when the group appears.allowed_policiesis enforced at the gate: passes carry their policy (PassPolicy.policy_id→PassRecord.policyId;verifyTokenoptionpolicyAllowed), a pass from a policy that is not allowed is refused before it is consumed.trust-publisher + wallet-core (2026-10-29; ADR-0068 follow-up): the registration-certificate status state is never silently restarted — without
wrprc-status.jsonbut with a published list (or an archived state) the build stops;wrprc-status --reset --reason "<why>"rebuilds it from the published list (revoked bits) and certificates. Every state change is also written toarchive/wrprc-status.<time>.json. Whenstatus_list_urichanges, revoked entries and blocks move to the new list as revoked and the old list keeps being re-signed until its last certificate expires. Manual revocation reasons are a code list plus an optional short note checked for e-mail addresses, numbers, links and names. wallet-core requiresexpon registration-certificate status lists (parseStatusTokenoptionrequireExp).trust-publisher (2026-10-29; ADR-0066 follow-up): in the ETSI XML view a wallet solution's status timeline is the solution's own history (the provider's current status is added only when the provider is not active); repeated entries of the same status collapse and no history instance repeats the current status. Characters not allowed in XML 1.0 (C0 controls except tab, CR, LF; U+FFFE/U+FFFF; lone surrogates) stop the real-network build and are stripped with a warning in the sandbox (
sanitizeTrustedListInput); the generator never writes them. Root CAservice_typein the JSON registries is the ETSISvctype/CA/PKCURI (wasNationalRootCA-QC, a qualified claim — SPEC-ID-0002 §8.1, TX2); the publisher rejects QC values.trust (2026-10-29; K5 finding): the JSON list loader refuses LOTL /
tl-<cc>signed by a certificate with EKUid-tsl-kp-tslSigning(certExtendedKeyUsages, pure DER reader). A separatexml_signing_keysfield would be narrower; it is a new public name and waits for a decision.verify (2026-10-29; OpenID4VP session and replay acceptance tests, SPEC-PROTO-0002 §10.1, PV10; no package change): a wallet error response (
error+state) that arrives while a response to the same presentation is being verified is now refused with 400 (a response is being processed) instead of closing the presentation — before, the decline wrote REJECTED and the in-flight verification then overwrote it with its own result, so the outcome could change after it was written. The response path also re-checks that the presentation is still open after verification before writing a result. Newapps/verify/test/session-replay.test.tscovers eight cases: an old response sent to a new attempt, a proof made for another verifier (KB-JWTaud), the same valid response sent concurrently, a result requested by another session or RP, an expired attempt, malformed input first (and state / nonce swapped between two sessions), re-reading the result after acceptance, and a credential with a missing field; plus a Digital Credentials API origin mismatch and a response after a decline. The server-side verification guide has a "a success page is not proof" checklist item.docs (2026-10-28; data-protection pre-review, no package change): ADR-0040 note — the sandbox's real identity path defaults to the invitation mode (
invite) until the legal review is complete, the quick trial stays open to everyone; RI1 rewritten (tr/en/az, INVARIANTS). Sandbox guide §8 and the warning text now say deletion of the provider session is requested at issuance. SPEC-ID-0003: time-based purge of expired/revoked identity records (30 days, with the provider session) and event-log rows (365 days), erasure responseprovider: "partial"without the delete permission (tr/en/az).verify + docs/ARF sites + brand (2026-10-29; K14): fonts are self-hosted — no Google Fonts. Onest, IBM Plex Sans (upright + italic) and IBM Plex Mono are served from our own origin:
ops/brand/fonts/(woff2 built from the google/fonts sources with fontTools — Latin, Latin Extended, Cyrillic, Cyrillic Extended; variable weight; OFL 1.1 licence files alongside,fonts.css).tamga-ui.cssimportsfonts/fonts.cssinstead offonts.googleapis.com; Tamga Verify serves/assets/fonts/*; the docs and ARF sites bundle the same files through Vite. The visitor's IP address no longer reaches a third-party font host. Tamga Verify's CSP tightens tostyle-src 'self'; font-src 'self'. No package code changed (packages/*untouched).verify + verifier/web (2026-10-29; security round K10): strict Content-Security-Policy on every Tamga Verify page. No inline script or style any more: page scripts (waiting page, sample site, gate terminal, Digital Credentials API test), the brand stylesheet and the early theme stamp are separate files under
/assets/*, values reach them throughdata-*attributes; the gate's QR reader (jsQR 1.4.0, unchanged file, hash pinned in the test) is served by the verifier itself — no CDN. Policy:default-src 'none'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; font-src 'self'; … base-uri 'none'; object-src 'none'; require-trusted-types-for 'script'; trusted-types 'none'(no nonce, no'unsafe-inline', no'unsafe-eval'; since K14 no font or style host other than'self'). The site kit (@tamga-network/verifier/web) sets its styles through CSSOM instead ofstyleattributes and clears the mount point withoutinnerHTML, so it also works on integrator sites whose CSP has no'unsafe-inline'and enforces Trusted Types. Sharedops/brand/tamga-ui.cssgains small utility classes;tamga-ui.jsbuilds fingerprint groups with DOM nodes.trust + trust-publisher + verify (2026-10-29; ADR-0069, completes ADR-0065 K2/K5): gate groups in the trust list. The verifier record's
terminal_groups[](ADR-0012 K5) gets a schema:group_id(unique in the list),institution_id(issuerslugor verifierdns_nameoperating the gates),label,allowed_policies[], optionalcert_fingerprints[]andoffline_allowed,valid_from/valid_until. The publisher refuses to publish an active group without a known institution and a policy (TG1).TrustSource.terminalGroup()/terminalGroupByCertFingerprint()read it (the latter prepares certificate-based gates; gates still use terminal keys). Tamga Verify records the group's institution on every terminal key and accepts an institution-scoped admin token (x-tamga-institution+x-institution-token= base64url(HMAC-SHA256(admin token, "tamga-terminal-keys/v1:" + institution))): an institution gets, lists and revokes keys only for its own listed groups (TG2);GET /terminal/keysalso returnsgroupsand each key'sownerandlastUsedAt. A key of a group withdrawn from the list, or whose institution changed, gets 403 at/terminal/verify(TG3). Groups not in the list keep the ADR-0065 path (operator only).core + wallet-core (2026-10-29; external-audit preparation, property/fuzz tests with
fast-check): three hardening fixes the new property tests found.resolveSdPayload(@tamga-network/core/sd-structure, used by the verifier and the wallet) rejects a plain__proto__key anywhere in the payload — JSON keeps it as an own key and the assignment changed the result object's prototype, so a claim could be read through inheritance without appearing in any key (issuer-signed content only).statusBitAt(wallet-core) reads 4- and 8-bit lists correctly — the CWT path accepts them and the old reader took every non-1-bit list as 2-bit, so in an 8-bit list it read a neighbour's bits (a revoked entry could read as valid); values above 3 now read as 3 (invalid).checkDcqlShaperejects malformed queries with aWalletErrorinstead of aTypeError: credential queries must be objects,claimsan array, each claim path a non-empty array of strings,nullor non-negative integers (OpenID4VP 1.0 §7),valuesa non-empty array. Property tests:packages/*/src/property.test.ts; contract invariant/fuzz sequences:contracts/test/invariants-fuzz.test.ts.verifier + verify (2026-10-29; ADR-0067, OpenID4VP 1.0 §5.10 / §8.2 / §8.3.1, HAIP §5): request branches and soft decline (protection against forged declines). OpenID4VP does not authenticate error responses, and
statesat in a request object that anyone who saw the QR code could fetch, so a bystander could close the real person's presentation witherror=access_denied&state=…. Now every fetch of therequest_uri(GET, or POST withwallet_nonceechoed) mints a new request object with a fresh 128-bitstate, a freshnonceand a fresh ephemeral encryption key (kidenc-<presentation>.<branch>). A decline — unencrypted or encrypted — closes only its own branch; the presentation becomes REJECTED only if it has exactly one branch and that branch is closed, otherwise it stays open until expiry and the first valid presentation wins. Decline answers are 200 and theirredirect_urino longer carries the status token. Responses that no branch key can decrypt no longer count as attempts; attempts are per branch (5); at most 10 branches per presentation (then 429 — replaced the same day, see the amendment entry above). The Digital Credentials API path is unchanged (its object is not a branch). New in@tamga-network/verifier:createRequestBranch,openPresentationResponse(separates an encrypted error response),acceptableWalletNonce,RequestBranch,RequestContent,ResponseBinding;responseKidOfreturnsbranchId,decryptPresentationResponsetakes an optional branch lookup;stateis now 128 bits. TheGET /presentations/{id}contract is unchanged. Same rule in the operator's inline identity presentation.trust-publisher + wallet-core (2026-10-29; ADR-0068 Accepted, ETSI TS 119 475 V1.2.1 Table 7 and §6): registration certificates carry
policy_id(Tamga's own OID; ETSI's EU OID0.4.0.19475.3.1is refused by the publisher),certificate_policy(the new Tamga ARF page "Registration Certificate Policy", FW-POL-0003) andstatus(status_list {idx, uri}). The registrar publishes a 1-bit IETF Token Status List (statuslist+jwt, signed with the registrar key that signs the certificates,ttl1 h,exp24 h, re-signed byheartbeat). Indexes are random and never reused: the same path with the same content keeps its index, changed content or an earlier expiry gets a new index and the old one is revoked (superseded); certificates that disappear from the publication are revoked (registration_ended). New publisher commandswrprc-statusandwrprc-revoke <path> --reason r(the content stays blocked until it changes); the state is kept inwrprc-status.jsonnext to the published files. Enabled only when the registry'sroles.registrar.wrprcis set — today the sandbox (2.25.…OID,trust.sandbox.tamga.network/status/wrprc/1); the real network's OID and addresses wait for name approval.@tamga-network/wallet-core:fetchRegistrationStatuses(one request per list, signer must be a LOTL registrar key, verified tokens cached, unexpired cached copy used offline),registrationStatusRefs,wrprcStatusRef,MemoryRegistrationStatusCache;checkRegistrationCerts,relevantRegistrationCerts,checkIssuerRegistrationandcheckProximityRegistrationtake the statuses as an optional last argument (presentProximityoptionregistrationStatuses): a revoked certificate makes the request invalid, an unchecked status adds the flagregistration_status_unknown(secure default when no statuses are passed); a malformedstatusorpolicy_idinvalidates the certificate. Certificates withoutstatusare accepted as before.trust-publisher + trust (2026-10-29; ADR-0066 Accepted the same day, ETSI TS 119 612 V2.4.1): optional ETSI TS 119 612 XML view of each country list, generated from the same signed
tl-<cc>object and the LOTL with the same version (TSLSequenceNumber=version) and signed XAdES-B-B (enveloped, Exclusive C14N, SigningTime / SigningCertificateV2 / DataObjectFormat, only the signer certificate in KeyInfo). Off by default: onlyTAMGA_TL119612=1makesbuildwritetl-<cc>.xml,tl-<cc>.sha2(§6.1) andarchive/tl-<cc>.vNNNN.xml; signerTAMGA_TL119612_SIGNERmust follow the §5.7.1 profile (on the real network a non-conforming signer or missing publication data stops the build; warning in sandbox). No EU "notified/qualified" URIs (EUgeneric,granted,recognisedatnationallevel,…/QC): list type, status and rules URIs underhttps://trust.tamga.network/tl/(names approved). Verifiers are not listed; inactive records stay with their history (SKI).@tamga-network/trustnow exportscanonicalizeXmlandparseXml(the signer uses the reader's canonicalisation). Official ETSI XSDs inapps/trust-publisher/etsi/19612/; tests validate every generated list against them (libxml2 via the dev dependencyxmllint-wasm) and verify the signature with the package reader and independently with xml-crypto; a sandbox sample is inapps/trust-publisher/test/fixtures/tl119612/. After acceptance:ops/gen-pki.tsissues a separate §5.7.1 XML signertl-xml-signer-1(root-issued leaf, basicConstraints CA=false, keyUsage digitalSignature + nonRepudiation, EKUid-tsl-kp-tslSigning); the sandbox registry lists it among the TR slot's signing keys and carries placeholder addresses marked "Sandbox (TEST)"; the sandbox publishestrust.sandbox.tamga.network/tl-tr.xml+.sha2. The URIs are defined on the new docs pageconcepts/etsi-trusted-list(en/tr/az). The real network stays off until real postal addresses and the production signer exist.trust-publisher + trust + verifier + verify (2026-10-29; independent test with the open-source EU test wallet eudi-dev 3.5.0 against the sandbox): (1) registration certificates (ETSI TS 119 475 Annex B.2.9, ARF RPRC_21) now register each use in its presentation format — a relying-party scope may carry
format(dc+sd-jwtdefault,mso_mdoc,mso_mdoc_zk) and, for mdoc,mdoc_namespace; thecredentialsentry is thendoctype_value+[namespace, element](element names per CIR 2026/1731 Table 6) instead of alwaysdc+sd-jwt+vct_values. An EU wallet in strict mode treated the mdoc and ZK age requests as over-asking.registrationScopesFor(verifier) picks a use with the same format; the age scopes in both registries set it. (2) Tamga Verify accepts a Digital Credentials API response withoutstate(OpenID4VP 1.0 Appendix A.2:stateis not defined for the DC API); astatethat is present must still match, and the cross-device path still requires it. (3) The wallet-provider certificate check accepts any EN 319 412-1 semantic identifier (e.g.NTRNL-NLTEST.00000000), not only letters and digits after the hyphen. (4) SD-JWT VC over the Digital Credentials API: the Key Binding JWTaudisorigin:<origin>(OpenID4VP 1.0 Appendix A.4, also for signed requests; SPEC-PROTO-0002 §7.1) in wallet-core and in Tamga Verify — both used the client identifier, so an EU wallet's DC API presentation was rejected. Cross-device keeps the client identifier (PV7); a proof bound to the other path is rejected. Wallets on wallet-core 0.7.3 need 0.7.4 for SD-JWT over the DC API (mdoc and ISO 18013-7 Annex C are unchanged). (5) ETSI TS 119 602 lists (the trust-publisher LoTE projection and the sandbox test LoTE script) carry the JAdES signing time iniat(ETSI TS 119 182-1 V1.2.1 §5.1.11) instead of a criticalsigT, which new signatures must not use since 2025-07-15 (§5.2.1); a JOSE library without JAdES support rejected the old header. Readers still acceptsigTin older lists. The sandbox test LoTEoidf-test-pidwas re-signed (sequence 3, same signer). (6) wallet-core reads averifier_inforegistration certificate whosedatais the base64url encoding of the JWT (ETSI TS 119 472-2 V1.3.1 RO-16 as eudi-dev applies it) as well as the plain JWT that Tamga Verify and the EU reference implementation send; checked against registration certificates from the eudi-dev registrar.
0.7.3 — 2026-10-27
- issuer (2026-10-27; OpenID4VCI 1.0 §12.2.4, OpenID conformance checks
VCIValidateDisplayLocales/VCIWarnOnNonCanonicalDisplayLocales): displaylocalevalues in the Credential Issuer metadata are strict BCP 47.credentialDisplay,issuerDisplayFromand the top-leveldisplayofissuerMetadatawrite the canonical form (en-us→en-US,TR→tr), drop an entry whose tag is malformed or has an unregistered language or region subtag, and keep one display object per language (the first; also only one entry without a locale). Two registry keys that canonicalize to the same tag become one entry. The values served today (tr-TR,en-US) do not change. Regression tests also pin two properties the newer conformance checks look at: every presentation request carries a new response-encryption key with akid(VP1FinalCheckEncryptionKeyNotReused), and batch copies get distinct, non-sequential status indices on one shared list (VCIEnsureBatchStatusReferencesAreDistinct,VCIEnsureBatchStatusListIndicesAreUnpredictable). - Breaking (flagged retroactively on 2026-10-29):
createPresentationRequestno longer accepts thepurposeoption andRespondOutput.showUrlis gone (details in the next entry). Migration: drop the option; show the registration certificate'spurpose/purposeLocalizedthatcheckRegistrationCertsreturns. - OpenID conformance self-test, verifier plan round 1 (2026-10-27; OpenID4VP 1.0 §5.1, §8.2; SPEC-PROTO-0002 §3, §8.1). Two warnings in every module are fixed. verifier:
createPresentationRequestno longer writes apurposeparameter into the signed request object (not an OpenID4VP parameter; thepurposeoption is removed) — the purpose shown to the person is thepurposeof the registration certificate inverifier_info(ETSI TS 119 475 intended use) and the registered use in the trust list. wallet-core:checkRegistrationCerts/checkProximityRegistrationreturn the certificate'spurpose(English or first text) andpurposeLocalized(BCP 47 → text);respondno longer readsshow_url(RespondOutput.showUrlremoved). Tamga Verify: the direct_post response carries onlyredirect_uri(pluspass_grant/passfor access-pass policies, ADR-0012 B); on ACCEPTED the face-to-face check view key is part of that address (/p/{id}?st=…&show=…, valid 5 minutes after the result, then the address falls back to the status page; without the status token an old key gets 410). Tamga Wallet shows that address as the "Have it checked" QR.
0.7.2 — 2026-10-27
- verifier (2026-10-27; SPEC-CRED-0003 §9.1 / publishing rule T1, ADR-0036 K5 D): an external (federated) issuer's Status List has no anchor, so its address is now learned on first sight like an identifier list (
StatusCache.want; that verification is INDETERMINATE, later ones read the prefetched list) — previously it was never fetched. New explicit opt-inVerifyInput.statusFetchOnDemand(default off): a missing Status List on the issuer's declared status host is fetched during that verification (PrefetchStatusCache.fetchNow: same https / declared-host / public-IP / pinned-connection checks, time-boxed, not added to the prefetch set). Tamga Verify enables it only for the sandbox OpenID conformance self-test policy (oidf-selftest-eu-pid; the test tool serves a new list URL in every test and checks that it was fetched). Sandbox registry: the self-test LoTE (oidf-test-pid, sequence 2) lists the tool's PID signing certificate as the PID revocation service and the tool's host as the service supply point. - Tamga Verify (2026-10-26; ADR-0065, security review): gate terminals authenticate to
POST /terminal/verifywith an operator-issued terminal key bound to a terminal group (Authorization: Bearer tk_…); without a key the request gets 401 and the pass token is neither read nor consumed (a photographed single-use ticket QR can no longer be spent by a bystander). Admin endpoints/terminal/keys(issue once, list without hashes, revoke;terminal-keys.jsonstores SHA-256 only);TAMGA_VERIFY_TERMINAL_KEYSfor local/sandbox demo gates; the/terminalpage gets a key field (browser tab only). - Protocol review fixes (2026-10-24; SPEC-PROTO-0001 §2, §13, SPEC-PROTO-0002 §2, §10.1; ADR-0059 note). issuer:
authServerMetadata({ preAuthorized: false })— an authorization server without the pre-authorized grant advertises neither the grant, norpre-authorized_grant_anonymous_access_supported, nor thenoneauth method (the identity service uses it);issuerMetadata({ issuerDisplay })+issuerDisplayFrom— the issuer'sdisplaycomes from the trust-list record (legal_name,service_descriptionper BCP 47 locale) instead of the first credential type's name with a hard-codedtr-TR;tokenErrorResponsemapsoffer_used/offer_expired/ PIN failures to the standardinvalid_grant(reason inerror_description);dpopChallengebuilds theWWW-Authenticate: DPoP error=…, algs="ES256"header for 401 credential responses;distinctCnfKeyschecks PR6 per request (invalid_proof);redeemCoderejects a malformedcode_verifier(RFC 7636 §4.1, 43–128 chars) withinvalid_grant. sd-jwt / mdoc: status lists withbits4 or 8 are parsed on the read side (READ_STATUS_BITS,STATUS_LIST_CWT_READ_BITS); Tamga publishers still write only 1 or 2 (signStatusListTokenrefuses others);verifySdJwtVc({ allowMissingSdAlg })accepts a missing_sd_algas sha-256 and reportssdAlgPresent. verifier: a Tamga type without_sd_algis rejected at A4, external types may omit it; a status value outside 0/1/2 is INDETERMINATESTATUS_VALUE_UNKNOWN(not REJECTED);vp_formats_supportedlists only the formats used in the DCQL (vpFormatsFor); DCQL never carries an emptyclaimsarray (claimsis optional inDcqlQuery). wallet-core:declineRequestpostserror=access_denied+stateto theresponse_uriwhen the person declines (PV5; no reason). Tamga Verify:/vp/responseaccepts the OpenID4VP §8.4 error response (error+state) and closes the presentation without storing a reason; a presentation is consumed only after holder binding passes (A6 / Z1 / P1) — undecryptable bodies,statemismatch, emptyvp_tokenand A1–A6 failures leave it open, count as attempts (attempts,last_attemptin the pending status) and close it as REJECTED after 5; concurrent responses to one presentation are serialised. Conformance vectors: VERSION 7. - Security round (2026-10-24). wallet-core: the local-network exception for a presentation request's
response_uri(localhost / private IP without a matching SAN) is now off by default —verifyRequestObject/parseDcApiRequesttakeallowLocalDevHost: true, which a wallet passes only in a development build or on the sandbox network. Tamga Verify: every HTML page carries a Content-Security-Policy with a per-request nonce for its inline scripts (default-src 'self',frame-ancestors 'none',form-action 'self',base-uri 'self',object-src 'none'),X-Frame-Options: DENYandnosniff; styles keep'unsafe-inline'(inlinestyle=""attributes). Dependencies: fastify 5.12.7, fast-uri, zod 4.6.7, vitest 4.1.12 (npm auditclean). - Fixes after a code review of ADR-0059…0062. wallet-core:
startAuthorizedadds the ZK copy companion scope only when the authorization server lists it inscopes_supported(a server without it would reject the PAR); when a refresh or ZK copy binding ends withinvalid_grant,removedKeyRefsalso carries the binding's instance key unless the wallet's WIA or another binding still uses it (no orphaned keys);removeCredentialcomputes the keys in use once. issuer:createParaccepts a companion scope when the credential type comes fromauthorization_details(RFC 9396 §3.1). - ADR-0064 accepted (2026-10-23):
age_over_15in the identity credential. schemas: the identity credential and its ZK copy carryage_over_15next toage_over_18(ISO/IEC 18013-5age_over_NNpattern; the threshold set is closed, {15, 18}, and changes only by ADR); selectively disclosable, derived at issuance, not required. The Longfellow circuit proves equality, so the same circuit provesage_over_15 = true(end-to-end test with the desktop prover). Tamga Verify:age-over-15-mdocandage-over-15-zkpolicies, trust list scopesage-over-15-1andage-over-15-zk-1, a 15+ option on the browser test page. Credentials issued earlier get the attribute when they are issued again (no migration). - ADR-0063 accepted (2026-10-23): the on-chain status list registry accepts the list's own bit size.
StatusListRegistrytakesbitsPerEntry1, 2, 4 or 8 (IETF Token Status List) instead of always 2, so identity service lists (bits = 1, ADR-0048) can be anchored; the value is written once and emitted inListRegistered. trust-publisher:statusListRegistrationOfderives the registration parameters from a signed status list token. No production chain (local development and test only). - ADR-0062 accepted (2026-10-23): the ZK copy refresh token only when the ZK copy scope is requested. issuer
createPar({ allowedCompanionScopes })accepts a companion scope next to one credential type (ParRequest.companionScopes); wallet-corestartAuthorizedrequests the ZK copy scope with the identity credential when the issuer declares ZK copies (companionScopes). A refresh token is then for the scope it was granted for (RFC 6749 §6). - issuer:
issuerMetadatafollows OpenID4VCI 1.0 (Final) §12.2.4 — credential configurations carry their display only incredential_metadata.display(the legacy top-leveldisplayis gone) and display entries uselocale(the type metadata'slangis translated by the newcredentialDisplay). Wallet-core already readcredential_metadata.displayandlocale. Only the OpenID4VCI issuer metadata changes: SD-JWT VC Type Metadata (vct documents,display[].lang,claims[].display[].lang) and the credentials themselves keeplang, as SD-JWT VC defines. - ADR-0060 accepted (2026-10-22): refresh token bound to the client instance key. issuer
clientInstanceJkt(RFC 7638 thumbprint of the client attestation'scnf). wallet-core: refresh and ZK copy bindings keepinstanceKeyRef(the WIA key of the issuance);autoRefreshCredential/refreshZkCopiestakewuaForInstanceto get a fresh WIA for that key (wuaForBinding); the DPoP key may change on refresh (RFC 9449 §5, attestation-based client authentication §10.3).removeCredentialalso deletes the binding's key unless it is in use (instanceKeysInUse). - ADR-0061 accepted (2026-10-22): pseudonym seed as a separate credential configuration. wallet-core
obtainCredentialrequestsurn:tamga:id:PseudonymSeed:1with the same access token after the identity credential (single proof with the first copy's key) when the issuer declares it; the credential response no longer carries a non-standardpseudonym_seedfield. - ADR-0059 accepted (2026-10-21): several credential requests per access token. The access token can be used for more than one credential request within its lifetime (≤ 5 minutes), as OpenID4VCI 1.0 §8 allows and the EU reference issuer does: only the configuration the token covers, at most 10 copies per token in total (
MAX_COPIES_PER_ACCESS_TOKEN,withinAccessTokenAllowancein issuer), every request with the token's DPoP key. The ZK copy token and tickets stay one package. - issuer:
authServerMetadatanow publishesclient_attestation_signing_alg_values_supportedandclient_attestation_pop_signing_alg_values_supported(["ES256"]), which draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth-07 §10.1 requires whenevertoken_endpoint_auth_methods_supportedincludesattest_jwt_client_auth(OpenID conformance self-test, issuer metadata check). - issuer: DPoP binding at PAR (RFC 9449 §10).
createPartakesdpopJkt(thedpop_jktform parameter) anddpopProofJkt(the key of a verified DPoP proof on the PAR request); if both are present they must match (invalid_dpop_proof). The bound key is kept on the PAR record (ParRequest.dpopJkt) andredeemCode({ dpopJkt })refuses a token request signed with another DPoP key (invalid_grant). - issuer: new
checkParParams— a PAR body with a repeated parameter or arequest_uriis refused (invalid_request, RFC 9126 §2.1), and onlyresponse_type=codeis accepted (unsupported_response_type, FAPI 2.0). AplainPKCE method now answersinvalid_request(RFC 7636 §4.4.1) instead of the non-standardunsupported_code_challenge. - issuer: DPoP
htuis compared after RFC 3986 §6.2.2–6.2.3 normalisation (normalizeHtu: case of scheme and host, default port, query and fragment ignored; RFC 9449 §4.3).redeemCodeanswers a missingcode_verifierwithinvalid_grantand burns the code (OAuth 2.1 §4.1.3), and flags a reused code (reused: true) so the caller revokes tokens issued from it (RFC 6749 §4.1.2). - issuer: new
unlinkableTimeClaims(now, exp, { acceptableAt })andcertsValidAt— credentialiat/exp(and mdoc validity) rounded down to the hour so copies and verifiers cannot correlate them by the issuance instant (RFC 9901 §10.1);iatstays exact only when the rounded instant would precede the signing certificate or the issuer's listing.
0.7.1 — 2026-10-21
- Wallet side of ISO/IEC 18013-7 Annex C (
org-iso-mdoc) in wallet-core.parseDcApiRequestnow also accepts the browser'sorg-iso-mdocrequest (parseDcApiMdocRequest): it parsesDeviceRequest+EncryptionInfo, builds the SessionTranscript with thedcapihandover for the calling origin, and requires reader authentication (readerAuth) valid for that transcript — an unsigned request, or one signed for another origin, is refused (PV6). The reader certificate becomes the request'sx509_hashclient identifier, so the request goes through the samematchDcql→checkRp(approval, ADR-0056 K8) → registration certificate → disclosure policy path as OpenID4VP. The registration certificate travels inrequestInfo.euWrprc(CBOR,rc-wrp+cwt) and is bound to the reader certificate (checkRegistrationCerts; newhasRegistrationCert; ADR-0056 K10 still refuses a request without one).respondanswers with the selectively disclosed, device-signedDeviceResponse, HPKE-encrypted to the verifier (dcApiResponse, no POST). One document and one namespace per request (Tamga profile). mdoc:DeviceRequestversion1.1is read as well. - verifier: the Annex C request carries the relying party's registration certificate (
createMdocDcApiRequest({ registrationCwt }); the reference verifier reads the publisher's.cwtnext to the JWT). Interop tests: wallet-core ↔ verifier for both browser protocols, origin binding and single use. - Reference verifier: Digital Credentials API test page
/dc-api-test(sandbox only; the real network redirects to verify.sandbox.tamga.network/dc-api-test). It callsnavigator.credentials.getwithopenid4vp-v1-signed,org-iso-mdocor both, forwards the encrypted answer to the verifier and shows the outcome, the checks, the trace and (sandbox sample data only) the disclosed values; the page's server opens the request with an RP assertion like any relying party. A browser without the API gets a "not supported in this browser" message./sample-site/startacceptsdc_api_origin(only the site's own origin) and returns the DC API requests, so the sample site's "Share from this device" button works. - Per-site pseudonym bound to the registered domain (ADR-0031 K2). wallet-core
derivePseudonym/presentPseudonymnow refuse a site key that is a client identifier (x509_hash:…,x509_san_dns:…or any other prefixed value): the site is the relying party's registereddns_namefrom the trusted list, which wallets obtain withstableRpKeyaftercheckRp. A verifier's access certificate can be reissued (newclient_id) without changing anyone's pseudonym on that site; a test covers the whole path (signed request → registration → pseudonym) across a reissue with the same registration.recordPseudonymUserefreshes the stored value on every use. verifierverifyPseudonymrejects an expected site in client-identifier form. - ADR-0058 accepted (2026-10-21): access certificate profile (ETSI TS 119 411-8). The network's verifier access certificates (production and sandbox) were reissued with the same key:
CNis the trade name, the SAN carries the registered domain name, the support address and an organisational email. Theirclient_idchanged, their registration (dns_name) and the pseudonyms at those sites did not.pki-issue:--contact-uriis required for production access certificates, new--contact-email, and--key+--replacefor a same-key reissue. The publisher warns when an ACTIVE production verifier's certificate has no SAN contact. The identity service certificate getsorganizationIdentifierat the foundation handover (prepared, not done). - wallet-core:
ts8ReportAttachment(state, entry, lookup)— the machine-readable attachment for a report to a data protection authority (EU TS8, RPT_DPA_04): the reported request's single record in the TS10 transaction log format (claim names, never values), with the sametransactionIdentifieras ints10TransactionLog. pki-issue:--contact-uriwrites the relying party's support address into the access certificate's SAN and--service-idwrites a service identifier intoOU(ETSI TS 119 411-8 §6.6.1; ADR-0058, proposed). Both optional; a production access certificate without--contact-urigets a warning.- Wallet specification §5.4.1: item-by-item mapping of per-site pseudonyms to the EU pseudonym rules (ARF Topic 11, PA_01–PA_31), with the open points. ADR-0058 (proposed): access certificate profile and the timing of the identity service certificate change.
- Documentation in Azerbaijani: docs.tamga.network/az/ and arf.tamga.network/az/ (machine translation, awaiting a native speaker's review; every translated page carries a short notice). Generated pages (release notes, binding rules, packages, API reference) and the ARF change page are English only; their
/az/addresses link to the English page. - Institution onboarding: a new working example,
examples/05-institution-source— the institution's lookup endpoint for the hosted issuing service (it checks the signed request against the trust list: an agreed, ACTIVE relying-party record,aud, lifetime, single use; it returns only the fields the document type needs and never the national ID number). Tested against the hosted service end to end. - Example 02 (verify on your own server) now attaches the verifier's registration certificate to every request (
registrationScope, read fromtrust.tamga.network/wrprc/index.json); since 0.7.0 Tamga Wallet refuses requests without one. The "Verify on your server" guide has the same step. - Registry tool: a
REVOKEDentry is final and aRETIREDone can only becomeREVOKED(same rule as the registry contracts);ACTIVEis reached again only fromSUSPENDED.pki-issue --prodrequires--dnsand--org-idfor access certificates. - Institution source contract:
isced_f_codeis required (null means no mapping: no credential is issued, E11). - ADR-0057 (accepted 2026-10-20): in hosted issuance the institution's signing key stays with the institution; signatures are requested through the Cloud Signature Consortium API v2 with the digest only.
- Production trusted list: the network's own verifier (
verify.tamga.network) and identity service (tamga-id) now carry their registration data (the tax number of the provisional operator, markedprovisionaluntil the foundation is established; postal address; data protection authority complaint route), so registration certificates are published for them (trust.tamga.network/wrprc/). The verifier's access certificate was reissued with the same key and carriesorganizationIdentifier(ADR-0026 K3); itsclient_idchanged, its registration (dns_name) did not. Revoked records no longer produce registration-data warnings.
0.7.0 — 2026-10-20
Misuse-resistant package defaults (ADR-0056). Code written against 0.6.0 has to pass the new required security inputs (or an explicit "none"); see the breaking changes below.
Breaking changes — misuse-resistant defaults (ADR-0056)
A security input that affects the acceptance decision is now required; forgetting it is a rejection, and skipping a check deliberately is written explicitly as "none". No compatibility layer (development stage, ADR-0029).
sd-jwt:verifySdJwtVcrequiresrootCertsDer(trust anchors, or"none"to skip the chain check deliberately); an empty or missing value fails at A3.issuer:createParrequiresallowedRedirectUris; a client without registered redirect addresses is rejected (invalid_redirect_uri).trust/issuer/verifier:verifyWalletAttestation,verifyKeyAttestation(verifyKaProof,verifyAttestationProof) requirestatusOfandverifyPseudonymrequireswalletStatusOf(a status check, or"none"). New result fieldstatusChecked; a successfulPseudonymResultcarriesclientStatus.verifier:verifyPresentationrequiresrp(the relying party's registration,nullfor an unregistered party, or"none"to skip E3 deliberately); omission is rejected at E3.issuer:verifyDpopis replaced byverifyTokenDpop(token endpoint) andverifyResourceDpop(resource endpoints; access token and bound key required).sd-jwt:verifyStatusListToken,verifyStatusListCwtandverifyStatusListAnyrequire a fourth argument{ expectedSignerFingerprints }; an unexpected signer fails withD3before the signature check. The verifier pins the institution's registered status keys;WalletStatusCheckerpins the wallet provider keys of the trusted list.mdoc:verifyIssuerSignedreturnsvalid: falsewhen the MSO has no device key.wallet-core:respondrequires theapprovalthatcheckRpreturns for the same request (ApprovedRequest; bound toclient_id, nonce, response address/origin, signing certificate and intermediary). No approval for impersonation, an inactive registration or an unverified intermediary.verifier:PassRegistry.issue({ verified, … })takes the ACCEPTED output ofverifyPresentation(in-process registry); thepresentationinput is removed.wallet-core: a request without a registration certificate is rejected (registration_missing), remote and in proximity — the warning-until-2028 transition of ADR-0026 K5 is removed;WRPRC_REQUIRED_FROMand the time argument ofmissingRegistrationPolicyare removed. Wallet-to-wallet proximity is unchanged.verifier: E4 is inchecks_performedonly when anauditfunction was given; otherwise it is inchecks_skipped.core:EpochSeconds/EpochMilliswithepochSeconds,epochMillis,nowSeconds,nowMillis,secondsToMillis,millisToSeconds,secondsOrNow,millisOrNow(subpath@tamga-network/core/timefor React Native). Acceptance functions takenowin seconds; the wallet's registration certificate checks,checkRp, the disclosure policy and the verifier's scope helpers in milliseconds. The wrong unit is a compile error and aRangeErrorat run time.verifier/schemas: a credential without a status entry is rejected at D1 when its type uses a status list (usesStatusList).trust: rollback protection (TL2) is on by default — loads withoutversionMemoryuse an in-process memory per network and root fingerprints (versionMemory: "none"turns it off;resetDefaultListVersionMemoryfor tests).- Clock skew options (
maxSkewSec,clockSkewSec,maxClockSkewSec) are capped atMAX_CLOCK_SKEW_SEC= 600 s. - New:
isYes(output, claim)— reads a yes/no attribute safely (true only for an ACCEPTED result with the value exactlytrue). - Conformance vectors version 6: the status list vectors add an "unexpected signer" negative case; the runner pins the signer.
Trust list publisher (apps/trust-publisher)
Chain projection (ADR-0051, accepted 2026-10-19; off by default, no production chain exists):
npm run trust:chain-submitwrites only the digests of the signed trust lists (sha256(<file>.jws), version, previous digest, issue time) and of the anchor log's latest line to a trust list anchor registry contract;chain-checktells a verifier whether a list digest is anchored (YES/NO/UNKNOWN). The signed lists remain the source of truth: on conflict the list prevails and the chain answer is never required for verification. Feature flagTAMGA_CHAIN_ENABLED(default0): while off nothing connects to a chain;--dry-runprints the plan. An anchor counts only once the registry's confirmation threshold of distinct writers has submitted identical data (production threshold ≥ 2). New dependencyethers(app only, not in the published packages). The command ischain-submit, notchain-anchor: one writer's submission is a vote, and the name stays clear of the hourly anchor log commandtrust:anchor.Competing anchor candidates (ADR-0053): the first writer to open a list version can no longer lock it. When the registry holds a different, not yet confirmed digest for a version,
chain-submitnow submits its own verified digest as a competing candidate (decisionCONTEST, reported ascontestedwith a warning on stderr) instead of skipping it; the first candidate to reach the threshold wins and every conflict is an on-chain event. A confirmed different digest is stillCONFLICT(exit code 3).npm run trust:wallet-provider -- list|show|check|activate|suspend|revokemanageswallet_providers[]in the production and sandbox registries.activatechecks the provider's signing certificate against the wallet attestation policy (EC P-256, ecdsa-with-SHA256,digitalSignature, not a CA, within its validity) and the ETSI TS 119 412-6 §5 profile: the subject'sorganizationIdentifierequals the one derived from the entry'sidentifiers[](e.g.TR-VKN→VATTR-…) and the qcStatements carry the QcTypeid-etsi-qct-wal.checkruns the same checks without writing (signing key rollover).Tamga Wallet's provider
TAMGA-WP-1isACTIVEin the production and the sandbox trust lists (certificatewallet-provider-tamga-wp-1).
Packages
sd-jwt:verifySdJwtVcoptionskipValidityPeriod— skips A7 (exp/nbf) for proofs of possession that are not acceptance decisions (the identity service's erasure request accepts an expired credential, whose record is still held).issuer:redeemCoderejects a request without a code, or a PAR that has no code yet, as an unknown code (invalid_grant).wallet-core: fixedwiaRevokedByList— the "entry beyond the list" bound assumed 2-bit status lists; on a 1-bit list a revoked WIA entry in the upper half of the last bytes read as "not revoked". The bound now follows the list'sbits(newwiaRevokedInList).wallet-core: proximity presentation (presentProximity) and the wallet-to-wallet holder (presentToPerson) no longer offer a suspended credential — the same rule as the remote presentation (matchDcql).verifier: documented that the mdoc A3 step anchors thex5chainleaf directly (anchor itself or signed by the anchor; no intermediates) — conformant with ISO/IEC 18013-5 Annex B (document signer issued directly by the IACA). SPEC-API-0001 A3 row.- Misuse guards (security review 2026-10-19). Checks that compared against an expected value now fail when the expected value is empty or missing instead of comparing against it:
sd-jwtverifySdJwtVcwith a KB-JWT (expectedaud/nonce),issuerverifyProofJwt(credential_issuer/c_nonce),verifyKaProofandverifyAttestationProof(nonce),verifyDpopwithjkt: ""(a token record without its bound key),verifierpass-key proof andverifyPseudonym.verifierverifyPresentationreturns INDETERMINATE at T0 when the policy's freshness limits are missing or not finite non-negative numbers (ormax_clock_skew_sec> 600) — before, a missing limit silently disabled the trust-list and status token age checks.allowLocalIssuerUrlscompares the host name exactly (http://localhost.example.orgis not local).wallet-coremissingRegistrationPolicythrows when given seconds instead of milliseconds (with seconds the 2028 rejection date was never reached). Reported steps match what ran:verifySdJwtVclists A6 only when a KB-JWT was verified, andverifyIssuedSdJwtlists B4 only when the catalogue knows the type.
Reference verifier (apps/verify)
- Fixed: the scope check E3 now uses the registration of the relying party that opened the presentation. Before, a presentation opened on behalf of another relying party was checked against the verifier's own (wider) registration, so a wallet that disclosed more than asked could pass that party an attribute outside its registered scope (ADR-0017 K7/HV6, AP6).
- The control view key (
?show=) is compared in constant time. - Rate limits no longer share one bucket behind the reverse proxy (which does not pass client addresses): opening a presentation counts against the authenticated relying party's own bucket (unauthenticated requests share one), and the wallet response endpoints (
/vp/response,/vp/dc-mdoc/:id) count per presentation after the cheap lookups. Before, one client within the proxy's per-address allowance could exhaust the shared bucket and block every relying party. - Fixed: sign-in with a site pseudonym now checks that the wallet unit is not revoked (the WIA's
client_statuslist, signed by a wallet provider in the trusted list), as ADR-0031 PS5 requires. Before, the hosted verifier checked the WIA's signature but not its revocation, so a wallet unit closed after a lost phone could still sign in to sites.
Documents
- ADR-0056 (accepted 2026-10-19): misuse-resistant package defaults (above). ADR-0026 K5: a request without a registration certificate is rejected from today (the transition until 2028-08-11 is removed). SPEC-API-0001: E3 needs the RP registration (
"none"skips), E4 only with an audit sink, D1 rejects a missing status entry for status-list types, D3 pins the signer; SPEC-CRED-0003 signer pinning; SPEC-PROTO-0001 PAR allowlist and the two DPoP functions; SPEC-PROTO-0002 / SPEC-WALLET-0001 wallet approval and registration rule. Tamga ARF RB-WP-19 updated. - ADR-0052 (accepted 2026-10-19): Besu 25.6.0 removed onchain permissioning and Tessera privacy, so the chain stage uses Besu local permissioning — a
permissions_config.toml(node and account allowlists) on every node, derived from the on-chain contract state, identical on all validators and checked for drift; a node's JSON-RPC endpoint is never exposed to the internet (reverse proxy with mTLS). The onchain permissioning contract assumption is removed from the chain-stage documents. - Status list verification step Ş5 and verification step D4:
ttlis a refresh hint; the token stays usable untilexpand the policy'smax_status_token_age_sec(as in §8.1 and in the code). PR13: a redirect address outside the allowlist is rejected withinvalid_request(RFC 9126 §2.1), as the services answer.
Fixed before release (code review 2026-10-20)
verifier:verifyPresentationwithrp: null(unregistered relying party) is now always rejected at E3, as SPEC-API-0001 specifies. Before, a presentation that disclosed no claims passed E3 with an unregistered party (an empty scope has no overrun).wallet-core/trust:TrustPins.versionMemorycarries a persistent "last seen" list version memory (TL2) to every helper that loads the trusted list (fetchTrustSource,fetchRpRecord,fetchRegistrarKeys, the issuer directory). Without it the rollback protection is in-process only and resets when the app restarts.@tamga-network/trust/corenow exportsListVersionMemory,ListMarkandMemoryListVersionMemory.
0.6.0 — 2026-10-13
EU alignment (ADR-0048, ADR-0049, ADR-0026 K5, EU TS9, ISO/IEC 18013-7 Annex C). Credentials issued with earlier packages — identity credentials and diplomas — have to be issued again (new status lists; the diploma's Type Metadata changed, ADR-0029).
sd-jwt,mdoc: status lists with 1 or 2 bits per entry (the identity service publishesbits = 1, institutionsbits = 2); the CWT form of the same list (application/statuslist+cwt) for mdoc copies;verifyStatusListAny.schemas:suspension_allowed(diploma only); the verifier rejects a suspension value in a type without suspension.mdoc: reader authentication (signReaderAuth,verifyReaderAuth),requestInfowith the CBOR registration certificate (euWrprc), the EU TS9 presentation offer, status-onlyDeviceResponse, HPKE and ISO/IEC 18013-7 Annex C.verifier,apps/verify: browser verification through the Digital Credentials API by default (Annex C for Apple WebKit, QR as a fallback on desktop); the cross-device and the DC API requests are separate objects with their own keys.wallet-core: a request without a registration certificate carries a warning and defaults to "don't share" (refused after 2028-08-11); proximity readers are verified against the trust list's anchors (readerTrust, breaking); wallet-to-wallet presentations follow the TS9 offer; new log events and log retention.trust:walletProviderListingfor the "Listed on Tamga Network" indicator (ADR-0049).issuer:keyStorageStatuspolicy for key attestations.- Conformance vectors version 5 (status lists in JWT and CWT).
0.5.2 — 2026-10-13
Security fixes and EU format alignment (0.5.1 was not published). Breaking: registrationCert (one per request) and the wallet attestation result (clientStatus).
- Security: an embedded disclosure policy is evaluated only when the access certificate is anchored in the trust list; trust anchors may be certificates (
TrustAnchor); status list fetching only overhttps, on hosts the issuer declares, never to private addresses, redirects re-checked and connections pinned (SSRF, DNS rebinding); external issuers' identifier list hosts come from the external list or the document signer certificate. - EU format:
iatin the request object header and the chain without the root (TS 119 472-2); one registration certificate per request; every OAuth client attestation (draft -07) is read as a wallet instance attestation;vc+sd-jwtaccepted for external types; DCQLtrusted_authoritieswithetsi_tl. - Hardening: wallet status lists under 10,000 entries are refused (CIR 2026/1731).
- Fixes: wallet-to-wallet revocation checks have three outcomes; mdoc clock tolerance only at
validFrom; an unreadable mdocstatusentry invalidates the credential; the revocation maintenance period is compared with a tolerance.
0.5.0 — 2026-10-12
- Embedded disclosure policy (ADR-0046):
core/disclosure-policy, published by the issuer in its metadata, stored and evaluated offline bywallet-core; never sent to the verifier. - Issuer preferences for wallet attestations (EU ARF WUA_05a, WUA_32, ISSU_12c):
issuerAttestationPrefs,capToRevocationMaintenance. - EU trusted lists in the XML format (ETSI TS 119 612):
readTrustedListXmlwith platform-independent XMLDSig; externaletsi-tl-xmllists also in the wallet. New dependency@xmldom/xmldom. - Attestation Revocation List (identifier list, CWT) verified in step D and in the wallet.
- Wallet-to-wallet protocol in
wallet-core; the registration certificate carriesservice_id; optionalrevocation_policy_urifor institutions (ADR-0047).
0.4.0 — 2026-10-12
- Identity credential attribute names follow the EU PID encoding (ADR-0045):
birthdate,nationalities[](SD-JWT VC);birth_date,nationality(mdoc). Newcore/pidsubpath. - Zero-knowledge presentations only with the short-lived ZK copy
urn:tamga:id:ShortLivedIdentityAttestation:1(≤ 24 hours, no revocation entry, refreshed bywallet-core; ADR-0044). mdocverifyIssuerSigned({ clockSkewSec });issuerissuerMetadata({ mdocConfigurations }).
0.3.1 — 2026-10-09
sd-jwt: a status list token is valid until itsexpplus the policy's maximum age (the 6-hour outage buffer of the network's lists);signStatusListToken({ expSec }).verifier: a missingaccept_unrevocable_zkmeansfalse.wallet-core: oninvalid_noncethe wallet fetches a fresh nonce and retries once.
0.3.0 — 2026-10-09
Alignment with OpenID4VCI 1.0 Final, OpenID4VP 1.0 and HAIP 1.0: key attestation typ key-attestation+jwt; the nonce only from the nonce endpoint; no notification_id; OpenID4VCI 1.0 error codes; SD-JWT disclosure serialisation as specified.
0.2.0 — 2026-10-08
The nine packages as a set: core, trust, schemas, sd-jwt, mdoc, issuer (+ /client), verifier (+ /web, /zk), wallet-core, zk (wallet-side Longfellow ZK prover: /node, /react-native).
0.1.0 — 2026-09-28
First publication of the package names on npm.
Documentation 1.0.0 — 2026-10-16
The current state of the documentation set; changes before the public announcement are made in this release.
- Tamga ARF 1.0 (arf.tamga.network, English and Turkish): the main document; Annex A — Trust Framework; Annex B — Tamga Rulebook; Annex C — the Education, Identity, Event Ticket and Contact Rulebooks in the EU Attestation Rulebook template; Annex D — Definitions; Annex E — References; the Revocation Policy and the Wallet Attestation Policy (mapped to ETSI TS 119 471); Reading path, Roles and Onboarding.
- Developer documentation (docs.tamga.network, English and Turkish): guides (including the sandbox), concepts, specifications, decision records ADR-0001 … ADR-0050, the API reference generated from the OpenAPI files, and a glossary.
- Services: trust lists (
trust.tamga.network), the reference verifier Tamga Verify (verify.tamga.network) and the sandbox test network (sandbox.tamga.network). The network operates no wallet (ADR-0042); it lists wallet providers, and Tamga Wallet's provider is listed asACTIVE.