In short
A verifier carries two certificates in the network: the access certificate (X.509), which shows who it is, and the registration certificate, which shows what it may request. The registration certificate had a revocation list (ADR-0068); the access certificate did not. When a verifier was suspended, the Tamga wallet recognised it from the signed list and refused it, but an EU wallet that checks the certificate only through the X.509 path would still have seen the certificate as valid. With this decision a standard revocation list (CRL) is published for access certificates, and the certificate enters that list at the moment of suspension, revocation or expiry of the registration.
Context
- EU rule. ETSI TS 119 411-8 V1.1.1 §6.3.9: the access certificate provider monitors the verifier's registration and revokes the access certificate when the registration is suspended or revoked (REV-6.3.9-02/03/04). Revocation status information and the CRL profile are tied to EN 319 411-1 (REV-6.3.9-01, CSS-6.6.2-01). The text of EN 319 411-1 is not in the library; the periods below were chosen below the known upper limits.
- RFC 5280. CRL v2 (§5),
nextUpdatemandatory in this profile (§5.1.2.5), the Authority Key Identifier (§5.2.1) and CRL Number (§5.2.3) extensions, a reasonCode per entry (§5.3.1). The CRL is signed by the authority that issued the certificate; another signer is possible only with an indirect CRL (cRLIssuer+indirectCRL), and support for it in validators is weak. The certificate points to the CRL's location with the CRL Distribution Points extension (§4.2.1.13). - EU alignment round (2026-11-15, recommendation 4; KA-411-8-1). The EU reference wallet library performs PKIX revocation checking on the access certificate; since our certificate shows no revocation path, it either cannot be checked at all or (in strict mode) may be refused.
- Today. Access certificates are issued directly by the offline root (ADR-0058); the root's key is only in the operator's secret folder, not on the server. The verifier's status (
ACTIVE/SUSPENDED/REVOKED/RETIRED) is in the signed list; the Tamga wallet core matches the leaf that signs the request with the fingerprint in the list and refuses a registration that is not active. The registration certificate is revoked in the status list on suspension and revocation under ADR-0068 K4. - Direction of project management. CRL was chosen as the revocation path (not OCSP); the publication address will be a path under the existing trust list domain without opening a new subdomain; the names are approved separately.
Decision
K1 — Scope: which certificate is revoked through which path
| Certificate | Format | Revocation path |
|---|---|---|
| Access certificate (WRPAC) | X.509 | CRL (this decision) |
| Registration certificate (WRPRC) | JWT / CWT (ETSI TS 119 475) | Token Status List (ADR-0068) — unchanged |
| Credential issuer certificate | X.509 | organisation status in the signed list (C1/C2); outside the scope of this decision |
Each certificate type has a single revocation path. The CRL carries only X.509 serial numbers; the registration certificate does not enter the CRL. When a verifier is suspended, two things happen in the same publication: its registration certificates are revoked in the status list and its access certificate in the CRL. The trigger is one (the status change in the registry); the outputs are separate.
K2 — Access certificate authority
- The CRL is signed by the authority that issued the certificate (direct CRL). Since the root stays offline, access certificates are issued by the access certificate authority (
access-ca-1): a root-signed intermediate authority; basicConstraints CA, path length 0 (critical); keyUsage keyCertSign + cRLSign (critical); SKI; AKI = the root's SKI; its own CRL distribution point is the root's CRL. It issues only access certificates. - The authority's key is held by the list publisher, under the same protection as the registrar key. The root key does not go to the publisher.
- The root's own CRL (covering intermediate authorities and, during the transition, the access certificates issued directly by the root) is signed on the computer where the root is kept (
ops/gen-pki.ts --root-crl);nextUpdateat most 365 days; it is re-signed at once when an intermediate authority or an access certificate issued by the root is revoked. The publisher checks this copy (authority signature, issuer name, validity period, required serial numbers) and publishes it; it raises an alarm on a missing or expired copy. - Transition: today's access certificates issued directly by the root are covered by the root's CRL until they expire or are renewed; on renewal they are issued by the access certificate authority (renewal with the same key as in ADR-0058;
client_idchanges, the persistent identitydns_namedoes not — ADR-0034, ADR-0075). Thex5cof the request object carries the intermediate authority after the leaf (root excluded).
K3 — Address and distribution point
- The address is at the publication root, without a new subdomain:
<trust list domain>/crl/<authority>.crl. Real networkhttps://trust.tamga.network/crl/access-ca-1.crland…/crl/root-ca.crl; sandboxhttps://trust.sandbox.tamga.network/crl/…. - Format DER, response type
application/pkix-crl(RFC 2585), public, CORS open. - Every access certificate and the access certificate authority's certificate carry a non-critical CRL Distribution Points extension (2.5.29.31) with a single distribution point pointing to the issuer's CRL (no
cRLIssuerand noreasons). - The configuration is in the registry at
national_lists[].roles.access_ca.crl(issuers[{ca, uri}]); it is an internal setting of the publisher and is not written to the LOTL. Without the configuration no CRL is produced.
K4 — CRL profile and freshness
- v2, ES256 (ecdsa-with-SHA256), issuer = the authority's subject name (byte for byte identical), AKI = the authority's SKI, CRLNumber (monotonically increasing per authority), a reasonCode per entry.
- The CRL of the authority whose key is held by the publisher is re-signed at every publication and every hourly heartbeat;
nextUpdate=thisUpdate+ 24 hours. So even if the publisher stops for a day, the CRL appears expired (a validator does not accept it as valid with stale information). - The state persists in the publication folder (
access-crl-state.json: CRL number per authority, certificates seen, revocations; no personal data). If the file is lost, the state is rebuilt from the published CRL (the revocations are signed in the CRL itself).
K5 — Revocation triggers
| Event | reasonCode |
|---|---|
The verifier's registration was suspended (SUSPENDED) or revoked (REVOKED) | privilegeWithdrawn (9) |
The registration ended (RETIRED) | cessationOfOperation (5) |
| The access certificate was removed from the registration (replaced by a new one) and has not expired | superseded (4) |
Manual revocation (crl-revoke; e.g. key compromised) | keyCompromise (1), affiliationChanged (3), superseded, cessationOfOperation, privilegeWithdrawn |
- Revocation is automatic and in the same publication (REV-6.3.9-04). A revoked certificate is never removed from the list.
- A manual revocation request is authenticated through the path in ADR-0068 K4 (the registrar, the verifier itself or a competent public authority, REV-6.2.4-02/03); the serial number, domain name and reason code are written to the public changelog, no person's name.
K6 — Permanent revocation for suspension (no certificateHold)
- The access certificate of a suspended registration is permanently revoked; RFC 5280's reversible
certificateHoldreason is not used. When the registration becomes active again, the verifier is issued a new access certificate (possibly the same key, a new serial number). - An active (
ACTIVE) registration cannot point to a revoked access certificate: in that case the publisher stops the publication before the list is signed.
K7 — Who checks
- The Tamga wallet core and verifier do not fetch the CRL. They take trust in the access certificate from the registration in the signed list (fingerprint + status); the CRL is produced from the same registry state and carries no new information. A second check adds a network request, latency and a "which verifier is being talked to" leak, with no security gain.
- The CRL is for EU wallets and PKIX validators: a wallet that checks the access certificate only through the X.509 chain sees the suspended verifier in the CRL.
- In the verification pipeline the CRL/OCSP step for the credential issuer certificate (A3c) is skipped as today (the credential issuer's status is in the list).
K8 — Rollout
- Sandbox: the access certificate authority, the configuration, the CRL and the nginx response type from today (once the authority's key is loaded on the sandbox server, the CRL is signed there); new access certificates are issued by the authority.
- Real network: the authority certificate is issued at the root ceremony, its key is placed in the publisher, the root's CRL is signed, the access certificate of the network's own verifier is renewed from the authority and the configuration is added — after the path names are approved. Until the configuration is added, the real network's publication does not change.
Options considered
| Option | Result | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| OCSP | rejected | Requires a permanently online responder and signing key; tells the server which certificate is asked about at every check (privacy); EU wallets read CRLs too |
| Today's path (only dropping from the list) + justification | rejected | REV-6.3.9-04 requires revocation of the certificate; a wallet following the X.509 path cannot see the suspension |
| CRL signed directly by the root, ceremony only | rejected | Immediate revocation on suspension would need an offline ceremony each time; the "same publication" rule cannot be kept |
| Indirect CRL or a separate CRL signer (same name, another key) | rejected | Exists in RFC 5280, but support in validators is weak and inconsistent; interoperability risk |
certificateHold for suspension | rejected | Reversible revocation; many validators either do not process it at all or treat it as permanent revocation; ETSI and ADR-0068 say revoke on suspension |
| CRL checking in the Tamga wallet as well | rejected | The same information is in the signed list; a double check adds a network request and a leak |
| Online access certificate authority + direct CRL, 24 hours + the root's yearly CRL | chosen | Standard PKI arrangement (offline root, online issuing authority); suspension in the same publication; no extra protocol |
Invariants
| Code | Rule |
|---|---|
| AR1 | When a verifier's registration is suspended, revoked or ended, its access certificate enters the CRL in the same publication; permanent revocation is used for suspension too (no certificateHold), and a revoked certificate is never removed from the list. |
| AR2 | An access certificate issued after this decision carries a CRL Distribution Points extension pointing to the issuer's CRL; the online authority's CRL is re-signed at least every 24 hours (nextUpdate ≤ 24 hours). |
| AR3 | An active verifier registration cannot point to a revoked access certificate; in that case the publisher stops the publication before the list is signed. |
| AR4 | A registration certificate does not enter the CRL; each certificate type has a single revocation path (access certificate: CRL; registration certificate: the ADR-0068 status list). |
| AR5 | The Tamga wallet core and verifier take trust in the access certificate from the signed list; the CRL is not an additional or alternative source of trust for them. |
Consequences
apps/trust-publisher:src/access-crl.ts(revocation plan, CRL signature and check, state recovery), wiring intobuildandheartbeat,crl-status,crl-revoke;roles.access_ca.crlis in the TL11 allow list and is not written to the LOTL.ops/gen-pki.ts:access-ca-1(development and sandbox), CRL distribution point in access certificates,--root-crl.ops/pki-issue.ts:--ca,--crl-uri(mandatory for access certificates on the real network), the intermediate authority's certificate<name>.chain.pem.- Operator:
/crl/(application/pkix-crl) in the nginxtrust.*blocks. - Documents: SPEC-TRUST-0001 §2 and the release note.
- The real network steps are in K8; the path names (
/crl/,access-ca-1.crl,root-ca.crl) and the authority's subject name await approval.
Status
Accepted — 2026-11-15 (approval by project management; the verbatim quotation is in the private approval record). DECISIONS: D-REG-5. AR1–AR5 are binding. In force in the sandbox; on the real network once the path names are approved (K8).